The Yale Leibniz

Confessio philosophi

Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671–1678

G. W. Leibniz

Translated by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.

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Daniel Garber and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.

General Editors

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G. W. Leibniz

Confessio philosophi

Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671–1678

Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction

by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.

Additional Contributions from

Brandon Look and James Stam

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To David, Stephen, and Joanne

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Preface

This volume has been a long time coming. It began in a Latin reading group, connected with a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar in 1981, at the conclusion of which James Stam and I agreed to translate the *Confessio philosophi* and associated texts into English. James Stam produced early drafts of the *Confessio philosophi* as well as other pieces. Brandon Look was invited into the project to translate the rather difficult German of "Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen." He is responsible for that translation; I am responsible for everything else in its final form—the other translations, the annotations, the introduction, and the index.

I acknowledge with gratitude the aid of numerous scholars, including Robert Adams, Richard T. W. Arthur, Todd Bates, Jonathan Bennett, Andrew Black, David Blumenfeld, Michael Cavatorta, Daniel Cohen, Jan Cover, Jack Davidson, Michael Getzinger, Sean Greenberg, Michael Griffin, Jack Hanson, Nicholas Jolley, Sven Knebel, Mark Kulstad, Ingrid Marchlewitz, Christia Mercer, Michael Murray, Alan Nelson, Hilary Nobel, Harry Parkinson, Walter Ratjen, Donald Rutherford, Reginald Savage, Maria-Brigitte Schröder, Brian Skelly, and Eric Wielenberg. I am especially grateful to Robert Adams, Harry Parkinson, and Donald Rutherford for detailed suggestions that significantly improved the translation of the *Confessio philosophi.*

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Herbert Breger, director of the Leibniz-Archiv in the Niedersäschsische Landesbibliothek, in Hannover, provided me with a copy of the handwritten version of the *Confessio philosophi,* for which I am grateful. I also thank Anke Hölzer of the Handschriftenabteilung for her help in this regard. Heinrich Schepers, and his successor as director of the Leibniz-Forschungsstelle in Münster, Thomas Leinkauf, provided support.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Division of Research Programs of the National Endowment for the Humanities, which provided me with a translation grant for the summers of 1994 and 1995.

Finally, I am indebted to Susan Laity of Yale University Press for her patient, expert editing of a difficult manuscript.

Abbreviations

A = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe,* ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt: Akademie-Verlag, 1923–). Cited by series, volume, and page number; or by series, volume, and piece number.

AG = *Leibniz: Philosophical Essays,* ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).

C = *Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz,* ed. Louis Couturat (Paris: Alcan, 1903; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966).

Causa Dei = *G. W. Leibniz, Causa Dei,* trans. Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker, in *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). Cited by section number.

Commentary on Burnet = Leibniz's commentary on article 17, "On Predestination and Election," of Gilbert Burnet, *An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England* (London, 1699), found in LH I XVIII. Cited by Burnet's section number and Leibniz's annotation letter.

DSR = *G. W. Leibniz, De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675–1676,* ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

DM = *G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics,* trans. Peter G. Lucas and Leslie Grint (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961). Cited by section number.

Foucher de Careil = *Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz,* ed. L. A. Foucher de Careil (Paris: Durand, 1857; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1975).

G = *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz,* 7 vols., ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–90; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965). Cited by volume and page, e.g., G.vi.264.

GM = *Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften,* 7 vols., ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Asher and Schmidt, 1849–63; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1963). Cited by volume and page, e.g., GM.ii.231.

Grua = *G. W. Leibniz, Textes inédits,* 2 vols., ed. Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948; reprint ed. New York: Garland, 1985).

Guhrauer = G. E. Guhrauer, *Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz. Eine Biographie* (Breslau: Hirt, 1842; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966).

Huggard = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy,* ed. A. Farrer and trans. E. M. Huggard (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985). Cited by page number.

JUL = Gaston Grua, *Jurisprudence universelle et théodicée selon Leibniz* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953; reprint ed. New York: Garland, 1985).

L = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters,* 2d ed., ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969).

LA = *The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence,* ed. and trans. H. T. Mason (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967). Cited by page number, e.g., Gii:56.

LB = Eduard Bodemann, *Der Briefwechsel des Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover* (Hanover, 1889; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966).

LC = *Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,* trans. H. G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956). Cited by page number, e.g., Gvii:389.

LH = Eduard Bodemann, *Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover* (Hanover, 1895; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966).

Monadology = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Monadology,* trans. in AG. Cited by section number.

NE = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding,* ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Cited by page number, e.g., A VI.vi:181.

P = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Logical Papers,* ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966).

PNG = *G. W. Leibniz, Principes de la nature et de la grace fondes en raison/Principes de la philosophie ou Mondadologie,* ed. Andre Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954). Cited by section number. A translation can be found in AG.

PW = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings,* ed. and trans. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson (London: Dent, 1973).

T = G. W. Leibniz, *Essais de Théodicée: Sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal* (Amsterdam: Isaac Troyel, 1710). Cited by section number. A translation can be found in Huggard.

WF = *Leibniz's "New System" and Associated Contemporary Texts,* ed. and trans. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).

A Note on the Texts, Translations, and Methods of Citation

The standard edition of Leibniz's work is the edition being prepared by the Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, under the title *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Samtliche Schriften und Briefe* (referred to hereafter as the Akademie edition). The first volume of this monumental undertaking appeared in 1923; it is an ongoing project whose completion lies in the distant future. Leibniz's philosophical writings constitute series 6 of the Akademie edition; his philosophical correspondence, series 2. Currently, only one volume of the philosophical correspondence has appeared, hereafter referred to by the notation "A II.i," covering 1663 through 1685. ("A" refers to the Akademie edition, "II" to series 2, and "i" to volume 1 of series 2. So the notation "A II.i:117–18" refers to pages 117 through 118 of volume 1 of series 2 of the Akademie edition—the location of the letter to Magnus Wedderkopf, as it turns out.) Some references to the Akademie edition are to piece number. Thus "A II.i N60" also refers to Leibniz's letter to Wedderkopf. Five volumes of the philosophical writings have appeared, hereafter referred to, respectively, as "A VI.i," "A VI.ii," "A VI.iii," "A VI.iv," and "A VI.vi." (Volume 5 has not yet been published.) The first four of these volumes collectively cover the period 1663 through mid-1690, while the fifth, A VI.vi, contains the "Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain" (NE), written between 1703 and 1705, and short pieces relevant thereto. All dates have been converted from the Julian calendar used by Leibniz to the current Gregorian calendar.

With one exception, the original-language texts presented are those of the Akademie edition, and various typographical features used in that edition are noted in the text. Variants of the text cited in the Akademie edition are not included; philosophically significant variants are annotated. Where it seems instructive to note that a passage was added by Leibniz to a predecessor version, that passage is enclosed ⟨in angle brackets⟩. The one text that is not taken from the Akademie edition is "Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen," which is presented in Fraktur in the Akademie edition. For ease of printing we have utilized a Roman version prepared by Beth Moore, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

The original version of the *Confessio* is typically referred to as "LH I 3, 5 Bl 1–22." Let's decode that. Leibniz's papers were catalogued by Eduard Bodemann, a librarian in Hannover, beginning in 1863. In 1889 Bodemann published a catalogue of Leibniz's handwritten work under the

title *Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover.* This work has been reprinted by Olms (Hildesheim, 1966). The Royal Public Library at Hannover is now the Lower-Saxony State Library (Die Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek). So "LH" stands for "Leibniz-Handschriften," that is, Leibniz's handwritten work. The "I" refers to the first series in Bodemann's catalogue (the theological work); "3" for volume three; "5" for the fifth subsection of volume 3; and "Bl 1–22" for the first twenty-two sheets catalogued in subsection 5. It should be noted that "Die Leibniz-Handschriften" (Leibniz's handwritten work) refers to handwritten material of which Leibniz is the author; it does not imply that the work is in Leibniz's handwriting. And, indeed, the *Confessio* is written in the hand of various secretaries to Leibniz with corrections in Leibniz's own hand. Undoubtedly there once was (perhaps still is, in some attic) an original in Leibniz's own hand, but it has not been found.

LH I 3, 5 Bl 6 (recto)–22 constitutes a manuscript of the entire *Confessio.* It is designated L^A. LH I 3, 5 Bl 1–6 (verso) constitutes a revised version of the last quarter of the *Confessio.* It is designated L^B. Where the revised version (L^B) contains philosophically significant variation from the original (L^A) I mention this in the notes.

The *Confessio philosophi* first appeared in print in a volume edited by Ivan Jagodinsky under the title *Leibnitiana inedita "Confessio philosophi"* (Kazan, 1915). Subsequently, Yvon Belaval prepared an edition (with a French translation) under the title *G. W. Leibniz, "Confessio philosophi"—La Profession de foi du philosophe* (Paris: Vrin, 1961). A revised version was published in Paris in 1970. Otto Saame prepared an edition (with a German translation) under the title *G. W. Leibniz: "Confessio philosophi"* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967, reprinted with minor changes in 1994), based on a careful study of the handwritten manuscripts. It is to Saame that we owe the identification of the author of the objections, written in the margins. I owe much more than that to Saame. I have often turned to his translation in time of trouble; his scholarship has guided my own. I also acknowledge indebtedness to Yvon Belaval's translation and to Ezequiel de Olaso, whose scholarship and translation served me well—see "La profesión de se del filósofo," pages 96–144 of G. W. Leibniz, *Escritos Filosoficos* (Buenos Aires, 1982); and to Francesco Piro—see his translation *"Confessio philosophi" e altri scritti* (Naples, 1992); and to Concha Roldán Panadero and Roberto Rodriguez Aramayo—see their translations in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Escritos en Torno a la Liberatad Elazar y el Destino* (Madrid, 1990).

My aim has been to produce a translation that hews closely to the text

and yet is readable. It will be obvious to anyone comparing translation to text that I have not been inhibited by Leibniz's sentence structure or punctuation in my efforts to make the translation readable. There are a number of passages in the texts where I do not grasp the philosophical point Leibniz intended to make—and the text seems to me enigmatic. My hope is that the translation is both accurate and, where relevant, equally enigmatic. Matching the original enigma for enigma is perhaps the hardest row a translator has to hoe.

There are two types of annotations in this book. Marginalia and the like (usually Leibniz's) are presented as footnotes to the text, numbered sequentially with the prefix "L", as "L1", etc. Editorial annotations are given as endnotes.

All passages quoted in the introduction and annotations are presented in English, followed by a reference to a source containing the passage in the original language. In the case of reference to material written by Leibniz, citation is to the Akademie edition wherever possible. In the case of material not yet available in the Akademie edition, citation is to a standard published source or via Bodemann catalogue number. Leibniz's original titles for the pieces in this volume appear in quotations in the table of contents. Elsewhere, I have generally left titles of works by authors other than Leibniz untranslated but translated titles of works by Leibniz into English, with some exceptions, e.g., *Confessio, Causa Dei, De summa rerum,* and *De affectibus*—the first three because the pieces are well known under those titles, the latter because any translation I have tried has generated disputes that I can do without. (For the translation in this volume of the *Confessio,* however, I have translated the title.) Except for the best known of Leibniz's works my policy has been to cite the original language title in full, followed by my translation. Subsequent citations employ the English title.

Introduction

1. Evil and Theodicy

In his introduction to *Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin,* Norman Powell Williams wrote, "The problem of evil is at once the most momentous, most terrible, and most intractable question which has ever vexed the thoughts of man."[1] Some might wish to champion the cause of other vexatious problems, but there is no doubt that efforts to solve, dissolve, or otherwise defang the problem of evil have occupied philosophers and theologians throughout much of the history of Western thought.

In its most general form the problem of evil concerns the question of the consistency of the existence of evil in the created world with the characteristics attributed by theists to its creator; specifically, his moral perfection, holiness, justice, wisdom, and power. Leibniz concerned himself with this general problem of evil throughout his career, culminating in the only philosophical book he published in his lifetime, the *Theodicy,* but he also concentrated on specific problems arising from the apparent incompatibility of various attributes usually ascribed to God with the nature of the world. Four special cases were of particular concern to him. First was a threat to God's holiness because of his apparent *moral concurrence in sin:* he does not prevent sin it is in his power to prevent. Second was a threat to God's holiness generated by Leibniz's acceptance of the thesis that *God physically concurs* in all actions of his creatures, including those that are sinful—that is, God causally contributes to each sinful act in such fashion that, had he not so contributed, the sinful action would not have occurred. Third was a threat to God's justice arising from the combination of the thesis that God metes out punishment—indeed, eternal damnation—for a sinful life with the thesis that God exercises complete providential control over his creation, including, of course, sinners. Fourth was a threat to God's justice arising from the combination of the thesis that salvation is ultimately a matter of the bestowal of divine grace with the thesis that such bestowal is gratuitous, that is, utterly independent of the merits of those on whom grace is bestowed.

Late in his career Leibniz coined the term *théodicée* to refer to problems of this ilk—problems that concern the justification of the ways of God with respect to the creation. We may follow his lead and term these problems theodicean.

2. The *Confessio* and Related Texts

The centerpiece of this volume is Leibniz's *Confessio philosophi,* a discussion of theodicean problems presented in dialogue form, which Leib-

niz wrote sometime in the fall of 1672 or winter of 1672–73, according to the estimate of the editors of the Akademie edition. In the *Confessio philosophi,* Leibniz aimed to resolve various theodicean problems he had previously raised, for the most part without resolution, in the work "Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen" (On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man), written in 1671. And in the *Confessio philosophi,* Leibniz aimed to provide resolutions less strident than those contained in his letter of May 1671 to Magnus Wedderkopf. Hence, we precede the translation of the *Confessio* with translations of the letter to Wedderkopf and "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God." This latter piece is one of a number of essays Leibniz wrote between 1668 and 1672 as contributions to the program of *The Catholic Demonstrations,* an outline of which occurs in the standard edition (A VI.i:494–500) under the title "Demonstrationum Catholicarum Conspectus" (Conspectus of Catholic Demonstrations).

As outlined in the conspectus, the *Catholic Demonstrations* were to be divided into four parts. Part I, "Demonstration of the Existence of God," would contain discussions of topics probed in the pieces in this volume: the principle of sufficient reason and the doctrine that divine conservation amounts to continued creation. Part II was entitled "Demonstration of the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul" and Part III "Demonstration of the Possibility of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith." Part III was to contain chapters on other topics probed in this volume: divine omniscience, including a criticism of the doctrine of middle knowledge; divine omnipotence, including criticisms of Hobbes and Wycliff; the nature of freedom and of divine obligation; the respective causal contributions of God and humans to the occurrence of evil and, especially, sin; the doctrine of original sin; and the respective natures of mortal and venial sin. Part IV was entitled "Demonstration of the Authority of the Catholic Church and of Scripture."

It must be remembered that Leibniz was a Lutheran. During his lifetime various incentives for converting to Catholicism were presented to him; there was no conversion. Still, the project of laying the philosophical foundations for church reunion—reunion among Calvinists and Lutherans on the Protestant side and, ultimately, reunion of Protestants with Catholics—remained a priority for Leibniz throughout his life.[2] The *Catholic Demonstrations* were intended as a contribution to that project. Since the pieces in this volume may be viewed as providing content for some of the subjects included in the "Conspectus of Catholic Demonstrations," they too may be seen as contributions to the reunion project. But

they are more than that. They focus on the problem of evil and kindred topics, that is, human freedom and divine middle knowledge. The problem of evil is an equal-opportunity dilemma; that is, every orthodox version of Christianity—every version of Christianity that holds that God is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, the creator, and providential, and yet holds that there is sin—is faced with a set of problems generated by these doctrines. In the early going, including the *Confessio philosophi,* Leibniz aimed to solve the relevant problems and let the reunion chips fall where they might. By contrast, in Leibniz's mature published work on this topic, the *Theodicy,* the diplomatic purposes of church reconciliation are more evident. There is a reticence, an eye to diplomatic concerns, in many of Leibniz's mature works on theodicean topics, not to be found in the early work gathered here. Thus it is hard to find mature writings that match the stridency with which Leibniz expressed his attitude toward what he took to be a standard scholastic effort at resolving the problem of the author of sin. In his paper "The Author of Sin" (included in this volume) Leibniz wrote, "To say that God is not the author of sin because he is not the author of a privation, although he can be called the author of everything that is real and positive in sin—that is a manifest illusion. It is a leftover from the visionary philosophy of the past; it is a subterfuge with which a reasonable person will not be satisfied."

As noted, the *Confessio philosophi* is a dialogue. Leibniz wrote little of his philosophical work in dialogue form, and that is something for which to be grateful. Still, as dialogues go, it is extraordinary, particularly with respect to the power and resilience of the interlocutor, the Theologian, who is given the role of formulating objections to the proposals put forth by Leibniz's spokesman, the Philosopher.

These pieces were all written between 1671 and 1673. The remaining essays were written in 1677 and 1678, with the exception of "On Free Choice," which may have been written as late as 1681. Again, with the same exception, they have an established connection with Nicolaus Steno, the Apostolic Vicar to Hannover from the fall of 1677 to the spring of 1680.[3] "Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom" is a record of a conversation between Leibniz and Steno that occurred, according to Leibniz's notation, on 7 December 1677, on topics related to the *Confessio philosophi.* "Middle Knowledge," "On the Necessity of Choosing the Best," and "A Demonstration That God Understands All Possibles" may have been written by Leibniz for Steno. In any case, copies were found among Steno's papers by his later editors. There is an intimate connection between Steno and the *Confessio philosophi.* Leibniz's original handwrit-

ten draft of the *Confessio* has not been found, but there was a version written in the hands of secretaries with corrections in Leibniz's hand, along with objections to some of the doctrines of the *Confessio* located in the margins in another hand, and replies in Leibniz's hand. Ivan Jagodinsky, an early editor of the *Confessio,* surmised that the objections were written by Antoine Arnauld; Yvon Belaval believed that the objections may have belonged to Simon Foucher. Otto Saame, whose edition (and translation into German) of the *Confessio* is an extraordinary work of scholarship, established through painstaking comparisons of handwriting that Steno was the author of the objections.

Nicolaus Steno served in Hannover as Apostolic Vicar during a time of intense reunion activity centered at the court of Hannover. Steno was a convert to Catholicism who before his conversion had made important contributions to anatomy and geology. Leibniz's opinion of Steno, first as anatomist and geologist and then as a theologian, is stated rather bluntly in *Theodicy* 100, where he wrote, "He was a great anatomist, and well versed in the knowledge of nature, but unfortunately, he abandoned its study, and from being a great physicist he became a mediocre theologian."

Leibniz expressed essentially the same judgment in a letter to Hermann Conring in January 1678 (A II.i:385). By that time Leibniz had conversed with Steno on matters of philosophical theology and had studied some of Steno's written contributions to theology. So Leibniz had a basis for formulating his judgment of Steno's abilities. I am in no position to dispute his judgment, but I do find Leibniz's withering critical comments in response to Steno's objections in the margins of the *Confessio philosophi* excessive and undeserved. Surely some of Steno's remarks are lackadaisical, and are even expressed in lackadaisical Latin. But some are worthy of serious consideration, even if they are not ultimately decisive. In my opinion, some of Steno's objections are on target; moreover, I believe that Leibniz subsequently came to have reservations about aspects of the position elaborated in the *Confessio* analogous to those of Steno.

The handwritten manuscript, both the material in the hands of various secretaries and Leibniz's corrections, is relatively easy to read (as these things go). There are a few places (noted in my annotations) where the manuscript is torn and guesses have had to be made. Fortunately, the tears are not located in the immediate neighborhood of any heavy-duty philosophy. The handwritten manuscript also contains two titles for portions of the text. At A VI.iii:118 Leibniz inserted the following title in the margin—"Fragmentum dialogi de humana libertate et justitia Dei" (Fragment of a Dialogue Concerning Human Freedom and the Justice of God).

And at A VI.iii:140–41, at the top of the manuscript containing the revised version of the last quarter of the *Confessio,* Leibniz wrote this title: "Fragmentum colloquii inter Theophilum et Epistemonem de justitia Dei circa praedestinationem aliisque ad hoc argumentum spectantibus" (Fragment of a Discussion Between Theophil and Epistemon Concerning the Justice of God with Regard to Predestination and Other Aspects of This Problem). It is reasonable to suppose that these titles were inserted on occasions when Leibniz had thoughts of publishing the *Confessio,* or portions thereof. This raises a question about what Leibniz did with the *Confessio.* One thing we know is that he did not publish it.

The editors of the *Confessio* for the Akademie edition estimate that the handwritten version recorded at LH I 3,5 was written while Leibniz was in Paris—in the fall of 1672 or the winter of 1672–73. In the introduction to A VI.iii the editors speculate that a piece entitled "Meditation vom freien Willen des Menschen" (Meditation on the Free Will of Man), which Leibniz mentioned in a letter of 1671 to Johann Friedrich, may have been an early draft of a portion of the *Confessio.*[4] Unfortunately, this piece, like Leibniz's original handwritten draft, has not been found. In the preface to the *Theodicy,* Leibniz wrote that around 1673 he gave Arnauld a dialogue that he had written in Latin; Leibniz noted that in it he held that God chose the most perfect of all possible worlds and that God had permitted sin because it is contained in the best possible world (Gvi:43 [Huggard 67]). Leibniz made the same affirmation at paragraph 211 of the *Theodicy.* In a letter to Nicolas de Malebranche of 22 June 1679, Leibniz recalled showing a small dialogue to Arnauld and Gilles des Billettes, in which he claimed to locate the proper conception of freedom. And in another letter to Malebranche (27 December 1694), Leibniz noted that while in Paris he had shown Arnauld a dialogue in Latin on freedom.[5] It is a reasonable hypothesis, but by no means certain, that all these references are to the *Confessio* or, more likely, to drafts of parts of it.

There are other uncertainties worth noting with respect to the text of the *Confessio.* The editors of A VI.iii have estimated that the second version, covering the last quarter of the *Confessio,* was written in 1677–78. Assuming Leibniz's own dating is correct, we know that the "Conversation with Steno" occurred late in 1677. We can presume that Steno's reading of the *Confessio,* with criticisms written in the margins, took place about the same time. So we have three items of interest occurring in late 1677 and early 1678—Leibniz's drafting of a new version of the last quarter of the *Confessio,* Steno's appending criticisms in the margin of the *Confessio,* and a meeting between Leibniz and Steno on the topics of the *Confessio,*

which Leibniz then summarized in the "Conversation with Steno." What is the chronological order of these events? Steno's marginal criticisms are not contained in the second version of the last quarter of the *Confessio*—some evidence, but not much, that it was drafted after Steno's critical reading. Unfortunately, we lack a basis for assigning an order. Moreover, we do not have a firm basis for determining just when Leibniz made various changes to the main text. Some of this ignorance bears on our understanding of the development of Leibniz's thought on these matters.

Like the *Confessio,* none of the remaining items has appeared in a published English translation with the exception of the letter of 1671 to Wedderkopf, which is translated in *Philosophical Papers and Letters* (L 146–47). "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man" is the only work contained in this volume that is written in Leibniz's native German. Most of Leibniz's philosophical work was written in Latin or French. If "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God" is a fair sample of what Leibniz would have produced had he written his philosophy in German, we can only be thankful that he didn't. The piece is written in a flowery style, and it lacks Leibniz's usual precision, making up for this with uncharacteristic bombast. Perhaps some measure of Leibniz's usual precision is a byproduct of his writing philosophy in languages foreign to him, i.e., Latin and French. If so, we should all write in Latin.

3. Modality

I begin by considering what I will call the "per se modalities," a topic introduced in the *Confessio* in response to the Theologian's criticism of Leibniz's effort to solve the problem of the author of sin. The Theologian asked the Philosopher to consider the following argument:

> (i) The existence of God is necessary; (ii) the sins included in the series of things follows from this; (iii) Whatever follows from something necessary is itself necessary. Therefore, (iv) sins are necessary.

Surely the Theologian's point is this: the argument is valid, but its conclusion, (iv), is heretical, hence, unacceptable. However, (i) is a basic truth of philosophical theology, and (iii) is a basic truth of modal logic. So (ii) must be rejected. But (ii) is a consequence of essential aspects of Leibniz's scheme in the *Confessio* to resolve the problem of the author of sin. So much the worse for Leibniz's proposed solution.

Leibniz responded in the original draft of the *Confessio* as follows: "It is false that whatever follows from something necessary is itself necessary." In so doing he clearly intended to deny (iii) of the Theologian's argument.

This appears to constitute a flat-out denial of the following principle of modal logic:

(1) If a conditional is necessarily true, and its antecedent is necessarily true, then its consequent is also necessarily true.

It is natural to suppose that Leibniz came to think better of denying (1). In any case he subsequently emended his original draft so that the final version reads as follows, "It is false that whatever follows from something necessary in itself (per se) is itself necessary in itself (per se)." Leibniz thereby explicitly introduced the per se modalities into the discussion. Subsequently, the per se modalities came to play an important, perhaps crucial, role in his efforts to support freedom, divine and human. Here in the *Confessio,* Leibniz seems to have used the per se modalities to ward off the dreaded doctrine of necessitarianism, which we might formulate as follows:

(2) For any proposition *p,* if *p* is true then *p* is necessarily true.

Note that the argument the Theologian presented may be generalized so that necessitarianism is its conclusion. Not just the sins included in the series of things follow from the existence of God, according to doctrines Leibniz advocated in the *Confessio;* any state of affairs that actually obtains does so.

I shall first discuss the per se modalities and then consider the use to which Leibniz put them in the *Confessio.* In an important text written in 1675—that is, between the original version of the *Confessio* and this emendation—Leibniz wrote, "Impossibility is a twofold concept: that which does not have an *essence,* and that which does not have *existence,* i.e., that which neither was nor will be because it is incompatible with God" (A VI.iii:463). Here we have the distinction between per se impossibility (no essence) and ordinary, metaphysical impossibility (no existence because incompatible with God). Interestingly, in the same text Leibniz wrote, "Whatever is incompatible with what is necessary is impossible" (A VI.iii:464). This is tantamount to affirming (1). In so doing Leibniz must have had the ordinary, metaphysical modalities in mind, not the per se modalities.

Using the text noted above and others of the same time period as our guide we can characterize per se possibility thus: a state of affairs is per se possible just in cases where it is metaphysically possible in the ordinary sense that it obtains or, if it is not metaphysically possible in the ordinary sense then the impossibility of its obtaining does not result from an in-

compatibility among its internal, intrinsic features but rather from an incompatibility between those features and some other state of affairs that obtains of necessity.[6] As an illustration consider the following example, which Leibniz employed in the "Conversation with Steno":

(3) There is someone who is innocent, who will be damned eternally.

Leibniz thought that there are necessary truths concerning God and his justice which, when joined with (3), imply a formal contradiction. But absent references to God and his justice, there is no such proof of impossibility. So he concluded that (3), although metaphysically impossible in the ordinary sense, is nonetheless per se possible. Leibniz's idea is that its impossibility does not result from its intrinsic features but from its relations (albeit, necessary relations) to a being (albeit, a necessary being) extrinsic to it.

How did Leibniz intend to use the distinction between the ordinary metaphysical modalities and the per se modalities to avoid the criticism contained in the argument presented by the Theologian (in either the form actually presented or the generalized form where necessitarianism is the conclusion)? Consider the following:

(1′) If a conditional is necessarily true, and its antecedent is per se necessarily true, then its consequent is per se necessarily true.

And

(2′) For any proposition *p,* if *p* is true then *p* is per se necessarily true.

Leibniz noted that (1′) is worthy of rejection. So, if (iii) of the original argument is read as (1′), then the Theologian's reasoning fails to show that (ii), to which Leibniz was committed, is the culprit. Put this way, the response the Theologian ought to have made sticks out like a sore thumb: Leibniz's move shows that he is not committed to (2′) but now that he recognizes that (1), unlike (1′), *is* acceptable, he is well and truly stuck with (2), which is heretical and, hence, unacceptable. So he had better renounce those aspects of his account that led him to (ii). In other words, the Theologian ought to have responded that Leibniz's modal distinctions simply lack relevance to the Theologian's main point of criticism.

How might Leibniz respond? There is very little room to maneuver here. Apparently, he would have to argue that (2′), rather than (2), formulates the thesis that is heretical, unacceptable, indeed, dreaded, while (2), contrary to our initial, uncritical reaction, is actually innocent. No ques-

tion that Leibniz saw (2′) as heretical and unacceptable. Perhaps during the period in which he wrote the texts in this volume, Leibniz saw (2) as innocent, although there is scant textual evidence to sustain that claim. In any case, I do not believe that in his philosophical maturity Leibniz saw (2) as innocent. In a number of texts from later periods in his career Leibniz wrestled with an argument in favor of necessitarianism, i.e., (2), that we may summarize as follows:

> (a) Because of various attributes God necessarily has, God necessarily chooses to create the best possible world; (b) whatever possible world is the best, is so necessarily; therefore, (c) whatever states of affairs obtain do so necessarily.

In these texts Leibniz considered denying (a) and he considered denying (b). He never suggested accepting (c), taking the bite out of it by noting that the necessity recorded in (c) is not per se and hence not really threatening. So I incline toward the view that in his philosophical maturity Leibniz did not regard the per se modalities as a viable weapon in the war against necessitarianism, although he did regard them as crucial to defending freedom, especially divine freedom.

My confidence concerning Leibniz's ultimate attitude toward the relation of the per se modalities to unacceptable necessitarianism, though moderate, exceeds my confidence concerning what Leibniz was up to in the revised version of the *Confessio* on the same score. I am inclined to think that Leibniz may have come close to conflating the per se modalities and the ordinary metaphysical modalities in the original draft. Because of the 1675 paper from *De summa rerum,* we have good reason to believe that Leibniz was fully aware of the relevant distinction when he revised the original draft. Consider the following passage Leibniz added to the original text, "For in this place we call *necessary* only what is necessary *per se*" (A VI.iii:128). I believe that Leibniz was calling our attention to the fact that in the original text the modalities employed were the per se modalities. In that case, in the original text Leibniz did not deny (1), except nominally, taking it to be equivalent to (1′). I see the revised text as introducing the *terminology* of the per se modalities; the concepts were in place in the original version. If so, when Leibniz revised the text, he must have been aware that problems remained with respect to avoiding commitment to (2).

4. The Author of Sin

The intent of the Theologian's argument was to derive an unacceptable conclusion from essential aspects of Leibniz's proposed solution to the

problem of the author of sin, joined with premises that the Theologian assumed Leibniz would accept. In this section I comment on various aspects of Leibniz's treatment of the problem of the author of sin exemplified in texts in this volume, concluding with a discussion of the purported solution offered in the *Confessio philosophi.*

In paragraph 15 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man," Leibniz formulated an argument for consideration and subsequent rebuttal:

> (A) He who knowingly permits sin, creates all the opportunities for sin, and brings it about that the agent can do it, indeed, even provokes the will of the agent itself, and brings it about that he wants to do it—while he could hinder the sin, indeed, could refrain from creating the opportunities and provoking the will—is to be considered the author of sin.
> (B) God does such a thing, as has been shown.
> (C) Therefore he is to be considered the author of sin.

Basically, Leibniz construed the problem of the author of sin to consist in locating what is wrong with this argument and with others that reach the same conclusion from similar premises. In this formalization from "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," Leibniz combined considerations from two theodicean problems that he often treated separately. Both considerations aim to establish that God is related to sin in ways inconsistent with his holiness. One bears on God's causal activity with respect to sin, the other on the lack thereof. The latter is intended to establish that God *morally concurs* in sin, the former that God *physically concurs* in sin. The standard argument in favor of the thesis that God morally concurs in sin in a fashion that is inconsistent with his holiness is this: with respect to any sin that occurs, God knows that it will occur unless he intervenes to prevent it, and he knows that he has the power to do so. Plainly, for each sin that does occur, God did not intervene to prevent it. But, so the argument goes, any agent who knows that he can intervene to prevent sin, and knows that sin will occur unless he intervenes, and does not intervene, is morally culpable for the occurrence of that sin. Hence, God is culpable for the occurrence of sin, even if he merely permits it.

The other consideration aims to show that God is more intimately involved in the production of sin; he does not merely stand by and permit it. Leibniz accepted orthodox theses concerning the utter dependence of creatures on their creator. Thus, Leibniz held that when a created agent acts, not only does that agent owe its creation, its conservation, and its

ability to act to God but, in addition, the very action of the agent requires God's *physical concurrence*—a divine causal contribution to the action—with the result that the action is God's action as well as the creature's.

In the argument quoted from paragraph 15 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," Leibniz aimed to capture a problem with which philosophers and theologians had wrestled for centuries. There was a standard solution attributed to those termed "the scholastics" by Leibniz and some of his contemporaries such as Hobbes, that was subject to some efforts at rebuttal and much ridicule. We need to outline the rudiments of "the scholastic" solution. Since versions extant in Leibniz's time were variants of theses of Thomas Aquinas, we should go to the source. According to Aquinas, God has a will concerning everything that occurs in the created world, but in some cases, sin included, God's will is merely permissive.[7] In numerous texts, Aquinas wrote critically about the principle employed in our gloss on the argument of paragraph 15, namely, if an agent knows that he can prevent sin, and knows that sin will occur unless he prevents it, and fails to prevent it, then that agent is morally culpable for the occurrence of that sin. As it stands this principle won't do. Suppose that there are two states of affairs, A and B, each sinful, each preventable by me, each about to occur if I fail to intervene, and all this is known to me. I intervene and prevent the occurrence of B but not A. I could not prevent *both* A and B from occurring, and all this is known to me. Of course my powers are vastly limited compared to those of an omnipotent being. Still, the example shows that the principle employed in the gloss on the argument of paragraph 15 won't do. In various texts Aquinas aimed first to formulate a correct principle connecting failure to prevent a sin from occurring (permission of sin) with moral culpability on the part of the one who permits, and second to show that given the correct principle and a proper understanding of God, God is never morally culpable for the sins he permits.[8]

We need not concern ourselves with Aquinas's effort to formulate the relevant principle. Those who rejected the scholastic solution, including Hobbes and Leibniz in the period that concerns us, argued that the solution proposed by the scholastics concerning God's *physical concurrence* in sin precluded the scholastic solution concerning God's alleged *moral concurrence* in sin. The idea of the criticism is this: the scholastic account of God's physical concurrence in sin, indeed, in every created state of affairs, employs the notion of divine productive will so as to eliminate the possibility of a divine will that is merely permissive. Hence, the scholastics' efforts to show that God is not morally culpable in permitting sin are inconsistent with their account of God's physical concurrence in sin.

Once again, we can utilize the writings of Aquinas. And we can grasp the fine line he meant to draw by contrasting his negative answer to the question whether God is the cause of sin with his affirmative answer to the question of whether the act of sin is from God.[9] The following passage from Aquinas's *De potentia* expresses the theory that is alleged to support this distinction in a manner that resonated with seventeenth-century scholastics: "In an act of sin whatever there is of being or action is reduced to God as its first cause; what there is of deformity is reduced to free choice [of a creature] as its cause."[10]

In this theory, evil in general, and sin in particular, is treated as a privation, a deformity, a lack of being; God is held to be the first cause of what is positive—what there is "of being"—in the sinful state of affairs, whereas the free choice of the sinner is held causally (and morally) responsible for the privation, the deformity that constitutes the sinfulness of the state of affairs. God is said merely to permit this aspect of the relevant action. This is the theory Leibniz ridiculed in paragraph 18 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God" and in the passage quoted from "The Author of Sin" in section 2 of this introduction, calling it "a manifest illusion," "a leftover from the visionary philosophy of the past," "a subterfuge with which a reasonable person will not be satisfied." In "The Author of Sin," Leibniz was prepared to accept a distinction between the natural components of an action and its moral aspect. And he did not ridicule, or even deny, the thesis that evil in general, and sin in particular, is a privation, a lack of being. What he ridiculed was the use to which the scholastics put these considerations.

The idea of the criticism seems to be that if you admit that God causally contributes to every natural component of an action, then you cannot absolve him from making a causal contribution to its moral aspect, hence, in relevant cases, to its sinfulness. Leibniz apparently assumed that the moral features of an action supervene on its natural features and do so in a manner that is necessary. Hence, whoever shares responsibility for the natural features on which a moral feature supervenes shares responsibility for that moral feature.

In "The Author of Sin" and "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," Leibniz criticized the scholastic account without providing an alternative solution to the problem of the author of sin. There is a rudimentary alternative suggested in the letter to Wedderkopf; Leibniz offered a full-blown alternative in the *Confessio philosophi.* Let us look at each, beginning with the letter to Wedderkopf, where Leibniz's strategy appears to consist in admitting that God is the author of sin while attempting to defang that conclusion of unwanted implications about God's holiness.

In the letter to Wedderkopf, Leibniz employed three principles concerning the relation of the divine will to the obtaining of various created states of affairs. By "created states of affairs" I mean states that would not have obtained had God created nothing at all.

> *First.* If God is omniscient, then for any created state of affairs ϕ that obtains, God decrees concerning ϕ's obtaining.
>
> *Second.* If God is omniscient, then for any created state of affairs ϕ that obtains, God decrees that ϕ obtains.
>
> *Third.* If God is omnipotent, then for any possible state of affairs ϕ, if God decrees that ϕ obtains, then ϕ obtains.

Surely Leibniz meant here, as elsewhere, to affirm that God is both omniscient and omnipotent. Hence, Leibniz seems to have been prepared to reach the conclusion that for any created state of affairs ϕ that obtains, God decrees that ϕ obtains; hence, God, through his omnipotence, is the author of ϕ's obtaining. Leibniz reinforced his point by claiming that God is never "purely permissive," that his decrees are "absolute." In so saying Leibniz meant to preclude various moves his predecessors had made in order to block the transition from the first principle to the second. The standard move, cast in appropriate terminology, goes as follows: True, God decrees concerning every created state of affairs that obtains, but in some cases his decree is purely permissive. That is, in some cases God does not decree that ϕ obtains, thereby bringing it about that ϕ obtains; rather, God decrees to *permit* ϕ to obtain, for example, as the result of the free exercise of some created agent's will. Since sins occur only by some agent's free act of will, and since God cannot sin, this strategy was designed with sin in mind: each sinful state of affairs that obtains is such that, although God decrees concerning it, he simply decrees to permit it to obtain, thereby avoiding being the author of its obtaining—thereby avoiding being the author of sin.

But doesn't Leibniz's thesis that each state of affairs that obtains is such that God decrees that it obtains lead to unacceptable theodicean conclusions? Leibniz thought not when he wrote to Wedderkopf. I think that a crucial element in his thinking is the supposition that a state of affairs ϕ is absolutely evil only if, were ϕ to obtain, then the best possible world would not obtain. Leibniz employed this notion of absolute evil in the "Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom." And it also seems clear to me that as early as the letter to Wedderkopf and "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God" Leibniz was committed to the thesis that God creates the best possible world. Given this commitment, plus the gloss on "absolutely evil," Leibniz could conclude, as he did (see A II.i:118, the

Letter to Wedderkopf), that no state of affairs that does obtain is absolutely evil.

What alleged solution, then, to the problem of the author of sin can we extract from the letter to Wedderkopf? Apparently this: True, for any sinful state of affairs ϕ that obtains, God decrees that ϕ obtains. That is, God causally contributes to ϕ's obtaining by an exercise of his productive will; the distinction between productive and merely permissive willing is eschewed. So God is the author of sin. Still, God's holiness is not thereby besmirched because although ϕ is sinful, it is not absolutely evil. Leibniz made no effort in the letter to Wedderkopf to justify his assumption that if a state of affairs ϕ is sinful but not absolutely evil, then God is not morally culpable for causing it to obtain. Leibniz may well have had some version of the "greater-good" defense in mind: an agent is not morally culpable for permitting (indeed, actually causing) the occurrence of some evil state of affairs ϕ if there is some state of affairs ψ such that the joint occurrence of ϕ and ψ exceeds in value the nonoccurrence of both and if the agent cannot bring about the occurrence of ψ without bringing about the occurrence of ϕ. If my gloss on Leibniz's use of the expression "absolutely evil" is correct, then we may explain Leibniz's strategy here as follows. Take any sinful state of affairs ϕ that actually obtains. Had God not caused ϕ to obtain then he would not have produced the best possible world. Now we engage the greater-good defense. For each sinful state of affairs ϕ that obtains, the greater good that excuses God will be the same, i.e., ψ will take as value the best possible world in each case.

And Leibniz might well have bolstered his use of the greater-good defense by noting that it seems to be the defense Aquinas employed in *De veritate* Q 5, a. 5, ad 3, to explain why God's permission of sin does not have the consequence that God morally concurs in sin. Aquinas wrote, "God loves a thing more, if it is a greater good. Hence, He wills the presence of a greater good more than the absence of a lesser evil. . . . Hence, in order that a greater good may be elicited, He permits some persons to fall even into the evil of sin."

No doubt Aquinas would have responded that his position retains an advantage over Leibniz's because it does not have the unacceptable consequence that God is a cause of sin, as does Leibniz's position. We already know Leibniz's response to that: Aquinas's alleged advantage is based on "a manifest illusion," "a subterfuge," "a leftover from the visionary philosophy of the past."

Leibniz's criticisms of this alleged subterfuge may be found in section 18 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God." In section 19 Leib-

niz considered an alternate scholastic strategy that centered around an incompatibilist, fully libertarian account of free choice in creatures. Leibniz construed this theory, which he often attributed to Luis de Molina and Molina's teacher Pedro da Fonseca, as postulating that human beings function as first causes with respect to their free choices. He argued, as did many scholastics, that this theory is inconsistent with God's nature as first cause. And in any case, an incompatibilist, libertarian account of free choice seems incompatible with the rigorous determinism Leibniz maintains in section 17. After clearing away what he took to be the scholastic debris in sections 18 and 19, Leibniz seemed poised to offer his own remedy to the problem in section 20. However, section 20, in its entirety, reads as follows:

> Damit wir aber
> [But we]

And there the manuscript breaks off. *Confessio philosophi* may be viewed as containing its conclusion. I turn to it.

There is something like a general picture of God's relation to sin that Leibniz intended to offer in the *Confessio.* Aspects of the general picture were constants in Leibniz's thinking about the problem of evil. The general picture is this: a most harmonious possible world, i.e., a best possible world, exists, but which possible world is the most harmonious is not under God's voluntary control. However, which possible world obtains *is* under God's voluntary control. Fortunately, because of his supreme wisdom, God has chosen to create the most harmonious world; unfortunately, it is not possible for it to obtain without precisely those sins that do obtain; hence, God has permitted those sins to obtain, although he is not the author of their obtaining. He is not the author of sin because the ultimate source of sin is the divine intellect, which is not subject to divine control; the ultimate source of sin is not the divine will, at least some actions of which are free, hence, under divine control. A major project of the *Confessio* is an effort involving a somewhat complicated discussion of divine causation aimed at establishing just this: that the ultimate source of sin is not the divine will but rather the divine intellect. We might have expected Leibniz to employ some version of the greater-good defense at this point—the defense that seems presupposed in the letter to Wedderkopf. But that is not the central strategy invoked. In various texts written in his philosophical maturity, Leibniz argued that an agent's causal contribution to sin cannot be justified simply because the obtaining of the sin is required in order to bring about a greater good.[11] In what follows I consider aspects of Leib-

niz's struggle with the problem of the author of sin in the *Confessio.* I do not offer a detailed, systematic interpretation of relevant aspects of the *Confessio.* Rather, I kick up dust that any adequate interpretation needs to settle.[12]

Let α be any sinful state of affairs that obtains. Leibniz set out in the *Confessio* to establish the following:

(I) God is the ultimate ground of α's obtaining.

And

(II) God is not the author of α's obtaining.

In the *Confessio,* Leibniz appears to have held that there are just two causal mechanisms by which God brings about the obtaining of states of affairs—his understanding and his will. While it is reasonably clear that Leibniz took these two modes of operation to be exhaustive of God's modes of causal operation, it is less clear whether he took them to be exclusive. More on this point in what follows.

In order to establish (I), Leibniz needed to show that God is the cause of α's obtaining either via his understanding or via his will. However, were God the cause of α's obtaining via his will, then (II) would be false according to the definition of "is the author of" that Leibniz advanced earlier. So Leibniz was committed to the following:

(III) God is the cause of α's obtaining via his understanding.

And

(IV) God is not the cause of α's obtaining via his will.

And, indeed, that is exactly what Leibniz asserted at A VI.iii:121: "Sins are not due to the divine will but rather to the divine understanding."

The plot thickens when we probe what Leibniz meant by these claims and how he supported them. Consider, first, the notion of divine causation via the divine understanding. It was a standard position, well known to Leibniz, that necessary truths are grounded in, hence, in a sense, caused to obtain by, the divine understanding.[13] And, indeed, in numerous passages Leibniz asserted just this. Moreover, an initial reading of Leibniz's remarks at A VI.iii:121–22 might suggest that he was committed to this doctrine in the *Confesssio.* This would lead us to attribute the following to Leibniz:

(V) God is the cause of α's obtaining via his understanding if, and only if, necessarily, if God exists then α obtains.

We must bear in mind, as noted in the previous section, that the basic tenor of the *Confessio* seems to support ascribing the following to Leibniz:

(VI) For any state of affairs α that obtains, necessarily, if God exists then α obtains.

Putting (V) and (VI) together, we reach the conclusion that in the *Confessio* Leibniz was committed to the thesis that every state of affairs that obtains is caused to obtain by the divine understanding. Since Leibniz clearly held that some states of affairs are caused to obtain by the divine will, we would reach the conclusion that Leibniz did not consider the two modes of divine causation mutually exclusive. In itself, that consequence does not appear troublesome. But troubles loom when we look carefully at the examples Leibniz utilized at A VI.iii:121 and 122 when discussing causation by the divine understanding. Bearing in mind the distinction between the unqualified modalities and the per se modalities, we may be inclined to suppose that (V) should be replaced by the following:

(VII) God is the cause of α's obtaining via his understanding if, and only if, it is per se necessary that α obtain.

Since Leibniz held that some states of affairs obtain whose obtaining is not per se necessary (V) and (VII) cannot both be correct. Surely a point of Leibniz's discussion at A VI.iii:127–28 is to avoid commitment to the thesis that the sins that obtain do so with per se necessity. So the difference between (V) and (VII) matters to our project of trying to understand Leibniz's solution in the *Confessio* to the problem of the author of sin. If we assume that Leibniz was committed in the *Confessio* to (VII) rather than (V), then there would be a serious problem concerning the sins that obtain. The supposition that the two modes of divine causation mentioned are exhaustive leads to the conclusion that God is the author of sin. Hence, whatever the examples may suggest, we had better stick to (V) and ignore (VII).

I have encountered problems in trying to grasp Leibniz's notion of causation via the divine understanding. Grasping his notion of causation via the divine will is also difficult. On this score, the definitions Leibniz offered at A VI.iii:127 are helpful. In particular it is important to make an effort to grasp Leibniz's distinction between an agent *being* the author of some state of affairs and the agent *willing* in favor of that state of affairs. This distinction appears to be intimately related to the traditional distinction between antecedent and consequent willing—a distinction with which Leibniz was familiar and which he employed in his mature writings. At T 23 Leibniz noted that God antecedently wills whatever is intrin-

sically good, and consequently wills whatever is best, all things considered. More generally, in Leibniz's usage, an agent antecedently wills what appears intrinsically good to that agent, and consequently wills only what appears best to that agent, all things considered. Since things are as they appear to God, in his case we can drop the reference to how things appear. At T 22 Leibniz noted that only consequent willing, not antecedent willing, satisfies the rule "that one never fails to do what one wills to do, when one has the power." Thus God antecedently wills each possible state of affairs that is intrinsically good, but some do not obtain, although God has the power to make each obtain. But God does not consequently will those intrinsically good possible states of affairs not included in the best possible world, according to Leibniz. Let us call this principle, which holds of consequent willing but not antecedent willing, the will/can/do principle. At T 158 Leibniz seems to come close to affirming the following closure principle for consequent willing: If an agent wills that α obtains and α's obtaining entails that β obtains, then the agent wills that β obtains. Perhaps this closure principle is more plausible if we place in its antecedent the claim that the agent is aware that α's obtaining entails that β obtains. Since our fundamental concern is with divine willing, this added requirement need not be stated. Obviously, the closure principle does not hold for antecedent willing. One may find some complex state of affairs α intrinsically good on the whole, although there is some state of affairs β such that β is a component of α and one finds β intrinsically evil.

The notion of willing in favor of something utilized in the *Confessio* is not the same as the notion of antecedent willing utilized in the *Theodicy.* But it is similar in some crucial respects. For example, the will/can/do principle, which holds for consequent willing, holds for neither, and the closure principle, which is plausible in the case of consequent willing, holds for neither. At A VI.iii:130 Leibniz argued that willing in favor of something does not satisfy the closure principle utilizing just the sort of consideration employed above to show that antecedent willing does not satisfy a closure principle.

It is important to bear in mind the distinction between antecedent and consequent willing in crucial passages of the *Confessio,* such as the following: "Having posited that we believe something good, it is not possible that we do not will it; having posited that we will it and at the same time that we know that the external aids are available, it is not possible that we do not act" (A VI.iii:133). The initial claim—if we believe something good, then we will in its favor—fits antecedent willing perfectly. But the next claim—if we will in favor of something and we have the requisite

power, then we act—is close to the will/can/do principle that consequent willing satisfies and antecedent willing does not. In any case, we need to be on guard for the possibility of a systematic ambiguity in Leibniz's use of *velle* (will in favor of)—one use of which fits his definition at A VI.iii:127, the other of which does not but rather approximates his mature notion of consequent willing. In particular, since our focus is the problem of the author of sin, we must pay heed to just what notion of willing Leibniz employed when he defined being the author of something as being its cause via one's will. Surely much of Leibniz's reasoning in the *Confessio* suggests that the relevant notion of willing is akin to antecedent willing. We might thus read the relevant equivalence as amounting to this: an agent is the author of α's obtaining if, and only if, the agent is the cause of α's obtaining (somehow) and the agent wills in favor of α's obtaining, i.e., the agent takes delight in α's obtaining. Then we would take Leibniz's claim that God is the ultimate ground of sin but not its author to amount to this: each sin that obtains is such that God is the cause of its obtaining (via his understanding, presumably), but God does not find it intrinsically good, i.e., God does not take delight in its obtaining.

Notice that if we understand "being the author of" in this way then we cannot identify it with consequent willing, since a closure principle is plausible for the latter but not the former. This might please Leibniz. It would allow him to hold that God is the author of the entire series of things but not the author of various elements of the series, e.g., its sinful components. But this is a rather weak notion of being the author of, particularly with respect to its causal component.

This account may seem not to merit the Philosopher's claim at A VI.iii:121 to have devised an account that clarifies in a significant way what the scholastics should have asserted on this topic. In his mature treatments of the problem of the author of sin Leibniz was clear that it is not enough to show that God does not take delight in sin; it is also necessary to show that his causal activity with respect to the sinful states of affairs that obtain does not tarnish his holiness, whatever his preferences with respect to those sins may be. In later work Leibniz took refuge in his own version of anomie theory. In an important paper, "Concerning Freedom, Fate, and the Grace of God" (A VI.iv:1595–1612), Leibniz took up anomie theory again. He wrote, "It seems illusory to say that God concurs in the matter of sin but not in the formal aspect, which is a privation or anomie. But one should know that this response is more solid than it seems at first glance, for every privation consists in imperfection, and imperfection in limitation" (1605).

This passage applies the conceptual tools of Leibniz's ultimate solution to the problem of the author of sin—a solution on display in the *Theodicy.* Roughly, the idea is that every created entity is a combination of perfection and limitation. What is limited in a created entity is the source of its imperfection and, ultimately, its sin, if it is a rational created entity that sins. The ultimate source of the limitation present in created entities is to be found in the possible individuals in the divine intellect—a source not under the control of the divine will. In the *Theodicy,* Leibniz coupled this framework with a theory of concurrence between created agent and God in the production of a creaturely action. Not surprisingly, this theory has the consequence that causal responsibility for sin falls uniquely on the created agent. All the ingredients of this theory are present in the *Confessio* except the account of concurrence. But the account of concurrence is not merely adscititious in this context; in fact, it is near to the heart of the matter.

5. Freedom, Individuation, and the Lament of the Damned

At A VI.iii:136 the Theologian brings a lengthy discussion concerning the causes of choices and their relation to freedom of choice to a theodicean head with these remarks: "We have arrived at the chief point of the difficulty without noticing it. For this inexorable difficulty is placed before us, whatever sophistry we may employ: the apparent justice of the lament of the damned—that they were born in such a way, sent into the world in such a way, came upon such times, persons, and occasions that they were unable not to perish." The basic idea of the general difficulty formulated by the Theologian may be expressed as follows: the choices of creatures—the items on which their salvation or damnation turns—are outside the control of the creatures whose salvation or damnation is at stake. Hence, ultimately, God is entirely responsible for the behavior of his creatures that he rewards with salvation or punishes with damnation. How can anyone regard this as fair?

This general difficulty takes a variety of more specific forms in the *Confessio.* From A VI.iii:134–36 the Theologian sets out to establish that Leibniz's rigid causal determinism, a consequence of which is that, ultimately, God is causally responsible for everything that occurs, is inconsistent with creaturely freedom and, hence, inconsistent with fairness in the distribution of salvation and damnation. And at A VI.iii:146, the Theologian argues that since the assignment of soul to body sets the course by which the fate of that soul is sealed, and since that assignment is not under the control of the soul, fairness of the distribution of salvation and damnation is once again open to question.

Leibniz set out to meet the challenge with respect to freedom of choice by attacking what he saw as the major alternative, i.e., the libertarian account that he associated with Molina. And his major objection to Molina's libertarianism is that it is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient reason. His own account of freedom in the *Confessio* is summarized at A VI.iii:133: "Each one is all the more spontaneous, the more his acts flow from his nature, and the less they are altered by external matters, and all the more free the greater his capacity for choice, that is, the more he understands many things with a pure and tranquil mind."

It is worth comparing the account of freedom offered here in the *Confessio* with his mature account at paragraph 288 of the *Theodicy:* "Freedom, just as the theological schools require, consists in *intelligence,* which includes a distinct knowledge of the object of deliberation; in *spontaneity,* in virtue of which we determine ourselves; and in *contingency,* i.e., in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity." Note that in the *Confessio* there is nothing comparable to the contingency requirement, which is the last of three requirements mentioned in the passage from the *Theodicy.* Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that in the *Confessio* Leibniz held that punishment and reward can be justified even though a contingency requirement is not satisfied. Leibniz stated his conclusion on this point in strong language in the *Confessio* at A VI.iii:138: "In every judgment concerning the infliction of punishment it suffices to believe that there is a will, recognized as deliberative and evil, whatever its source."

It is important to note that even in the *Theodicy,* in which full-fledged freedom requires contingency, Leibniz held that reward and punishment can be justified even if full-fledged freedom is absent. Consider the following passage from paragraph 67 of the *Theodicy:* "Whatever dependence is conceived in the case of voluntary actions, even if there were an absolute and mathematical necessity (which there is not), it would not follow that there would not be as much freedom as would be required to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable." This suggests that Leibniz was committed early and late to the thesis that the voluntariness of an action suffices for it to be subject to justified punishment or reward, as the nature of the action dictates—that full-fledged freedom is not required.

The second form in which the Theologian poses the difficulty—the form pertaining to the assignment of soul to body—brings to the forefront a theodicean move having to do with individuation, various forms of which Leibniz employed throughout his career. Suppose that by reason of the circumstances in which I am placed and the lack of divine bestowal

of victorious grace at a moment when it would have provided me with the strength to resist temptation, I begin the downward slide that ultimately leads to my damnation. What is it to me that even so this is after all the best possible world? Some were provided the relevant grace and ensuing strength, leading ultimately to salvation, who deserved grace no more than I. Can't I complain legitimately that I have been treated unfairly? Leibniz's answer throughout his career was no, you can't. Perhaps the most surprising of his grounds for this answer, based on considerations bearing on individuation, is found in a passage written in 1689 or 1690. Considering a situation like the one envisaged above, he wrote, "You will insist that you can complain, Why did God not give you more strength? I reply, If He had done that, you would not exist, for He would have produced not you but another creature" (A VI.iv:1639; cf. DM 30).

Leibniz was relying on a doctrine that may be formulated as follows:

> For any individual *x* and property *f,* if *x* has *f,* then for any *y,* if *y* had lacked *f* then *y* would not be *x.*

This is surely one of the most striking theses of Leibniz's mature metaphysics. It may seem at first reading that Leibniz was up to the same thing at A VI.iii:148 of the *Confessio* when he wrote, "I parried the arguments of those who are indignant that God did not eliminate Adam and Eve . . . in order that their stain would not be propagated to their posterity. . . . For I have drawn attention to the fact that if God had done that . . . they themselves would not have existed in the world." The point here is surely theodicean. But given the supposition that every human person (except Adam and Eve) is a descendant of Adam and Eve, Leibniz's conclusion in the passage just quoted may be reached employing premises substantially weaker and, hence, substantially more plausible than the doctrine on which the passage relies.

Perhaps when we turn our attention to Leibniz's discussion of the difficulties alleged to arise from the assignment of soul to body, we find something closer to the principle at work in the passage just quoted. At A VI.iii:148 Leibniz wrote, "To ask why this soul rather than another is subjected from the beginning to these circumstances of time and place (from which the entire series of life, death, salvation, or damnation arises) . . . is to ask why this soul is this soul. Imagine that another soul began to exist in the same body (that is, a body located at the same time and place) at the same time and place as that in which this soul had begun; then this very soul that you call another will not be another but will be *this one.*"

The reasoning exhibited in this passage does not require the principle to

apply in its full force. But it is moving in that direction. And in any case, the full-fledged doctrine seems to be what is behind Leibniz's assertion, "For neither God nor anyone blessed would be blessed, nor would even exist, unless the series were as it is" (A VI.iii:145). It is also worth noting that a number of features of Leibniz's reasoning in this context are unusual. (I discuss the unusual features in notes 107–13 of the *Confessio.*)

In this introduction I have concentrated on a few of the more striking features of these early theodicean efforts of Leibniz. There are numerous other aspects of these works that deserve attention. Many of these are associated with Leibniz's efforts to solve, or dissolve, problems that opponents might naturally take to ensue from the strict determinism apparently advocated in these texts, a determinism that appears to have the consequence that every contingent state of affairs that obtains does so as a logical or causal consequence of God's will. In the *Confessio philosophi,* Leibniz stated the objections with refreshing candor and replied to them in the same manner. Some of these discussions are as good as are to be found on these topics in Leibniz's writings, which means that they are as good as are to be found anywhere.[14]

Confessio philosophi

Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671–1678

117 1671

Fatum est Decretum Dei seu necessitas eventuum. *Fatalia* quae necessario eventura. Bivium difficile, Deus aut non de omnibus decernit, aut si de omnibus decernit, esse absolute omnium autorem. Nam si de omnibus decernit et res dissentiunt a decreto, non erit omnipotens. Si vero non de omnibus decernit, videtur sequi non esse omniscium. Impossibile enim videtur omniscium judicium suum de aliqua re suspendere. Quod nos saepe judicia suspendimus fit ex ignorantia. Hinc sequitur Deum nunquam se posse habere pure permissive. Sequitur etiam nullum decretum Dei esse revera non absolutum. Nos enim suspendimus judicia nostra conditionibus et alternationibus, quia minime exploratas rerum circumstantias habemus. Sed dura haec? fateor. Quid ergo? Ecce Pilatus damnatur. Cur? quia caret fide. Cur caret, quia caruit voluntate attentionis. Cur hac, quia non intellexit rei necessitatem (attendendi utilitatem). Cur non intellexit, quia causae intellectionis defuere. Omnia enim necesse est resolvi in rationem aliquam, nec subsisti potest, donec perveniatur ad primam, aut admittendum est, posse aliquid existere sine sufficiente ratione existendi, quo admisso, periit demonstratio existentiae Dei multorumque theorematum Philosophicorum. Quae ergo ultima ratio voluntatis divinae? intellectus divinus. Deus enim vult quae optima item harmonicotατα intelligit eaque velut seligit ex numero omnium possibilium infinito. Quae ergo intellectus divini? harmonia rerum. Quae harmoniae rerum? nihil. Per exemplum quod ea ratio est 2 ad 4 quae 4 ad 8, eius reddi ratio nulla potest, ne ex voluntate quidem divina. Pendet hoc ex ipsa Essentia seu Idea rerum. Essentiae enim rerum sunt sicut numeri, continentque ipsam Entium possibilitatem quam Deus non facit, sed existentiam: cum potius illae ipsae possibilitates seu Ideae rerum concidant cum ipso Deo. Cum autem Deus sit mens perfectissima, impossibile est ipsum non affici harmonia perfectissima, atque ita ab ipsa rerum idealitate ad optimum necessitari. Quod nihil detrahit libertati. Summa enim libertas est ad optimum a recta ratione cogi, qui aliam libertatem desiderat stultus est. Hinc sequitur, quicquid factum est, fit aut fiet, optimum ac proinde necessarium esse, sed ut dixi necessitate nihil libertati adimente, quia nec voluntati et rationis usui.

1. Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf[1] A II.i

117 1671

Fate is the decree of God or the necessity of events. *Fatal* things are those that will necessarily happen.[2] God either does not decree concerning everything or, if he does decree concerning everything, then he is the author of absolutely everything. Both alternatives involve difficulties. For if God decrees concerning everything and things are in conflict with his decree, he will not be omnipotent. However, if he does not decree concerning everything, it seems to follow that he is not omniscient. For it seems impossible that an omniscient being suspends his judgment about anything. That we often suspend judgments comes about from ignorance. For this reason it follows that God can never be considered purely permissive. Indeed, it follows that there is no decree of God that is actually not absolute. For we suspend our judgments because of conditions and alternatives, because we have insufficiently explored the circumstances.[3] But isn't this conclusion harsh? I admit it. What then? Consider Pilate, who is damned. Why? Because he lacks faith. Why does he lack it? Because he lacked the will to pay heed. Why does he lack this? Because he did not understand the necessity of the matter (the usefulness of paying heed). Why did he not understand? Because the causes of understanding were lacking.[4] For everything must be reduced to some reason, which process cannot stop until it reaches a primary reason, or it must be admitted that something can exist without a reason for existing; but if this were admitted, the demonstration of the existence of God and of many other philosophical theorems would be destroyed.[5] What, therefore, is the ultimate basis of the divine will? The divine intellect.[6] For God wills those things that he perceives to be the best and, likewise, the most harmonious; and he selects them, so to speak, from the infinite number of all the possibles. What, therefore, is the ultimate basis of the divine intellect? The harmony of things. And what is the ultimate basis of the harmony of things? Nothing. For example, no reason can be given for the fact that the ratio of 2 to 4 is that of 4 to 8, not even from the divine will. This depends on the essence itself, i.e., the idea of things. For essences of things are just like numbers, and they contain the very possibility of entities, which God does not bring about, as he does existence, since these very possibilities—or ideas of things—coincide rather with God himself. However, since God is the most perfect mind, it is impossible that he is not affected by the most perfect harmony and thus must bring about the best by the very ideality of things. But this does not detract from freedom.[7] For it is the highest form of freedom to be forced to the best by right reason; whoever desires another form of freedom is a fool. From this

In nullius potestate est velle quae velit, etsi interdum posse quae velit. Imo nemo optat sibi hanc libertatem volendi quae velit, sed potius volendi optima. Cur ergo quae nec ipsi optamus, Deo affingimus? Hinc patet absolutam aliquam voluntatem non a rerum bonitate dependentem esse mon-
118 strosam, contra, nullam esse in omniscio voluntatem permissivam, nisi quatenus Deus ipsi se rerum idealitati seu optimitati conformat. Nihil ergo absolute malum esse putandum, alioqui Deus aut non erit summe sapiens ad deprehendendum, aut non summe potens ad eliminandum. Hanc fuisse sententiam Augustini nullus dubito. Peccata mala sunt, non absolute, non mundo, non Deo, alioqui nec permitteret, sed peccanti. Deus odit peccata, non ut nec conspectum eorum ferre possit, uti nos quae aversamur, alioquin eliminaret, sed quia punit. Peccata bona sunt, id est harmonica, sumta cum poena aut expiatione. Nulla enim nisi ex contrariis harmonia est. Sed haec ad Te: nolim enim eliminari. Nam nec rectissima a quovis intelliguntur.[L1]

Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen A VI.i

537 (§1) Unter allen fragen, so das Menschliche Geschlecht verwirret, ist keine mit mehrer hize getrieben, öffter wiederhohlet, gefährlicher und grausamer ausgeübet worden als diese Strittigkeit: wie mit der allmacht und allwißenheit des alles-regirenden Gottes der Freye wille des Menschen, Straffe und Belohnung, stehen könne.

(§2) Denn wiewohl die erste frage bey allen Volckern und Glaubens-Bekändtnüßen vorkommen kann: “wie doch bey gegenwertigen Elend der Frommen und Glück der Boshafften eine Göttliche Versehung statt habe”; so hat doch solche, zwar in den gemüthern mehr, aüserlich aber soviel we-

L1. Leibniz later wrote: Haec postea correxi, aliud enim infallibiliter eventura esse peccata, aliud necessario.

it follows that whatever has happened, is happening, or will happen is the best and, accordingly, necessary. But, as I said, it has a necessity that takes nothing away from freedom because it takes nothing away from the will and the use of reason. It is in no one's power to will what he is going to will, although sometimes one can do what one wills.[8] In fact, no one wants to have this freedom of willing what he is going to will, but rather the freedom of willing the best. Therefore, why do we attribute to God what we do not want for ourselves? From this it is evident that an absolute will, not de-
118 pendent on the goodness of things, is monstrous. On the contrary, there is no permissive will in an omniscient being, except insofar as God conforms himself to the ideality itself of things, i.e., to what is best. Therefore, nothing is to be considered absolutely evil, otherwise either God will not be supremely wise with respect to its comprehension or God will not be supremely powerful with respect to its elimination.[9] There is no doubt that this was the opinion of Augustine. Sins are evil, not absolutely, not with respect to the world as a whole, not with respect to God—otherwise he would not permit them—but with respect to the sinner. God hates sins, not in the sense that he cannot bear the sight of them, as we cannot bear the sight of what we detest—otherwise he would eliminate them—but because he punishes them. Taken together with punishment or atonement, sins are good, i.e., harmonious. For there is no harmony except as a result of contraries. But these remarks are for you; I do not wish them made public. For not even the most proper remarks are understood by everyone.[L1]

2. On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man[1] A VI.i

[1670–71?]

537 (§1) Of all the questions that bewilder the human race, none is pursued with more passion, more often repeated, more dangerously and cruelly pressed than this point of contention: "how the free will of man, punishment, and reward can exist, given the omnipotence and omniscience of an all-ruling God."

(§2) For though the first question can arise for all people and all faiths, "how divine predestination can exist in conjunction with the present misery of the pious and the good fortune of the malicious," still such a question has not caused much fuss publicly, though privately somewhat more,

L1. Leibniz later wrote: I subsequently corrected these remarks, for it is one thing for sins to occur infallibly, another for them to occur necessarily.

sens nicht gemacht, dieweil die feinde der Versehung Gottes sich nicht viel blicken laßen dürffen.

(§3) Sobald man aber mit dieser richtig, und also einig gewesen, daß solche dem ansehen nach unrichtige austheilung der Gaben und Welt-Güther dieses Lebens den allweisen Regirer nicht auffhebe, sondern alle diese Verstimmung in einem andern Leben durch behörige Gegengriffe der Straffe und Belohnung gleichsam nach **Musicali**schen Regeln in eine weit vollkommenere Harmony ersezet werde: Ist man auff die andre gefallen, wie denn nun solche Straffen und Belohnung der Billigkeit gemäß, und von partheyligkeit entfernet seyn können, wann ja dieser allweise Regent der Welt, durch die wunderliche austheilung seiner Gaben macht daß bey einem Straffe beym andern Belohnung, aber wie es die Christen nennen, Seeligkeit und Verdammung nicht wohl anders als folgen kan.

(§4) Hier haben sich die Menschen hauptsächlich getheilet: kein **Comet,** kein Erdbeben, keine Landplage hat mehr schaden gethan: hier hat die faulheit einen unterschleiff, die bosheit eine farbe gefunden, und Gott selbst hat ein deckmantel beyder seyn müßen. Doch mit zimlicher mäßigkeit der Heyden, so solche Frage so viel müglich in den Schuhlen und Philosophischen Gallerien verschloßen; und mit nuzen der Türcken so der eingebildeten Kette einer unvermeydtlichen nothwendigkeit sich zu einer blinden tollkühnheit bey ihrer Miliz bedienet. Wir Christen allein haben weder den Torrent auffhalten, noch als er ausgebrochen, uns zu nuz machen können, sondern nach unsern gewohnlichen bösen gebrauch alle Schulfragen auff die Canzeln zu bringen, und dem Volck zu wißen nöthig zu machen, so viele Secten erwecket, daß selten ein Riß unter uns entstanden, da die Versehung und Gnadenwahl nicht eingemenget worden.

538 (§5) Es haben sich hierfür gethan die 2 Ursprünge der Manichäer, der Platonischen Christen vermischung Nichts und Etwas, schatten und Liechts, so sie durch in einander strahlung zweyer einander entgegen gesezten Triangel ercläret, **Origenis** barmherzigkeit gegen die Teüfel und Verdamten, der Pelagianer Stolz, der halben Pelagianer List, der **Massili**enser wiederspenstigkeit, der Schuhl-Lehrer ausflüchte, und endtlich die nur alzu bekandte lezte erregungen der welt, darinn gewislich, **Fatum, Praedestinatio, Liberum Servumque arbitrium, Necessitas, Gratia resistibilis vel irresistibilis, praeveniens vel subsequens, Auxilia gratiae, Scientia Media, Concursus DEI cum Creaturis, Decreta ab aeterno, Voluntas antecedens et Consequens, absoluta et Hypothetica, Supra-Lapsarii et Infra-Lapsarii,** und was der Nahmen mehr, so alles verwirret, die Blut-Fahnen geführet.

because the enemies of God's predestination have not been allowed to show their faces much.

(§3) But as soon as one understands and accepts that such an apparently unjust distribution of gifts and worldly goods in this life does not abolish the all-wise ruler, but rather that all such annoyance is replaced in another life by corresponding punishment and reward in a truly perfect harmony —as it were according to musical rules—then one comes to the other problem: how, then, such punishments and rewards can be in accordance with fairness and devoid of bias, when in fact this all-wise ruler of the world, through the wonderful distribution of gifts, brings it about that for one punishment, for another reward, or as Christians call it, salvation and damnation, cannot but follow.[2]

(§4) It is here that people have principally divided; no comet, no earthquake, no plague has done more harm. It is here that laziness has found shelter, evil has found camouflage, and God himself has had to be a pretence for both. Still, the pagans were relatively restrained and kept such questions within the schools and philosophical halls as much as possible; and, for their own benefit, the Turks made use of an imaginary chain of an unavoidable necessity to induce their army to fight with blind courage. We Christians alone have neither halted the torrent nor, when it broke loose, made use of it, but rather, because of our normal, bad custom of bringing all scholastic questions into the pulpit and of making it necessary that the people have knowledge of them, we have awakened so many sects that rarely a rift has arisen among us in which predestination and election have not had a part.[3]

538 (§5) Two principles of the Manichaeans have come into prominence: Nothing and Something, a Platonic-Christian mixture of shadow and light. These are illustrated by the intersecting rays of two opposed triangles and explained by the compassion of Origen toward the devil and the damned, the Pelagian pride, the semi-Pelagian trickery, the Massilian's willfulness, the excuses of the scholastics, and finally the only-too-well-known latest causes of excitement in the world, among which are certainly Fate, Predestination, Freedom and Servitude of the Will, Necessity, resistible and irresistible Grace, prevenient and subsequent Grace, Aids to Grace, Middle Knowledge, Concurrence of God with Creatures, Decrees from Eternity, Antecedent and Consequent Will, Absolute and Hypothetical Will, Supra-Lapsarians and Infra-Lapsarians, and whatever other labels designed to confuse everything have appeared leading the bloody banners.[4]

(§6) Ich sage noch einmahl, daß solche nahmen alles verwirret; daß deren Misbrauch und unzahlbare verdrehungen die Christenheit in einen unendtlichen Labyrinth geführet, daß in erclärung der Worthe, welches ohne schahm und erbarmung nicht zu lesen, keiner mit dem andern überein komme, daß also keiner den andern Verstehe oder Verstehen wolle; daß also auch hier was überall, wahr, daß man erdichteten oder auff eigne art gebrauchten Nahmen der Philosophen, so sie **Terminos** nennen, alle finsternüß der Wißenschafften zuzuschreiben habe. Daß also kein ander mittel heraus zu kommen, als daß man ohne einmischung solcher Wörther so nur den streit erneüern, die gemüther verbittern, der alten zanckereyen erinnern, zu unzahlbaren Verlegenen unverständtlichen Distinctionen ursach geben; sich der aller einfältigsten, gemeinesten, cläresten red-arten, so der armeste Bauer der von der sach seine meinung sagen müste, brauchen würde, bediene, und Versuche ob nicht dergestalt müglich sey etwas zu sagen, so zu erclärung der Sach gnug, und doch von niemand wiedersprochen werden könne. Die Teütsche Sprache ist am bequemsten dazu, die an nuzlichen zu gemeinem Leben gehörigen und sichtbare oder Verständtliche dinge bedeütenden Nahmen einen überfluß hat, zu den vermeint-Philosophischen Chimären aber nicht als mit Hahren gezogen und gleichsam genothzüchtiget werden kann. Dahingegen die Lateinische ihrer Jungferschafft vorlängst beraubt, und ihre töchter, die Italian- und Französische die Laster der Mutter anzunehmen alzu geneigt gewesen. Sollte dieses angehen, und Verständigen Billigen Leüten ein genüge geschehen, wird man vielleicht diesen Griff, wils Gott, zu mehrern **Proben** brauchen.

(§7) Es sind zwey Haupt-**Sophismata** oder betrügliche vernunfftschlüße in dieser Materi, der eine vor die Sünder, der andre wieder Gott; der eine wieder die Buße und vermeidung künfftiger Sünden, der andere wieder die Straffe der vergangenen gerichtet; der eine von der Vorsehung, der andere von der Versehung, der eine von der Wißenschafft und allweisheit, der andere vom Willen und Allmacht Gottes genommen. Der Erste lautet also: Gott siehet alles zukünfftige vorhehr, siehet also daß ich
539 werde seelig oder verdammet werden, eins von beyden mus wahr, und also von ihm gesehen seyn. Siehet ers nun vorhehr, so ists ja nicht anders müglich es mus geschehen, Mus es geschehen, so wird es geschehen, ich thue auch was ich immer wolle.

(§8) Ist alles zu dulden bis auff den lezten zusaz: ich thue auch was ich immer wolle, sondern wenn deine Verdamnüß gewis seyn wird, wird auch deine vorhehrgehende Sünde und unbusfertigkeit gewis seyn. Wir wollens aber umb alle unordnung zu vermeiden in einen Form-Schlus bringen:

(§6) I say again that such labels confuse everything, that their misuse and countless changes in meaning have led Christianity into an endless labyrinth, that in explaining the words, which are not read without shame and pity, no one person agrees with another—that in sum no one understands or wants to understand another. Consequently, what is here and everywhere true is that one has to attribute all the darkness of the sciences to the manufactured or idiosyncratically used names of the philosophers, which they call terms. So, in the end, there is no other way of getting away from this problem than this: rather than invoking such words, which only renew the debate, embitter spirits, recall old squabbles, give rise to countless, embarrassing, incomprehensible distinctions, a person must use the simplest, most common, and clearest expressions, which the poorest peasant, constrained to give his opinion on the subject, would use, and a person must try to determine whether in such a way it is possible to say something that would be sufficient to explain the issue that nevertheless cannot be contradicted by anybody. The German language, which has an abundance of meaningful terms for useful things belonging to common life, for things visible or intelligible, is the most convenient for that purpose; when applied to supposed philosophical chimeras, it can only seem false—it is violated. In contrast, the Latin language was robbed a long time ago of her virginity, and her daughters, the Italian and French languages, were all too inclined to take on the vice of the mother. Should this project take root and satisfy reasonable and fair people, then people can perhaps use this approach, God willing, for more tests.[5]

(§7) There are two main sophisms or deceitful conclusions of reason in this matter: one in favor of the sinners, the other against God; the one against repentance and avoidance of future sins, the other against punishment for past sins; the one from foreknowledge, the other from predestination; the one taken from the knowledge and omniscience of God, the other from the will and omnipotence of God. The first runs thus: God sees all future states beforehand, sees that I shall be saved or damned; one of the two must be true, and so seen by him. If he sees it beforehand, then
539 nothing else is possible—it must happen; if it must happen, then it will happen, no matter what I do.[6]

(§8) All this can be tolerated up until the final clause: "no matter what I do." Rather, if your damnation is certain to be, so are your prior sins and impenitence certain to be. However, in order to avoid any confusion, I wish to reduce it to a syllogism.

Was Gott vorhehr siehet daß mus geschehen oder kan nicht unterbleiben.

Gott siehet vorhehr daß ich werde verdammet (seelig) werden.

Derowegen mus meine verdamnüß (seeligkeit) geschehen, oder kan nicht unterbleiben.

Ferner

Was geschehen mus oder nicht unterbleiben kan, daß ist unvermaidtlich, oder wird geschehen man thue was man wolle.

Meine Verdamnüß (seeligkeit) mus geschehen, oder kan nicht unterbleiben.

Derowegen ist meine Verdamnüß (Seeligkeit) unvermaidtlich oder wird geschehen, man thue gleich was man wolle.

(§9) Dieses **Sophisma** stehet in einer bey allen Nationen und Sprachen eingerißener zweydeütigkeit der so gar gemeinen und dem ansehn nach ganz deütlichen wörther müßen, item nicht anders seyn können und anderer gleichgeltenden, dahehr auch dieser Betrug einen verständigen Mann nicht leicht auffhalten wohl aber einen einfältigen Verwirren wird. Nehmlich was heist das: Es muß seyn? Ercläre mir die worthe deines Schlußes, so will ich antworten. Es heist: es ist nicht anders müglich oder kan nicht anders seyn. Was heist denn Mügligkeit, oder was heist: können seyn, was verstehen wir Menschen unter diesen worthen, sie werden ja etwas zu bedeüten haben. Das kan ich nicht sagen, wird man mir antworten, so wenig als was heist warm oder kalt seyn. Allein, umb verzeihung guther Freünd, es ist ein unterscheid. Daß das feüer wärme, fühlestu, und darffts und kansts anders nicht beweisen, als wenn du einen dazu führest, daß ers auch fühle. Aber wenn du beweisen wilt, daß etwas so auch nicht ist, noch gewesen ist, seyn oder nicht seyn könne, so brauchstu dich keines fühlens sondern unterschiedener Vernunfft-gründe; ist nun die mügligkeit, oder das seyn können etwas welches durch vernunfftsgründe zu beweisen, so ist es auch etwas so zu erclären. Denn aller beweis so nicht durch eine empfind- und erfahrung geschicht, sondern auch dem ders nicht erfahren durch Vernunfftsgründe beybracht wird, bestehet auff einer erclärung, entweder deßen so man beweisen, oder deßen davon man beweisen will, oder beyder. Nun kan die mügligkeit von einer sach die keine erclärung bedarff, als zum exempel von der Zahl drey, bewiesen werden; mus also auff solchen fall die mügligkeit selbst ercläret werden, und also an sich selbst ercläret werden können.

540 (§10) Es klappet fast eben so wunderlich fragen was ist mügligkeit, als: was ist wahrheit, und dennoch wenn man die Schuhl-Lehrer **de radice**

(a) Whatever God foresees must happen or cannot not happen.
(b) God foresees that I shall be damned (saved).
(c) Therefore, my damnation (salvation) must happen or cannot not happen.

Further,

(a) Whatever must happen or cannot not happen is inevitable or will happen no matter what one does.
(b) My damnation (salvation) must happen or cannot not happen.
(c) Therefore, my damnation (salvation) is inevitable or will happen no matter what I do.

(§9) This sophism is based on an ambiguity prevalent in all nations and languages, an ambiguity resulting from such common and seemingly clear terms as "must" and "cannot be otherwise" and the like. Hence, this deception will not easily bother a reasonable man, but it will probably confuse a simpler man. Namely, what does this mean: "it must be"? Explain to me the words of your conclusion, I will then answer, It means, it is not possible otherwise or cannot be otherwise. What then does "possibility" mean, or what does this mean: "can be"? What do we human beings understand by these words; they certainly have to mean something. That I cannot say, someone will reply to me, as little as I can say what it means to be warm or cold. But, excuse me good friend, there is a difference. You feel that fire is warm, and you may and can prove this in no other way than by leading someone to it so that he can feel it, too. But if you want to prove that something that neither is nor was can be or cannot be, then you employ not feeling but rather distinct rational grounds. Now if "possibility," or "can be," is something that is demonstrable by rational grounds, then it is something that ought to be so explained. For every demonstration that is not based on a perception or an experience, but rather illuminates even him who does not have experience of the matter by means of rational grounds, requires an explanation either of what one wants to demonstrate or how one wants to demonstrate it or both. Now the possibility of a thing which needs no explanation, as, for example, the number three, is manifest; but the possibility itself must be explained in such a case and, thus, in itself be able to be explained.[7]

540 (§10) It sounds just about as fanciful to ask, "What is possibility?" as to ask, "What is truth?" Nevertheless, if you ask the scholastics about the

possibilitatis wie sie es nennen, oder von der wurzel und innern Natur der Müglichkeit fragen wird, wird man so wunderliche und so verwirrte dinge höhren, daß man Gott dancken wird wenn sie aufhöhren.

Aber umb Gottes willen, was brauchen doch die Menschen für mittel, wenn sie beweisen wollen daß etwas müglich oder nicht müglich sey. Wenn man ihnen auff die Hände oder vielmehr auff Maul und Kopf achtung geben wird, wird sich befinden daß sie unterweilen ein vergangenes oder gegenwertiges Crempel anführen, und denn ist die sach ausgemacht. Denn was geschehen ist, daß kan geschehen. Bisweilen aber aus mangel gleichförmiger exempel brauchen sie einen andern griff, sie bringen exempel für, so eben so wenig oder noch weniger müglich scheinen, und doch wahr und also auch müglich gewesen. Brauchen sich also der unmügligkeit zu beweisen die mügligkeit. Wie sie sich denn bisweilen damit zufrieden stellen, daß sie sagen; Es bleibt dieß solange müglich, bis einer komt, der die unmügligkeit beweiset. Wie beweiset man denn nun die unmügligkeit? Gieb achtung auff der Leüte gedancken und reden, so wirstu es finden. Nehmlich sie bemühen sich die sach, an deren mügligkeit gezweifelt wird, zu erclären, läst sie sich nun ganz deütlich erclären, und fein umbständiglich einbilden, so hält man sie für müglich; komt man an etwas, so sich mit sich selbst verwirret, und wiederspricht, so helt mans vor unmüglich; komt man auf etwas, da man stuzet, und die erclärung noch nicht bey der hand hat, so stellet mans annoch dahin, glaubets oder nicht, nach dem der ist, so es vorgebracht. Ist also müglich was sich deütlich ohne verwirrung und wiedersprechen gegen sich selbst erclären läßet.

(§11) Nun wollen wir solche erclärung der Mügligkeit zu unserem Form-Schluß bringen. Deßen erster saz lautet also: was Gott vorhehr siehet das mus geschehen, oder ist nicht müglich daß es unterbleibe. Wenn nun die erclärung der müglichkeit vor die mügligkeit gesezet wird, lautets also: was gott vorhehr siehet, deßen unterbleibung kan ich mir nicht einbilden, das ist bilde ich mir nicht ein wenn ich gleich will. Aber so ist der Saz falsch. Wenn ich will so bilde ich mir ein, nicht ich, sondern ein ander sey verdammet, oder seelig; ja ich kan mir wenn ich will einbilden, es sey weder Himmel noch Hölle, wie es denn auch müglich ist, denn Gott kan sie wenn er will abschaffen. Derowegen ob gleich wahr ist: was Gott vorhehr siehet, das wird geschehen, ist doch nicht zuzulaßen: was Gott vorhehr siehet, das mus geschehen. Denn sagen: Gott siehet es vorhehr: ist eben soviel, als: Gott dencket: es wird geschehen, weil nun seyne gedancken wahrhafft, so wird es geschehen. Ist derowegen eben soviel: was Gott vorhehr siehet wird geschehen. Als: was Gott dencket es werde

"origin of possibility," as they call it, or about the roots and inner nature of possibility, you will hear such fantastic and confusing things that you will thank God when they stop.

But for goodness sake, what means do people employ anyway, if they want to show that something is possible or not? If one considers their actions or, more especially, what they say and think, it will be the case that now and then they offer a past or present example, and then the matter is settled. For what happened can happen. But occasionally, owing to a lack of comparable examples, they need another tactic; they use examples for this which seem just a little or even less possible and yet were true and therefore also possible. In this way, they use impossibility in order to show possibility, just as people are sometimes content to say, "This remains possible until someone comes along who proves its impossibility." How, then, does one show impossibility? Pay attention to the thoughts and speech of the people, and you will find out. That is to say, they concern themselves with explaining a matter whose possibility is in doubt. If something is now clearly explainable, and conceivable in all its intricacy, then one holds it to be possible; if one comes upon something that is in itself confused and self-contradictory, then one holds it to be impossible; if one comes upon a matter where one stumbles and cannot find an easy explanation, then one leaves it open and believes in it or not depending upon who said it. Thus, something is possible that allows itself to be clearly explained without confusion and without contradiction.

(§11) Now we wish to apply such an explanation of possibility to our syllogism. The first premise runs thus: "Whatever God foresees must happen or cannot not happen." If now our explanation of possibility is substituted for possibility, it runs thus: "Whatever God foresees, I cannot imagine not happening, that is, I cannot imagine it even if I want to." But in this formulation the sentence is false. If I wish, I can imagine that not I but someone else is damned or saved; indeed I can imagine, if I wish, that there is neither heaven nor hell, which is also possible, for God can abolish them if he wishes. Therefore, though it is true that what God foresees will happen, it is not permissible to say that what God foresees *must* happen. For to say that God foresees it is as much as to say that God thinks it will happen; now because his thoughts are true it will happen. Therefore, "whatever God foresees must happen" means essentially "What God thinks will happen will happen." But because God is veracious, what will

geschehen, wird geschehen. Oder, weil Gott wahrhafft: was geschehen wird, das wird geschehen. So wohl als: was geschehen ist, das ist geschehen. Derowegen ist nicht nöthig Gott in diesen Formschluß zu
541 mengen: Man hätte stracks also schließen können: was geschehen wird, das wird nothwendig geschehen, oder mus geschehen. Gleichwie: was geschehen ist, das muß ja fürwahr geschehen seyn. Sagstu: ist denn das nicht wahr, nein, wenn nicht etwas drunter verstanden wird welches die Menschen umb fürze willen, und wiederhohlungen zu vermeiden, auszulaßen pflegen, so die wahre Ursach ist, warumb dieses **Sophisma,** diese **aequivocation** in allen Sprachen gilt, die weilen in allen Sprachen die Menschen den wiederhohlungen feind seyn. Denn wenn ich sage: was geschehen wird das mus ja fürwahr geschehen, ists eben soviel als wenn ich gesagt hätte: was geschehen wird, weil es geschehen wird, oder wenn es geschehen wird, so mus es geschehen, oder: vor das wort: muß, seine erclärung gesezet, wird der ganze Form-Schluß also: was geschehen (oder von Gott vorgesehen) wird, kan man sich nicht einbilden, daß wenn es geschehen (oder von Gott vorgesehen) wird, es nicht geschehen werde.

Nun meine Verdamnüß (Seeligkeit) wird geschehen (ist von Gott vorgesehen).

Derowegen von Meiner Verdamnüß (Seeligkeit) kan man sich nicht einbilden, daß wenn sie geschehen (von Gott vorgesehen) wird, sie nicht geschehen werde.

So wird der Erste Saz wahr, und der ganze Form-schlus thut nichts.

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici, zu deütsch: lachet doch alle was ihr könnet, laufft denn ein so abentheüerliches **Sophisma,** so Gott oder den Menschen, daß ist entweder die Providenz oder den Freyen willen aus der welt vertreiben will, auff nichts anders hinaus? Die Schuhl-Lehrer pflegen gar recht **inter necessitatem absolutam et hypotheticam** zu **distingvi**ren, aber verhoffentlich ist der grund allhier etwas genauer untersuchet, und die Ursach eines so allgemeinen betrugs entdecket worden.

(§12) Will man aber die müglichkeit anders erclären, so fern sie mehr von den Menschen, also von den dingen verstanden wird, daß nehmlich das jenige seyn müße, deßen unterbleibung nicht müglich ist, und müglich sey, oder daß man thun könne, das jenige so da geschicht wenn man will, wird der Form-Schluß also:

> Was geschehen (von Gott vorgesehen) wird, das (mus geschehen, oder) unterbleibet nicht, wenn Gott gleich wolte daß es unterbleiben solte.
>
> Nun neine Verdamnüß **etc.**
>
> Derowegen **etc.**

happen will happen, just as what has happened has happened. And so it is
541 not necessary to include God in this syllogism. One could have concluded straight off that what will happen will happen by necessity, or must happen, just as what has happened must indeed have happened. You say, "Is this not true?" No, unless something is thereby understood that people usually omit (for the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition), which is the real reason why this sophism, this equivocation, arises in all languages: because in all languages repetitions are avoided as much as possible. For if I say, "What will happen must in fact happen," it is just as if I said, "What will happen, because it will happen, or whether it will happen, must happen," or, if I substitute for the word *must* its definition, the entire syllogism becomes "Of what will happen (or what is foreseen by God) one cannot imagine that whether it will happen (or is foreseen by God), it will not happen."

Now my damnation (salvation) will happen (is foreseen by God).

Therefore, concerning my damnation (salvation) one cannot imagine that whether it will happen (is foreseen by God), it will not happen.

In this way the first premise will be true, and the whole syllogism achieves nothing.

"Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici." Or, in English, laugh then all you can. Does this remarkable sophism that wishes to drive God or man out of the world, that is, either providence [*Providenz*] or free will, lead to anything else? The scholastics are used to distinguishing between absolute and hypothetical necessity, but it is to be hoped that the basis of this sophism has been more carefully investigated, and the cause of such a universal deceit discovered.

(§12) But if one wishes to explain possibility in a different way, insofar as it is understood more with respect to mankind than with respect to things, that, namely, that thing must be whose remaining undone is not possible, and that thing is possible (or one can do that thing) which happens, if one wants to do it, then the syllogism becomes the following:

(a) What will happen (is foreseen by God) (must happen or) will not remain undone, even if God wanted it not to happen.

(b) Now my damnation, etc.

(c) Therefore, etc.

Also ist der erste Saz augenscheinlich falsch, man wolte ihn denn auch verdupplen oder **reduplicativè** verstehen also: was geschehen wird unterbleibet nicht, wenn Gott gleich wolte, daß in dem es geschehen wird, es nicht geschehen solte (wiewohl Gott solches als ungereimt nicht kan wollen). So bleibt der erste Saz wahr, aber der schluß ist wieder niemand.

(§13) Müßen derowegen wohl einfältige Leüte gewesen seyn, so sich durch dergleichen Schluß-arten übertaüben, und bereden laßen den acker
542 ungebauet, die Baüme ungepflanzet, die arbeit ungethan zu laßen, weil ohne ihr zuthun was folgen soll doch geschehen würde. Du Narr, bistu zur armuth, so bistu auch zu solcher nachlaßigkeit versehen gewesen, und eben dieser λόγος ἀργός die faule Regel (wie es die Rechenmeister nennen) hat dein elend so sehr befödert, als jenen Sternseher seine eigene Behutsamkeit und vorhehrsehung sein unglück übern hals gezogen, welcher sich den todt von einem pferd prophezeyet, und zu entgehen nicht auf die gaß kommen, unterdeßen zu haufe eine thüre so hart zugeschlagen, daß ein ährin pferd so herabgefallen ihn am haupt tödtlich verlezet. Wenn Gott das Ende so hat er auch die mittel vorgesehen, weis er daß ich werde seelig werden, so weis er auch daß ich gottes-furchtig lebe, Bin ich verdammet zu werden, so bin ich auch zu sündigen vorgesehen. So muß ich dann sündigen? Nein du sündigest und wirst sündigen, must aber nicht sündigen. Es stehet bey dir daß du zu keiner sünde versehen seyest. Wie so? ich wils beweisen: spize die ohren. Es stehet bey dir was an deinem willen lieget. Nun wenn du nicht wilst sündigen, so wirstu nicht sündigen, denn die sünde steht nur im willen, ein schlaffender, ein trunckender, wenn kein willen da, sündiget nicht. Wirstu nicht sündigen, so wirstu auch nicht zur sünde versehen seyn. Stehet also bey dir die erclärung ob du zur sünde versehen seyest oder nicht. Darffst also weder versehen noch Gott, sondern dich selbst, sonder deinen willen anclagen.

(§13′) Aber hier reget sich der lezte und härteste stoß: den sagstu warumb hat mich Gott nicht beßer geschaffen, warumb hat er mir keine **temperi**rtere **complexion,** keinen andern willen, keinen erclärteren verstand, keine glücklichere erziehung, keine vortheilhafftere gelegenheiten, keine gescheidere Eltern, keine fleißigere Lehrmeister, mit einem wort keine großere gnade geben. Daß ich also mus ein sünder, mus verdamt, mus verzweifelt, mus in weigkeit verfluchet, und verfluchend seyn. Hier bin ich dir nicht schuldig zu antworten, gnug ists daß du nicht gewolt von sünden abzulaßen, und deiner seligkeit obzuliegen. Auff den bösen willen gehöret die straffe, er komme wohehr er wolle. Sonst würde keine mißethat zu straffen seyn, es findet sich allezeit eine ursach des willens außer den wollenden, und donnoch ist der Willen der uns zu Menschen und Personen, zu sündern, zu seeligen, zu verdamten machet.

Thus the first premise is clearly false; one would then also want to reduplicate it or "reduplicatively" understand it thus: "What will happen will not remain undone, even if God wished that, in its happening, it should not happen (although God cannot want such a thing as it is absurd)."[8] In this way the first premise remains true, but the conclusion does not follow.

(§13) Thus there must have been simple people who were gulled by such a syllogism and allowed themselves to be talked into leaving their
542 lands fallow, their trees unplanted, and their work undone, because even if they did nothing what is supposed to follow should still happen. You fool, you were destined to poverty and so destined to such negligence. And precisely this λόγος ἀργός, the lazy rule (as the math masters call it), has contributed to your misery just as the caution and foresight [*Vorhehrsehung*] of that astrologer brought his misfortune down on him, who, having prophesied his own death by a horse, attempted to avoid this future by not going out on the street but slammed the door to his house so hard that a bronze horse fell on his head and fatally injured him.[9] If God has foreseen the end, he has also foreseen the means; if he knows that I shall be saved, then he also knows that I live a God-fearing life; if I am foreseen to be damned, then I am foreseen to sin. So, do I then have to sin? No, you sin and will to sin, but you do not have to sin. It is up to you whether you are destined to sin. How so? I want to explain this to you; pay attention. What depends upon your will is up to you. Now, if you do not will to sin, then you will not sin, for the sin is found only in the will; someone asleep or drunk does not sin when there is no will. If you will not to sin, then you will not be destined to sin. The explanation of whether you are destined to sin or not is also up to you. Thus, you may accuse neither predestination [*Versehen*] nor God, but yourself or your will.[10]

(§13′) But here comes the last and hardest shock. You say, "Why did God not create me better, why did he not give me a more moderate constitution, a different will, a more enlightened understanding, a happier upbringing, more advantageous opportunities, more sensible parents, more diligent teachers—in a word, greater grace? The way I am, I must be a sinner, must be damned, must be in despair, must be condemned for eternity, and for eternity cursing." Here I am not obliged to answer you; it is enough that you did not want to give up your sinning and take responsibility for your salvation. Punishment belongs to the evil will—no matter whence it comes.[11] Otherwise, no misdeed would be punished. There is always a cause of the will outside of the willing subject, and yet it is the will that makes us human beings and persons—sinners, blessed, damned.

(§14) Nichts desto minder, wiewohl nicht bey dir, muß doch bey ihr selbst und an sich selbst die Weisheit Gottes gerechtfertiget werden. Denn es sey also, der arme mensch habe weil er gewolt die Straffe verdienet, so hätte doch gleichwohl anfangs bey Gott gestanden zu wege zu bringen daß er niemahls auff den willen zu sündigen gerathen und in sünde und Verdammung gefallen were. So kan man auch nicht sagen Gott habe nur zugesehen (wiewohl sonsten auch von einem verstendigen Menschen erfodert wird, geschweige denn was der weisheit und Güthe Gottes gemäß, dem elend eines andern nicht zuzusehen, sondern ihn nicht allein aus dem unglück, sondern auch aus unverstand, ja wo es müglich aus bosheit und Verderbten willen zu reißen), denn Gott überdieß die gelegenheit zu
543 sündigen an die hand gegeben. Ein erzürnter verbitterter Mensch hat seinem feind den todt geschwohren, Gott giebt ihn wie die Schrifft redet, in seine Hände, und verschaffet (denn ja die anordnung aller dinge von ewigkeit hehr von ihm) daß er auf ihn stoßet, dahehr er ihn erwürget, und darüber, welches Gott wohl gewust, in Verzweifelung und Verdamnüß fället. Ist das nicht eben als wenn ein wildes ungezogenes kind in vollem lauff begriffen were, und ein Zuseher unterdeßen ihm eine fallthüre eröfnete, das kind seinen lauff vollführete, durchfiele und den hals abstürzete, der eröfner aber, ob er dieses alles gleich vorhehrgesehen, dennoch behaupten wolte, er were dieses falles keine ursach nicht, weil er das kind nicht lauffen machen. Zu geschweigen wenn einer dem andern einen trunck eingeben so ihn rasend, toll, truncken, erhizet, gemacht, ihm wißentlich also **generi**rt, daß er der vernunfft nach boshafft werden müßen, ihn zu aller bosheit erzogen, und doch seiner sünden keine Ursach seyn wolte. Nun hat ja Gott nicht allein unser Raserey zugesehen, sondern auch zum fall thür und thor geöfnet, den betrüglichen apfel gleichsam in den weg geschaffet, umb daran schiffbruch der Glückseeligkeit zu leiden, ja gar uns und sonderlich Adam und Eva also geschaffen, daß die ganze Kette der umbstände von der erschaffung an mit sich gebracht, daß Eva der Schlangen, Adam der Eva zu wiederstehen nicht bastant gewesen, sondern ihren worthen gehöhr und beyfall geben, und zu ewigen schaden ihrer nachkommen überwunden worden. Nachdem nun solcher Fall geschehen, were nicht beßer daß Adam mit samt der Eva aus der welt geschaffet und neüe menschen an ihre statt gestellet worden, also daß wir ohne unsre schuld in unser unschuld und ersten moment der geburt mit einem frembdem gifft zu vieler ewigen verderben angestecket, und aus solchem elend und zu sündigen und zu verderben geneigter art weis nicht mit was für einer partheyligkeit nur etliche durch eine unverdiente Gnade gerißen werden.

(§14) Nevertheless, the wisdom of God must still be justified in and for itself, although not in your particular case.[12] For the poor person may have deserved the punishment (because he willed), yet in the beginning God could have arranged it that the person would never come to will to sin and fall into sin and damnation. Moreover, one cannot say that God was just a spectator (as in other cases it is to be expected that a reasonable person, not to mention a wise and good god, would not observe the misery of another but rather save him not only from unhappiness but also from ignorance and, indeed, where possible, save him from evil and a corrupt will), for
543 God also gave man the opportunity to sin. An angry, bitter person swears to kill his enemy, and God gives that enemy, as the Scriptures say, into his hands and brings it about (for indeed the order of all things from eternity comes from him) that the person meets his enemy and thereupon strangles him and, consequently—something that God certainly knew—falls into despair and damnation. Is this not just as though a wild, badly behaved child were seen running, and an observer in the meanwhile opened a trapdoor so that the child fell through and broke his neck; but the person who opened the door, though he foresaw all the consequences, nevertheless wished to claim that he was not a cause of this event because he did not make the child run? Or, better, is this not the same as if one gives another a potion making him raving, crazy, drunken, heated—that is, knowingly making him a degenerate, so that he, according to reason, must become malicious, even raised to evil—and nevertheless does not want to be considered a cause of the other's sins? Now is it not in fact the case that God not only observed our ravings but also opened the way, created the tempting fruit in our path, in order that we would suffer the shipwreck of happiness. Indeed, he created us, and especially Adam and Eve, so that the whole chain of events from the creation on ensured that Eve was not strong enough to resist the serpent and Adam was not strong enough to resist Eve, but rather heard their words and approved and caused the eternal perdition of their followers? Now after such a fall would it not have been better if Adam and Eve had been banished from the world and new people put in their place than that we with no guilt of our own, in our innocence and from the first moment of birth, are infected with a foreign poison, causing great and eternal destruction, and out of such misery and tendency both to sin and to perish only a few are plucked by an unearned grace based on some unknown bias?[13]

(§15) Dies sind harte Knoten so mit keinem Alexanders-Schwerd aufzulösen, und hierinn steckt das andere Haupt-**Sophisma,** so in folgenden Form-Schluß zu bringen:

> Wer wißentlich die Sünde zu läßet, alle gelegenheiten dazu verschaffet, und machet daß der thäter thun kan; ja den willen des thäters selbst dazu reizet, und machet daß ers thun will: da er doch wohl die sünde hindern, ja die gelegenheiten dazu zu schaffen und den willen zu reizen, unterlaßen können, der ist ein Urheber der Sünde zu achten.
>
> Gott thut ein solches, wie erwiesen.
>
> Derowegen ist er ein Urheber der Sünde zu achten.

Dieß ist der stein des anstoßens daran sovieler seeligkeit zu scheitern gangen, dieß ist der zweifelsknoten, der soviele entweder zur verzweifelung oder Ruchlosigkeit bracht. Welcher bis hehr nicht eben allemahl also aufgelöset worden, wie es so vieler armen Seelen nothdurfft erfodert hätte.

(§16) Wer hat iemahls leügnen können, daß in Gottes macht stünde alle sünde aus der welt zu bannen, daß thut er nicht, **ergo** will er sie bleiben
544 laßen. Ja er will haben daß sie bleibe. Denn entweder er hält vor beßer daß sie bleibe, oder daß sie weiche. Ein drittes kan nicht gegeben werden. Hält er vor beßer daß sie weiche, so mus sie weichen, denn der allwißende will was er fürs beste hält, die Natur der Weisheit bringt mit sich das beste wollen, wer dieses laügnet verwirret allen gebrauch der Wörter. Denn wenn guth ist so man will (nehmlich wenn man deßen Natur verstehet), wie auch **Aristoteles** sagt, so wird das beste seyn so man für andern will, nehmlich wenn man es erkennet. Weil nun der allwißende das beste erkennet, folget ja daß ers wolle. Weil nun der allwißende will was er fürs beste hält, und weil er allmächtig, thut was er will, so folgt, daß die Sünde weichen müße, wenn er solches fürs beste hält. Weil sie aber in der welt bis **dato** bleibet, so ist ein zeichen daß Gott fürs beste halte und also haben wolle daß sie bliebe, und also die Sünde in der welt haben wolle.

(§17) Ja was noch mehr, weil Gott der lezte ursprung aller dinge und eine Ursach ist, warumb sie ehe seyn als nicht seyn und ehe also als anders seyn, so folgt dem ansehn nach daß Gott selbst die Sünde schaffe und mache. Worümb sündige ich iezo und begehe einen todtschlag? weil ich will und kan. Daß ich kan giebt mir Gott, daß ich will geben mir die umbstände, aber die hat ja Gott auch geschaffen mit der ganzen Kette ihrer Ursachen bis auf den anfang der welt zurück. Ich will, weil mich der andere

(§15) These are hard knots, which no sword of Alexander can loosen; and herein lies the other main sophism, which can be shown in the following syllogism:

> (A) He who knowingly permits sin, creates all the opportunities for sin, and brings it about that the agent can do it, indeed, provokes the will of the agent itself, and brings it about that he wants to do it—while he nevertheless could hinder the sin, indeed, could refrain from creating the opportunities and provoking the will—is to be considered the author of sin.
>
> (B) God does such a thing, as has been shown.
>
> (C) Therefore he is to be considered the author of sin.[14]

This has been the stumbling block for the happiness of so many; this is the point of doubt that has brought so many either to despair or wickedness, which until now has never been resolved, as so many poor souls needed it to be.

(§16) Who could ever have denied that it stood within God's power to banish all sins from the world, and that he did not do this, ergo, he wants
544 the sins to remain? Yes, he wants the sins to remain. For he holds it to be better that either they remain or they cease to exist. There is no third possibility. If he holds it to be better that the sins cease to exist, then they must cease to exist, for the All-knowing wills what he holds to be the best. The nature of wisdom brings with it willing the best, and whoever denies this misunderstands all uses of the words.[15] For if the good is what one wills (namely, if one understands its nature), as Aristotle also says, then the best will be what one wills instead of something else, that is, if one recognizes it. Now because the All-knowing recognizes the best, it indeed follows that he wills it. Now because the All-knowing God wills what he holds to be the best, and because he, as omnipotent being, does what he wills, it follows that sins must cease to exist, if he holds that to be best. But because they have until now remained in the world, this is a sign that God holds this to be best, and therefore wants to have them remain, and therefore wants to have sins in the world.

(§17) Indeed, what is more, because God is the ultimate origin of all things and the reason why they exist and why they are so and not otherwise, it follows apparently that God himself creates and makes the sins of the world. Why do I now sin and commit murder? Because I will to do so and can do so. God gives me the ability to do so; the circumstances give me the will to do so, but in fact God created the circumstances too, along with the whole chain of causes back to the beginning of the world.[16] I will

(vielleicht unwißend) verlezet, und ich eines cholerischen temperaments, darinn durch erziehung gestärcket, etwas in lauter glück und freyheit erzogen, einer steten unterwerffung und schmeichelen gewohnt; dieß alles hat wieder seine Ursachen, daß man, wenn der menschliche Verstand fähig were diesem strohm bis zu seinem Quell, ohne abbrechen nachzugehen, endtlich auff dem von Gott selbst erschaffenen ersten zustand der welt, daraus dieses alles gefolget, kommen würde.

(§18) Wieder diese Mauerbrecher hält keinen Stich was theils Schuhl-Lehrer aus den worthen etlicher heil. Vater aufgeführet, und weil nichts beßers da gewesen von vielen verständigen Leüten mit außgestreckten armen auffgefangen worden, nehmlich die sünde sey ein nichts, bestehe in mangel der gehörigen Vollkommenheit, Gott sey nur der **Creatur**en und in einer wirckligkeit stehenden dinge, nicht der enstehenden Unvollkommenheiten Ursach. Gleich als wenn einer so Ursach were der gedritten Zahl, leügnen wolte er were eine Ursach der Ungeradheit die drinnen stecket, und wenn er 3 Kinder gezeüget, sich erzürnen wolte, wenn man sagte er hätte sie also gezeüget, daß sie nicht alle **paar** und **paar** gehen köndten. Gewislich man bringt so lahme sachen vor Gott zu entschuldigen, daß sich deren ein **Advocat** eines beclagten vor einem Verständigen Richter schähmen würde. So ist denn ein übeler **Musicant** nur der schläge oder striche, und nicht der daraus folgenden **dissonanz** ursache. **Scilicet,** wer kan dafür daß sie sich nicht reimen wollen, soll deßen der **Musicant** entgelten? Ja ich sehe nicht warumb man dem sünder selbst für einen ursacher der Sünde hält, er thut die that (gleich wie Gott alles aus dem die that folget), wer kan dafür daß sie sich mit der Liebe Gottes nicht zusam-
545 men reimet; Es ist solche unvollkommenheit oder **dissonanz** ein **non ens,** ein **negativum** darein kein **concursus** noch **influxus,** wie sie es nennen statt hat. Dieß sind nun die schöhnen Advocaten Göttlicher gerechtigkeit, die zugleich alle sünder unstraffbar machen werden. Und wundert mich daß der tiefsinninge **Cartesius** hier auch gestrauchelt.

(§19) Andere bemühen sich unterm Vorwand des Menschlichen Freyen Willens die **adamantine** Kette der aus einander folgenden Ursachen zu zerreißen, und Gott zu erhaltung seiner Gerechtigkeit seine eigne Natur (daß er sey die erste und lezte Ursach aller dinge) zu benehmen. Derowegen obwohl die menschen ins gemein, so lang ihr gemüth von keinen gezwungenen unverständtlichen Grillen der Philosophen verdrehet und gleichsam gefälschet, dafür halten der jenige habe freyen willens gnug, der da thun kan, was er will und will was er guth befindet; So haben doch die guthen Herren, welche gesehen daß eine Kette der Ursachen, daraus sie sich nicht wicklen können, gleich daraus folge (dieweil der will auf die

to do so because the other person (perhaps unknowingly) harmed me, and I am of an irascible temperament, hardened by my upbringing, possibly raised in pure happiness and freedom, accustomed to constant scrutiny and flattery; all this again has its causes, which we could arrive at if human reason were capable of following continuously this stream to its source, ultimately to the first condition of the world created by God himself from which everything has followed.[17]

(§18) Compared with this battering ram, what some scholastics have cited from the words of several holy Church Fathers and—because there was nothing better available—was seized by many sensible people with outstretched arms, is unsound, namely, that sin is a nothing, that it consists in a lack of the appropriate perfection, that God is a cause only of creatures and of actually existing things, not of the originating imperfection.[18] This is as though someone were a cause of the number three and wanted to deny that he was a cause of its oddness; if he begat three children, he would become angry if someone said that he begat them so that they could not walk two by two. Of course, one says things in order to excuse God that are so lame that a defense attorney with similar arguments before a reasonable judge would be ashamed. In the same way a bad musician is only the cause of the violin bowings and drumbeats and not the resulting dissonance. That is, who can do anything about the fact that the bowings and beats are not in rhythm? Should the musician have to atone for that? Indeed, I do not see why one holds the sinner himself to be a cause of sin; he does the deed (just as God does everything from which the deed follows), and who can do anything about the fact that this deed is not in harmony with the love of
545 God? Such an imperfection or dissonance is a nonbeing, a negative thing in which no concurrence or influx, as they call it, takes place.[19] Now these are the lovely lawyers of divine justice, who will at the same time make all sinners unpunishable. And it surprises me that the profound Descartes stumbled here too.[20]

(§19) Others, under the pretext of human free will, try to destroy the adamantine chain of successive causes and to remove from God his own nature (that he is the first and last cause of all things) in order to preserve his justice.[21] Now as long as their minds are not distorted and falsified by the forced, incomprehensible whims of philosophers, most ordinary people hold that a man has sufficient free will when he can do what he wills and wills what he considers good. But the good men who saw that a chain of causes, from which they cannot loosen themselves, directly follows from this (because the will arises from the apparent good and this, in turn,

erscheinende güthigkeit, und solche wiederumb aus andern umbständen wie ein **effect** aus seiner vollkommenen Ursach entstehet), alle ihre kräffte des gemüths angewendet, solche Natürliche auslegung aus den gemüthern zu tilgen. Welches sie dann bey ihren schühlern auch erlanget, und wunder meinen, wie sie der göttlichen gerechtigkeit geholffen haben. Demnach sagen sie der Freye wille ist eine solche Krafft eines verständigen Geschöpfs, daß es ohne einige Ursach dieses oder jenes wollen kan. Dieses nun heißen sie **indifferentiam puram,** geben ihm wunderliche Nahmen, titel und unterscheide, und bringen eine unzahlbare menge unbegreifflicher dinge und **philosophi**scher wunderwercke wie leicht zu erachten darauß. Weil aber also die Kette der ursachen zerrißen wird, wißen sie nicht wie sie die allwißenheit Gottes, als die darauff gegründet, daß er die erste Ursach (**Ens a se, a quo omnia,** wie sie selbst lehren) ist, erclären sollen. Zum Crempel, als Abjathar dem David aus göttlichen eingeben prophezeyet, wenn Saul vor Ziclag käme, würden ihn die Bürger dem Belägerer liefern, da wißen sie nicht wie sie es machen sollen, umb zu sagen, wie doch Gott solches immermehr wißen können, was die Bürger von Ziclag einmahl würden gethan haben, da doch der Ziclager freyer wille ein ganz **indifferentes** an keine Ursachen gebundenes Ding, darinn Gott nicht das geringste sehen können (und wenn er gleich alle umbstände noch so genau betrachtet hätte, dahin doch menschen ihre zuflucht und offt unfehlbar gnugsam zu nehmen pflegen) daraus er gewis wißen können, wohin die **balance** ihres freyen willens auschlagen würde. Wie mus es doch nun Gott immermehr gemacht haben, daß er dieses geheimnüß errathen. Seine allmacht, dadurch er alles weis was er schaffet, hat hier nicht helffen können, dieweil er dem freyen willen seine ungebundene **Natur** läßet, und nicht das geringste in ihn würcket, wie sie glauben, dadurch der ausschlag verursachet werde. So hat auch seine Unendtlichkeit und Allgegenwart, dadurch künfftige Dinge gleichsam als iezo gegenwärtig vor ihm stehen, nichts dabey thun können. Denn hier war nicht die frage was künfftig geschehen werde, sondern was da würde geschehen seyn, wenn
546 Saul kommen, und David blieben were, obwohl weder David Blieben, noch Saul kommen. Hier ist nun der unvergleichliche Geist zweyer Spanier **Fonsecae** und **Molinae** der nothleidenden allwißenheit Gottes eben recht zu hülffe kommen, und hat dem Menschlichen Geschlecht eröfnet, wie daß Gott alle solche **consequenz**en der dinge da der freye wille mit eingemischet, wiße durch eine gewiße wißenschaft, so glaub ich im Himmel **Scientia Media** genennet werde. Mehr hat er nicht entdecket,

prohibent nam caetera Parcae
Scire Helenum farique vetat Saturnia Iuno.

from other circumstances as an effect from its perfect cause), have employed all their strength of mind to erase such a natural interpretation from their minds. This they also achieved with their students and now think that they have done wonderful things for the succor of divine justice. Therefore, they say that free will is a certain power of a rational creature such that it can will this or that without any cause.[22] Now this they call "pure indifference" and give wonderful names, titles, and distinctions to it, and derive from it an innumerable quantity of incomprehensible things and philosophical marvels as if it were quite simple. But because the chain of causes is to be destroyed, they do not know how they should explain the omniscience of God, as that which is based upon the fact that he is the first cause (a self-sufficient being from which everything follows, as they themselves teach). For example, when Abiathar prophesied by divine inspiration to David that the citizens of Ziklag would deliver him to the besieger Saul if Saul came to Ziklag, the philosophers did not know what to do.[23] In other words, they did not know how to explain that God would always be able to know what the citizens of Ziklag would have done at some point, since the Ziklagian free will was a completely indifferent thing, bound to no cause, in which God could not see anything (even if he had considered all the conditions ever so precisely to which people are used to resorting, and this is often infallible enough) by which he could know with certainty which way the balance of their free will would move. But how must God have made this in any case so that he could guess this secret? His omnipotence, by which he knows everything that he creates, could not help here, because he leaves to the free will its unbound nature, and he brings about not the slightest thing in it, as they believe, by which the decision is caused. Thus his infinity and omnipresence, by which future things stand before him just like present things, cannot help either. For here the question was not what will happen in the future, but rather what
546 would have happened, if Saul had come and David had remained, though Saul did not come and David did not remain. Now here the incomparable minds of two Spaniards, Fonseca and Molina, came just in time to the aid of the ailing omniscience of God and made manifest to the human race how God knows all such consequences of things where free will is involved, by a certain knowledge which, I believe, is called *scientia media* in heaven.[24] No more was revealed,

> For other things the Fates
> Keep from Helenus, and Saturnia's daughter,
> Juno, will not allow him speech of these. [Virgil, *Aeneid* III, 379–80]

O blinde menschen! Dieß wird als eine große **subtilität,** als eine übernatürliche erfindung, ja als ein Meisterstück des menschlichen Verstandes gerühmet, davon man nichts als den laut des worths verstehet. Die schwührigkeit stack darinn, wie aus den göttlichen **attributis,** und sonderlich aus dem unserm Verstand nach fürnehmsten haupt-**attributo,** daß er die Erste Ursach aller dinge sey, solches vorwißen heraus zu führen; dieses wird nicht gewiesen (wie es denn wenn obgedachte erclärung des freyen willen bleibet, in ewigkeit nicht zu weisen, wenn aber der freye will zu seiner Ursach die erscheinende Gütigkeit der vor ihm stehenden dinge und umbstände hat, allerdings richtig, dieweil Gott die umbstände so alsdenn den Ziclagern für den gedancken schweben würden, aus gegenwertigen zustand den er geschaffet ohnfehlbar weis, gleichwie ein rechenmeister der 4 mit 8 zu **multiplici**ren und das **product** mit 2 zu **dividi**ren hat, da dann 16 heraus komt, wißen kan, daß wenn er die zahlen anders sezen und etwa 8 mit 2 **multiplici**ren, das **product** mit 4 **dividi**ren daß alsdenn 4 heraus kommen werde, nur mit dem unterschied daß Gott alle unzahlbare mügliche versezungen und **consequ**entien auff einmahl über siehet, der rechenmeister zu ieder seine zeit haben mus), sondern anstatt deßen, der wißenschafft solcher dinge, daran niemand zweifelt, nur ein neüer nahmen geben, und auff die so sich dagegen sezen als ob sie die allwißenheit Gottes oder den Freyen Willen des menschen verlaügnen wolten, **fulmini**rt.

(§20) Damit wir aber . . .

Confessio philosophi **A VI.iii**

116 *Confessio philosophi.*

Catechista theologus. Satis superque nuper de immortalitate mentis, et necessitate Rectoris in mundo contulimus. Si sic perpetuo satisfacies, valde minues mihi instruendi tui laborem; Nunc exspectat nos spinosa tractatio de *Justitia Dei,* nihil enim crebrius, aut speciosius providentiae opponitur, quam perturbatio rerum. Hanc a te rectae rationis subsidiis adornari, ac velut perpoliri desidero, ut cum a me revelationum lux afferetur, puriore radiorum reflexu animi afficiantur.

O blind people! This is praised as a great subtlety, a supernatural discovery, indeed a masterpiece of human understanding, about which one understands nothing but the sound of the words. The difficulty lies in how to deduce such foreknowledge [*Vorwissen*] from the divine attributes, especially from the noblest principal attribute, according to our understanding, namely, his being the first cause of all things. And this is not shown (as indeed it never could be shown if the above explanation of free will remains, but could be if free will has as its cause the apparent goodness of present things and circumstances, correct to be sure, for then God knows infallibly the circumstances that then would have appeared in the thoughts of the Ziklagians by virtue of the contemporary state that he created, just as a math master who has to multiply 4 by 8 and divide the product by 2, then getting 16, can know that if he arranges the numbers differently and multiplies 8 by 2 and divides the product by 4, he will then get 4, with the sole difference that God sees all the innumerable possible arrangements and consequences at one time, while the math master must have time for each). Instead, the knowledge of such things, about which no one doubts, is just given a new name, and those who oppose this are denounced as though they wanted to deny the omniscience of God or the free will of man.

(§20) But we . . .[25]

[Translated by Brandon Look]

3. The Confession of a Philosopher[1] A VI.iii

[Fall 1672–Winter 1672–73?]

116 *The Confession of a Philosopher*

Theologian: Recently we discussed more than adequately the immortality of the mind and the necessity of there being someone who governs the world.[2] If you continue to satisfy me in this manner, you will greatly lessen my task of instructing you. Now the thorny topic of *the justice of God* awaits us,[3] for nothing is opposed to providence more frequently or speciously than the disorder of things.[4] I ask that with the aid of right reason you prepare this topic and, as it were, polish it, so that when I apply the light of revealed truths to it souls will be impressed by a purer reflection of its rays.[5]

CATECHUMENUS PHILOSOPHUS. Placet conditio, utrinque fructuosa. Tu modo incipe interrogando.

THEOLOGUS. Ergo, ut arcem causae invadamus; Putasne *Deum esse Justum?*

PHILOSOPHUS. Ego vero puto, imo scio.

TH. Quem vocas *Deum?*

PH. Substantiam omnisciam, et omnipotentem.

TH. Quid *Justum* esse?

PH. *Justus* est, qui amat omnes.

TH. *Amare* autem?

PH. Felicitate alterius *delectari.*

TH. Quid *delectari?*

PH. Sentire harmoniam.

TH. Quid tandem *harmonia?*

PH. Similitudo in varietate, seu diversitas identitate compensata.

TH. Posita definitione tua necesse videtur *Deum,* si justus sit, *amare omnes?*

PH. Ita certe.

TH. Sed hoc multis negatum nosti.

PH. Negatum est a nonnullis Viris magnis, sed et ab iisdem aliquando affirmatum variato vocum sensu.

TH. De hoc postea fortasse, nunc videre aveo quo sis argumento usurus.

PH. Sumpto ex responsis a me, et a te admissis. Nonne concessum est Deum omniscium esse.

TH. Quid tum?

PH. Ergo nulla ulli rei cogitabili harmonia inerit, quin ei perpetuo nota sit.

TH. Esto.

PH. Porro *omnis felicitas harmonica sive pulchra est.*

TH. Fateor.

PH. Ego ne alii negent probabo. Felicitas non est nisi mentium.

TH. Recte, nam nemo felix est, nisi sciat se esse. (Nosti illud: *O fortunatos nimium, bona si sua norint!*) Quisquis status sui conscius est, mens est. Ergo *nemo felix, nisi qui mens est.*

PH. Rotunde conclusum. Est autem utique felicitas status mentis ipsi menti gratissimus, nihil vero gratum menti praeter harmoniam.

PHILOSOPHER: This condition is pleasing; it is profitable to both sides. Now you begin the questions.

TH: All right, let's go right to the heart of the matter. Do you believe that *God is just?*

PH: I believe it, or rather, I know it.

TH: Whom do you call by the name *God?*

PH: An omniscient and omnipotent substance.[6]

TH: What is it to be *just?*

PH: He is *just* who loves everyone.[7]

TH: What is it *to love?*

PH: *To be delighted* with the happiness of another.[8]

TH: What is it *to be delighted?*

PH: To experience harmony.[9]

TH: And finally, what is *harmony?*

PH: Similarity in variety, that is, diversity compensated by identity.[10]

TH: If we accept your definition, then it seems necessary that if God is just, *he loves everyone.*

PH: Yes, certainly.

TH: But you know that many deny this.

PH: It has been denied by some great men, but sometimes it is affirmed by those same men after a change in the sense of the words.

TH: Perhaps we will return to this later; for now I wish to see what argument you will use.[11]

PH: It will be taken from the replies allowed by me and you. Isn't it granted that God is omniscient?

TH: What then?

PH: Therefore there will be no harmony in any conceivable thing that is not known perpetually by him.

TH: Granted.

PH: Furthermore, *all happiness is harmonious or beautiful.*[12]

TH: I agree.

PH: So that others cannot deny it, I am going to prove it. There is no happiness except in minds.

TH: Correct, for no one is happy unless he knows that he is. (You are familiar with the famous verse "O fortunatos nimium, bona si sua norint!")[13] Anything aware of its own state is a mind. Therefore *nothing is happy except a mind.*

PH: Elegantly concluded. Now, surely happiness is the state of mind most pleasing to the mind itself, but nothing is pleasing to a mind except harmony.

TH. Ita sane, cum paulo ante convenerimus nihil aliud esse delectari, quam sentire harmoniam.

PH. Consistet ergo felicitas in statu mentis quam maxime harmonico; Natura mentis est cogitare; harmonia ergo mentis consistet in cogitanda
117 harmonia; et *maxima harmonia mentis, seu felicitas in concentratione harmoniae universalis, id est Dei, in mentem.*

TH. Praeclare: eadem enim opera probatum est felicitatem mentis et contemplationem Dei idem esse.

PH. Praestiti ergo quod susceperam, *omnem felicitatem harmonicam esse.*

TH. Nunc tempus est conficias, *Deum amare omnes.*

PH. Factum puta. Si omnis felicitas harmonica est (per demonstrata), et omnis harmonia Deo cognita est (per definitionem *Dei*), et omnis harmoniae sensus, delectatio est (per definitionem *delectationis*), consequens est omnem felicitatem Deo gratam esse. Ergo (per definitionem *amoris* paulo ante positam) Deum amare omnes, ac proinde (per definitionem *justi* praemissam) *Deum esse justum.*

TH. Parum abest, quin te demonstrasse dicam. Et credo certe neminem etiam eorum qui gratiam universalem negavere, modo verba, quo tu sensu nihil a communi abhorrente usus es, intellexerint, contradicturos.

PH. Quod ex ipsorummet sententia duci posse puto. Cum enim Deum electos tantum amare ajunt, satis innuunt, alios prae aliis amasse (hoc enim est *eligere*), ac proinde cum non possent (per harmoniam rerum universalem, picturam umbris, consonantiam dissonantiis distinguentem) salvari omnes; aliquos, minus amatos, non quidem volente, attamen cum ita rerum natura ferat, permittente Deo (neque enim Deus vult mortem peccatoris) fuisse *rejectos.* Igitur cum dicitur Deus unum amasse, alium odisse, sensus est minus amasse, ac proinde cum omnes eligi non possent rejecisse. Ut autem minus bonum induit aliquando rationem mali, ita in casu concursus duorum amorum, minor amor potest dici induisse odii rationem, etsi minus propria sit talis locutio. Cur autem Deus unum prae alio amet, non est hujus loci definire.

TH. Imo vero, hinc difficultates potissimum nascuntur, quibus vide ut pari felicitate satisfacias.

TH: Yes, certainly, since we agreed previously that being delighted is nothing but experiencing harmony.

PH: Therefore, happiness consists in the most harmonious state of mind.

117 The nature of the mind is to think; therefore, the harmony of the mind consists in thinking about harmony; and *the greatest harmony of the mind or happiness consists in the concentration of the universal harmony, i.e., of God, in the mind.*

TH: Splendid. For at the same time it is established that the happiness of the mind and the contemplation of God are one and the same.[14]

PH: Therefore I have succeeded in my undertaking and proved that *all happiness is harmonious.*

TH: Now is the time for you to complete your proof that *God loves everyone.*

PH: Consider it done. If all happiness is harmonious (as demonstrated), and all harmony is known by God (by the definition of *God*), and all experience of harmony is a delight (by the definition of *delight*), it follows that all happiness is pleasing to God. Therefore (by the definition of *love* assumed previously) God loves everyone, and, accordingly (by the definition of *the just*) *God is just.*

TH: Little is left for me to say [to confirm] that you have demonstrated that. Certainly I believe that no one, even among those who deny universal grace, will contradict what you say, provided they understand the words in the sense in which you use them, which is not in conflict with their general usage.[15]

PH: That is what I claim can be deduced from their own opinion. For when they assert that God loves only the elect, they clearly mean that he loved some in preference to the others (for this is *to elect*) and that accordingly, since not everyone could be saved (because of the universal harmony of things, which sets off a picture by shading, consonance by dissonance),[16] some, less loved, were *rejected,* not by God's willing it (for God does not will the death of the sinner) but by God's permitting it when the nature of things demanded it.[17] Therefore, when it is said that God loved one and hated another, the sense is that he loved the one less and accordingly, since he could not elect everyone, he rejected that one. However, just as a lesser good sometimes assumes the character of evil, so in the case of the juxtaposition of two loves, the lesser love can be said to assume the character of hatred, even if such a way of speaking is less appropriate. However, why God loves one rather than another is not to be determined in this place.[18]

TH: Still, especially from this above all, difficulties arise; be sure to resolve them with the same success.

PH. Quaenam illae?

TH. Accipe capitales. Si Deus omnium felicitate delectatur, cur non omnes fecit felices; si amat omnes, quomodo tam multos damnat; si justus est, quomodo tam se *inaequalem* praebet, ut ex materia *per omnia pari,* ex eodem luto alia vasa ad honorem, alia ad dedecus effingat. Et quomodo non *fautor peccati* est, si sciens (cum eliminare mundo potuerit) admisit aut toleravit. Imo quomodo non *autor,* si omnia ita creavit, ut inde peccatum sequeretur. Et quod *liberum arbitrium* posita necessitate peccandi, quae *justitia poenae* libero arbitrio sublato. Quae praemii, si *gratia* sola factum est, ut alii ab aliis distinguerentur. Denique si *ultima ratio rerum Deus* est, quid hominibus, quid diabolis imputamus?

118 PH. Obruis me multitudine simul, et pondere rerum.

TH. Ergo distinctius agamus.[L1] Nonne ante omnia concedis, Nihil esse sine ratione?

PH. Hoc ego adeo concedo, ut demonstrari posse ⟨putem⟩ nunquam existere quicquam, quin possibile sit (saltem omniscio) assignare rationem sufficientem cur sit potius quam non sit, et sic potius quam aliter sit. Hoc qui negat, evertit discrimen inter ipsum esse, et non esse. Quicquid existit, utique habebit omnia ad existendum requisita, omnia autem ad existendum requisita simul sumpta, sunt *ratio existendi sufficiens*; Ergo quidquid existit, habet rationem existendi sufficientem.

TH. Non habeo quod contradicam demonstrationi, imo generis humani opinioni, et quod plus est praxi. Omnes enim homines cum aliquid sentiunt, praesertim si insolitum sit, quaerunt: *Cur,* id est rationem, et vel efficientem, vel si autor sit rationalis, finem. Hinc natum *curae* et *curiositatis* vocabulum, ut *quaerere* a *quis quaeve.* Et reddita ratione si vacet, aut operae pretium videatur, quaerunt rationem rationis, donec vel Philosophi incidant in rem claram, quae *necessaria,* seu sibi ipsi ratio est, vel vulgus in vulgarem jam tum et familiarem, ubi subsistunt.

L1. IN THE MARGIN: Fragmentum Dialogi de Humana libertate et justitia Dei.

PH: Which difficulties are those?

TH: Listen to the chief ones.[19] If God is delighted by the happiness of everyone, why did he not make everyone happy? if he loves everyone, how is it that he damns so many? if he is just, how is it that he presents himself as so *unfair* that from matter *that is the same in every respect,* from the same clay, he brings forth some vessels intended for honor, others intended for disgrace?[20] And how is it that he is not a *promoter of sin* if, having knowledge of it (though he could have eliminated it from the world), he admitted it or tolerated it? Indeed, how is it that he is not the *author of sin,* if he created everything in such a manner that sin followed? And what of *free choice,* when the necessity of sin has been posited, and what of *the justice of punishment,* when free choice has been taken away? And what of the justice of reward, if *grace* alone brings it about that some are distinguished from others? Finally, if *God is the ultimate ground of things,* what do we impute to men and what to devils?[21]

118 PH: You overwhelm me both with the multitude and the weight of these concerns.

TH: Therefore, let us proceed more precisely.[L1] Don't you accept before all else that nothing exists without a reason?[22]

PH: I grant this to the extent that I believe it can be demonstrated that nothing ever exists unless it is possible (at least for one who is omniscient) to assign a sufficient reason why it exists rather than not, and why it is thus and not otherwise. Whoever denies it, destroys the distinction between being itself and nonbeing. Whatever exists, at any rate, will have all the requisites for existing; however, all the requisites for existing taken together at the same time are a *sufficient reason for existing.* Therefore, whatever exists has a sufficient reason for existing.[23]

TH: I have no objection to this demonstration—or rather this opinion—and what is more, this practice of mankind. For all men, when they experience something, especially if it is unusual, ask *why,* that is, what is the cause, either the efficient cause or, if its author is a rational being, the final cause. From this *cur* [why] comes the word *curae* [concern] and *curiositas* [curiosity], just as *quaerere* [to ask] comes from *quis quaeve* [who or what]. And a reason having been given—if there is time for it or if it appears worthwhile—they seek a reason for the reason, until philosophers come upon something clear, which is *necessary,* that is, is its own reason, or common folk come upon a common reason already familiar to them, where they stop.

L1. IN THE MARGIN: Fragment of a dialogue concerning human freedom and the justice of God.

PH. Ita est omnino, imo ita necesse esse; aliter scientiarum fundamenta convellentur, ut enim *totum esse majus parte,* Arithmeticae et Geometriae, scientiarum de quantitate, principium est; ita *nihil esse sine ratione,* fundamentum est physicae et moralis, scientiarum de qualitate, vel quod idem est (qualitas enim nihil aliud est quam agendi patiendique potentia) actione, cogitatione nimirum et motu. Et tute mihi fateberis ne minimum quidem facillimumque theorema physicum et morale, nisi assumpta hac propositione demonstrari posse: existentiam autem Dei ei unice innixam esse.

TH. Concedis ergo, nihil esse sine ratione.

PH. Quidni concedam tametsi non videam quorsum tendat operosa propositionis tam clarae confirmatio?

TH. Attende parumper, videbis plus satis, quam nodosa inde difficultatum catena nectatur: Ecce enim, Judas damnatus est.

PH. Quis nescit?

TH. Nonne ob rationem?

PH. Noli quaerere, quae me scis dudum concessisse.

TH. Quaenam illa ergo?

PH. Status, puto, morientis, odium scilicet Dei quo flagrans obiit in quo
119 consistit natura desperationis. Hoc autem damnationi sufficit. Anima enim cum a mortis momento novis sensibus externis, dum corpus reddatur, non pateat,[L2] cogitationibus tantum postremis insistit,[L3] unde non mutat, sed auget statum mortis; odium autem Dei, id est felicissimi, se-

L2. STENO: Hoc supponitur, quidni enim possit percipere conditiones loci, in quo est?

LEIBNIZ: Quomodo nisi per corporis sensus.

L3. STENO: Et hoc supponitur, quidni enim possit simul omnes totius vitae cogitationes intueri? Sed videtur aliud dici, aliud innui, et postremis cogitationibus applicandum, τό, nihil amplius; scilicet dissoluto extenso illo et ista motus ordinatione cessante cessare omnes cogitationes. temperamento scilicet dissoluto nec esse opiniones. Sed quot in hoc systemate supposita? quae haec philosophandi ratio?

LEIBNIZ: Hoc est cavillari contra manifestam autoris mentem.

PH: It is entirely so; indeed, it is necessary that it be so, otherwise the foundations of the sciences would be subverted. For just as the proposition "the whole is greater than the part" is the basis of arithmetic and geometry, i.e., of the sciences of quantity, similarly, the proposition "nothing exists without a reason" is the foundation of physics and morality, i.e., the sciences of quality, or, what is the same (for quality is nothing but the power of acting and being acted on) the sciences of action, including thought and motion.[24] And you yourself will admit that even the least and simplest theorems of physics and morality cannot be demonstrated unless this proposition has been assumed. Moreover, the existence of God depends uniquely upon it.[25]

TH: Therefore you grant that nothing exists without a reason.

PH: Why wouldn't I grant this, even if I can't see the point of such a laborious confirmation of such a clear proposition?

TH: Pay heed a moment and you will see only too well what an intricate chain of difficulties is tied to that source. For example, Judas was damned, right?

PH: Who doesn't know that?

TH: Not without a reason?

PH: Don't ask what you know I granted a moment ago.

TH: What then is the reason?

PH: I believe it was the state of the dying man, namely his burning hatred of God—the state in which he died and in which consists the nature of
119 despair. Moreover, this suffices for damnation. For since the soul is not open[L.2] to new external sensations from the moment of death until its body is restored to it, it concentrates[L.3] its attention only on its last thoughts, so that it does not change but rather extends the state it was in at death. But from hatred of God, that is, of the most happy being, the greatest sadness

L2. STENO: This is a supposition. For why can't the soul perceive the conditions of the place in which it resides?

LEIBNIZ: How could it, except through the senses of the body?

L3. STENO: And this is a supposition. For why can't the soul contemplate at one and the same time all the thoughts of its entire life? But it seems that one thing is said and another is meant, and the expression "nothing more" is to be applied to the last thoughts. In other words, the extended element having been dissolved and that orderly arrangement of motion having ceased, all thoughts cease. Or, in other words, that mixture of the elements of the body having been dissolved, there are no opinions. But how many suppositions are there in this system? What is the basis of this philosophizing?

LEIBNIZ: This is to quibble with the manifest intention of the author.

quitur dolor maximus, est enim *odium,* dolere felicitate (ut *amare* felicitate amati gaudere), ergo maxime maxima. Dolor maximus est miseria, seu damnatio; unde *qui odit Deum moriens, damnat seipsum.*

TH. Sed unde in eo odium Dei, seu votum, voluntasve nocendi Deo?

PH. Unde, nisi ab opinione malevolentiae seu odii Dei erga ipsum. Ita enim admirabili providentiae arcano comparatum est, ut iis demum noceat Deus, quibus serviliter metuitur, seu praesumitur nociturus,[L4] uti contra quisquis se constanter credit electum, seu Deo carum, is se (quia Deum constanter amat) facit electum.[L5]

TH. Cur credidit Deum sibi malevelle?

PH. Quia se sciebat rebellem, illum credebat Tyrannum; se lapsum, illum non remissurum; se noxium, illum crudelem; se infelicem, illum injustum.

TH. Poteras brevius dicere fuisse simul et *poenitentem,* et *desperatum.* Sed unde hic eius animo status?

120 PH. Video te sine fine quaesiturum; poenitentiam habuit, quia conscientiam sui, desperationem, quia ignorantiam Dei: se sciebat peccavisse, illum credebat puniturum esse: sciebat quia mente praeditus a Deo, peccasse se, quia verum erat. Peccarat in prodendo Magistro, quia potuerat volueratque. Quod potuerat, dedit Deus. Voluerat, quia bonum putarat.

L4. STENO: Et hoc supponitur, cum ex adverso fere omnes in principio conversionis serviliter metuant Deum, et nociturum sibi saltem temporaliter praesumant, et tamen ad perfectam fiduciam amoris hac via perducuntur.

LEIBNIZ: Quicunque metuunt Deum serviliter illi non amant, adeoque nondum sunt in statu gratiae. Neque ergo hac via ad salutem ducuntur.

L5. STENO: Pro Lutheri sola fide nihil aptius dici posset, sed optarem hoc philosophice probari. Vidi enim malae vitae homines, constantissime se electos credentes, quos si in tali statu morerentur omnes jure damnatos crederent.

LEIBNIZ: Etiam hic aequivocatio est, nemo revera [se] Deo carum credere potest, nisi cui Deus carus. Adde quod non sufficit aliquem se Deo carum credere, nisi se ideo Deo carum credat, quia Deum amat.

follows, for *to hate* is to be sad about the happiness of the one hated (just as *to love* is to take joy in the happiness of the one loved), and therefore the greatest sadness arises in the case of hatred of the greatest happiness. The greatest sadness is misery, or damnation. *Hence, he who dies hating God damns himself.*[26]

TH: But this hatred of God, what is its source in him—this will or wish to harm God?

PH: From nothing but his belief in the malevolence or hatred of God toward him. For it has been established by an admirable mystery of providence that just as God harms only those by whom he is feared in a servile way,[27] that is, who presume he will harm them,[L4] so on the other hand whoever firmly believes himself to be elected, i.e., dear to God, he (because he firmly loves God) brings it about that he is elected.[L5]

TH: Why did Judas believe that God wished him ill?

PH: Because he knew that he had rebelled, and he believed that God was a tyrant; he knew that he had lapsed, and he believed that God would not forgive; he knew that he was guilty, and he believed that God was cruel; he knew that he was wretched, and he believed God was unjust.

TH: You could say more briefly that he was at the same time *penitent*[28] *and in despair.* But what is the source of this state of his soul?

120 PH: I see that you will question without end. He was penitent because he knew himself; he was in despair because he was ignorant of God. He knew that he had sinned, and he believed that God would punish him. Because God had endowed him with a mind, he knew that he had sinned, for it was true. He had sinned in betraying his Master, because he had the ability and he willed it. God gave him the ability. He willed it because he judged it good.

L4. STENO: And this is a supposition. Since on the other side, almost anyone, at the beginning of a conversion, fearing God in a servile way and presuming at least temporarily that he will harm him, is nevertheless led in this way to a complete trust in his love.

LEIBNIZ: Whoever fears God in a servile way does not love him and to that extent is not yet in a state of grace. Therefore, one is not led in that way to salvation.

L5. STENO: Nothing more apt can be said for Luther's "by faith alone." But I would want this to be proved philosophically. For I have seen men with evil lives, believing themselves elect in the most settled way, whom, if they were to die in such a state, everyone would rightly believe to be damned.

LEIBNIZ: Again, there is an equivocation. No one actually can believe himself dear to God, unless God is dear to him. Add to that that it does not suffice that someone believes himself dear to God unless he believes himself dear to God because he loves God.

TH. At cur bonum putavit, quod malum erat? Cur item detecto errore desperavit.

PH. Recurrendum hic ad causas opinionis, nam et desperatio opinio est. Omnis opinio duas habet causas: temperamentum opinantis, et objecti dispositionem; aliam praeexistentem opinionem non addo, quia primae opiniones denique in objectum, et dispositionem animi corporisque temperamentum, id est statum personae, et circumstantias rei resolvuntur; quare falsae in Juda opinionis exacta ratio, nisi omni retro statu mentis eius ab objectis immutatae ad primum nascentis temperamentum usque exposito, reddi non potest.

TH. Hic te captum teneo. Peccatum a potentia et voluntate. Potentia a Deo, voluntas ab opinione; Opinio a temperamento simul et objecto. Utrumque a Deo, ergo omnia peccati requisita a Deo, ergo peccati ut aliarum rerum omnium, ergo et damnationis ultima ratio Deus est.[L6] Vides quid ex illo theoremate sequatur, *Nihil est sine ratione.* Nimirum tute dixisti omnia, quae sibi ipsi ratio cur sint, non sunt, quale est peccatum quoque et damnatio, ea tamdiu in rationem, et rationem rationis, reducenda esse, donec reducantur in id quod sibi ipsi ratio est, id est Ens a se, seu Deum; quae ratiocinatio cum demonstratione existentiae Dei coincidit.

PH. Agnosco difficultatem, recolligamque me paulisper, ac respirabo.

TH. Nunc age. Invenistin' tandem aliquid, amice? promittis enim porrectiore subito fronte, hilare nescio quid, et excitatum.

L6. STENO: At inter omnia requisita necessaria ut damnaretur Judas, si ponatur praevisa a Deo in Juda libera voluntas vendendi dominum quo tempore potuisset non vendere, concurrit quidem ad requisita necessaria permissio Dei, at ultima ratio erit ipsa praevisa voluntas libera sive ipsius proditionis sive negligentiae, qua libere sprevit exercitium mortificationis a Magistro circa principia admissionis praescriptum, unde avaritia non mortificata a magistro reprehensa vindictae sociata proditionem tandem peperit.

LEIBNIZ: Imo voluntatem inter requisita posuit autor, sed voluntatis ipsius requisita quaesivit. Itaque absurdum est voluntatem liberam esse ultimam rationem, cum ipsa voluntas libera sua habeat requisita, neque enim est ens a se.

TH: But why did he judge as good something that was evil? Likewise, why, having detected his error, did he despair?

PH: It is necessary here to revert to the causes of opinion, for even despair is an opinion. Every opinion has two causes: the temperament of the one with the opinion and the disposition of the object of the opinion. I do not add another preexistent opinion, because primitive opinions are resolved finally into their object and the disposition of the soul and the temperament of the body—that is, the state of the person and the circumstances of the thing. Hence the exact reason why Judas held this false opinion cannot be given unless each state of his mind, which is altered by objects, has been explained right back to his initial temperament at birth.

TH: Here I have you.[29] Sin comes from ability and will. Ability comes from God, will from opinion. Opinion comes at the same time from the temperament of the person with the opinion and the object of the opinion. Both of those come from God; therefore, all the requisites of sin come from God. The ultimate ground for sin, like everything else, and hence even for damnation, is God.[L6] You see what follows from that theorem—*nothing is without a reason.* Certainly you yourself have said it: everything which is not the reason why it itself exists—such as sin and also damnation—must be reduced to a reason, and then to the reason of the reason, and so on, until it is reduced to what is its own reason, that is, the self-sufficient being, i.e., God. This reasoning coincides with the demonstration of the existence of God.

PH: I acknowledge the difficulty. I will collect myself for a moment, and catch my breath.

TH: Let's get on with it. Have you finally discovered something, my friend? For your countenance has suddenly become more cheerful, promising something joyful and exciting.

L6. STENO: If the free choice of Judas, foreseen by God, to sell his master at a time when he was able not to do so is assumed among all the necessary requisites for Judas's damnation, then indeed the permission of God concurs with the necessary requisites. But the ultimate ground will be this very foreseen free choice, either of the betrayal itself or of the negligence by virtue of which he freely rejected the practice of mortification prescribed by his master in connection with the starting point for admission as a disciple. From this beginning his unmortified greed, which was condemned by his master, combined with vengeance to produce at last his betrayal.

LEIBNIZ: Certainly the author placed the willing among the requisites, but he has sought the requisites of the will itself. Hence, it is absurd to hold that free choice is an ultimate ground, since free choice itself has its own requisites, since it is not a self-sufficient being.[30]

PH. Ignosce morae non infelici. Nam si unquam ego, hodierno certe ex-
121 perimento sensi, si quis ad Deum convertat, vel quod idem est a sensibus avocet, et in se reducat mentem, si sincero affectu conetur ad veritatem; findi tenebras velut ictu quodam improvisae lucis, mediaque in nocte per densam caliginem viam ostendi.

TH. Haec adepti verba sunt.

PH. Tu quid afferam Judex esto. Non possum negare Deum ultimam rationem rerum, ac proinde et actus peccati esse.

TH. Si hoc das, omnia dedisti.

PH. Ne festina tantopere: non inquam, non possum negare, quia certum est, sublato Deo tolli, posito poni totam seriem rerum,[L7] et has quae fuerunt, eruntve creaturas, hos bonos, malosque creaturarum actus, et proinde peccata in illis; et nego tamen peccata a voluntate divina proficisci.

TH. Hoc ergo vis, peccata contingere non quia Deus vult, sed quia est.

PH. Rem acu tetigisti. Esse scilicet Deum, etsi rationem, non tamen auctorem peccatorum, et si scholastice loqui liceret, causam Physicam ultimam peccatorum, ut creaturarum omnium, esse in Deo, moralem in peccante. Hoc volebant opinor, qui dixere substantiam actus a Deo, non tamen malitatem esse; tametsi explicare nequirent, quomodo non actum malitas consequeretur. Rectius dixissent, omnia contribuere Deum ad peccatum praeter voluntatem, ac proinde non peccare. Sentio igitur peccata deberi non *voluntati,* sed *intellectui* divino, vel quod idem est, ideis illis aeternis, seu naturae rerum, ne quis somniet bina principia rerum, geminosque sibi inimicos Deos, alterum boni, alterum mali principium esse.

TH. Miram rem narras.

L7. STENO: Posito Deo poni totam seriem rerum etc. ut sunt in idaea Dei certum est, seu ut possibiles; at ut actu exsistentes non est certum, cum nondum demonstravit non esse possibiles alias earundem rerum series, multo minus demonstravit non esse possibiles aliarum rerum series.

LEIBNIZ: Perinde est ac si diceret Deum non esse causam sufficientem rerum. Possibiles sunt aliarum rerum series in se, sed non sunt compossibiles sapientiae divinae.

PH: Pardon the delay; it was not unfruitful. For if I learned something
121 with certainty because of today's experience, it is this: if someone turns to God or, what is the same, withdraws from the senses and draws his mind back into himself, if he seeks the truth with a sincere affection, then the darkness will be split as by some unexpected stroke of light, and through the dense fog in the middle of the night the way is shown.

TH: These are the words of one who has obtained his goal.

PH: You be the judge of what I announce. I cannot deny that God is the ultimate ground of things and, accordingly, even of ⟨the act of⟩ sin.[31]

TH: If you concede this, you have conceded everything.

PH: Not so fast. No, as I say, I cannot deny—because it is certain—that if God is taken away, so is the entire series of things, and if God is posited, so is the entire series of things,[L7] including those created things that were and those that will be, the good and evil acts of creatures, and, accordingly, their sins. Nevertheless, I deny that sins arise from the divine will.

TH: You maintain, therefore, that sins occur not because God wills them but because he exists.

PH: You have hit the nail on the head. Namely, even if God is the ground of sins, he is nevertheless not the author of sins,[33] and if I may be permitted to speak in the manner of the scholastics, the ultimate physical cause of sins, ⟨as of all creatures,⟩ is in God; the moral cause is in the sinner.[34] I suppose that this is what is meant by those who have said that the substance of the act, but not the evil, is from God, although they have been unable to explain how it is that the evil does not result from the act.[35] They would have said more correctly that God contributes everything to sin except will, and accordingly he does not sin. I think, therefore, that sins are not due to the divine *will* but rather to the divine *understanding* or, what is the same, to the eternal ideas or the nature of things,[36] so no one should imagine that there are two principles of things and a pair of gods hostile to each other, the one the principle of good, the other of evil.[37]

TH: You say amazing things.

L7. STENO: God having been posited it is certain that the entire series of things, etc., is posited, insofar as these things are among God's ideas, i.e., insofar as they are possibles. But it is not certain insofar as they are actually existing things since the author has not yet demonstrated that other series of these same things are not possible, much less has he demonstrated that series of other things are not possible.

LEIBNIZ: It is just as if he were to say that God is not the sufficient cause of things. Series of other things are possible in themselves, but they are not compatible with divine wisdom.[32]

PH. Sed faxo ut veram fateare. Exemplum dabo, quo clarior credibiliorque mea reddatur oratio. Quod ter tria novem sunt, cui obsecro acceptum ferendum putamus, an *voluntati* divinae?[L8] quod diameter lateri in
122 quadrato incommensurabilis est, an Deum decrevisse statuemus?

TH. Non opinor, si sapimus: nam aliter nec novenarius ternariusque, nec quadratum latusve, aut diameter intelligi possunt: nomina enim erunt sine re, quemadmodum si quis diceret *Blitiri,* aut *Vizlipuzli.*

PH. Ergo naturae rerum, ideae scilicet novenarii, vel quadrati, et in quo subsistunt ideae rerum ab aeterno, intellectui divino, haec theoremata tribuenda sunt. Id est Deus haec non volendo fecit, sed intelligendo, intellexit existendo. Nam si nullus esset Deus, omnia essent simpliciter impossibilia, novenariusque et quadratum fortunam communem sequerentur. Vides ergo, esse, quorum Deus non *voluntate* sed *existentia* sua causa sit.

TH. Video, sed quo colore comprehendi peccata possint, avidus mirabundusque exspecto.

PH. Senties non me huc frustra digressum. Nam quemadmodum non voluntati, sed existentiae Dei debetur, ter tria esse novem, ita eidem imputandum est eam esse rationem trium ad novem, quae quatuor ad duodecim. Omnis enim ratio, proportio, analogia, proportionalitas, non a voluntate sed natura Dei, vel quod idem est, ab Idea rerum proficiscitur.

TH. Quid tum postea?

PH. Si ratio vel proportionalitas, ergo et *Harmonia* et *discordantia.* Consistunt enim in *ratione identitatis* ad *diversitatem,* est enim harmonia uni-

L8. STENO: Aliud est ter tria esse novem, seu ejusdem totius omnes partes simul sumptas, sive ut novem, sive ut ter tria considerentur esse idem totum, aliud est hoc totum aliquid in 9 vel 3 tria, vel aliter actu dividi. illud videt Deus, quia est, hoc est quia Deus vult.

LEIBNIZ: Non est quaestio hic de actuali quodam sed de harmonia abstracta. Sed ex ea postea sequitur quiddam, nempe ut unum sit alio melius. Quod etiam non est quia Deus vult, sed quia Deus ita contemplatur, sed hinc denique res existit, quia Deus vult, eam autem vult Deus quia optimam seu maxime harmonicam esse videt.

PH: But I will make you agree that it is true. I will give an example, in order to make my manner of speaking clearer and more believable. That three times three is nine, I ask, to what do we believe it must be credited, to the divine will?[L8] That the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with
122 a side, do we consider that God decreed it?[38]

TH: I think not, if we are knowledgeable. For otherwise, neither the numbers nine and three, nor square, side, and diagonal can be understood: ⟨for they will be names without any corresponding content, just as if someone were to say "Blitiri" or "Vizlipuzli."⟩[39]

PH: Therefore these theorems must be ascribed to the nature of things, namely to the idea of the number nine or the idea of square, and to the divine intellect in which those ideas of things subsist from all eternity. That is, God brought these things about not by willing them but by understanding them, and he understood them because he exists. For if there were no God, everything would be simply impossible,[40] and the number nine and the square would follow the same fate. Therefore, you see that there is something of which God is the cause not by his *will* but by his *existence.*

TH: I see, but I await your reply avidly and with wonder concerning in what light can sins be viewed.

PH: You will notice that I have not digressed in vain on this point. For just as the fact that three times three is nine is due to the existence of God and not to the will of God, similarly, the fact that the ratio of three to nine is the same as the ratio of four to twelve can be ascribed to the same thing. For every ratio, proportion, analogy, proportionality arises from God's nature or, what is the same, from the idea of things, and not from the will of God.

TH: What then?

PH: If this is the way it is with ratio and proportionality, then it is the same with *harmony* and *discord,* for they consist in the *ratio* of *identity to*

L8. STENO: It is one thing that three times three is nine, that is, that all the parts of the same whole assumed together at the same time whether considered as nine or as three times three constitute the same whole. It is another thing that some specific whole is in fact divided into nine or three threes, or otherwise. God sees the former because it is; the latter exists because he wills it.

LEIBNIZ: It is not a question here of something actual but of abstract harmony. But from this something definite follows, namely that one thing is better than another. But although this fact holds not because God wills it but because God contemplates it in that manner, still, finally, the thing exists because God wills it. However, God wills this because he sees that it is the best, i.e., the most harmonious.

tas in multis, maxima in plurimis; et in speciem turbatis et mirabili quadam ratione ex insperato ad summam concinnitatem reductis.

TH. Nunc demum quo tendas video. Peccata scilicet contingere ita ferente harmonia rerum universali, lucem umbris distinguente, Harmoniam autem universalem non a voluntate Dei, sed intellectu seu idea, id est natura rerum esse. Eidem ergo peccata transcribenda, peccata proinde non voluntatem, sed existentiam Dei sequi.[L9]

123 PH. Divinasti. Ita enim comparatum est cum rebus, ut sublatis peccatis tota rerum series longe alia futura fuerit. Sublata, vel mutata rerum serie, etiam ultima ratio rerum, id est Deus e medio tolletur mutabiturque. Eiusdem enim rationis eiusque sufficientis et integrae, qualis Deus est universo,[L10] oppositas esse consequentias, seu eodem sequi diversum, tam impossibile est, quam idem esse diversum; Nam si eidem addas, subtrahas idem, proveniet idem. Quid autem aliud ratiocinatio quam notionum additio et subtractio est? Si quis porro resistat, demonstratio in promptu est pertinaciae superandae. Nam Deus esto *A,* series haec rerum esto *B.* Jam si Deus est ratio rerum sufficiens, seu ens a se, et causa prima, sequetur po-

L9. STENO: Aliud est ex tali virtutum et vitiorum mixtura posse componi talem talis universitatis seu totius seriem, aliud est singulas virtutes et singula vitia singulis individuis vel imperare, vel volentibus permittere. Sicut aliud est ex tali consonantiarum et dissonantiarum mixtura posse componi Harmoniam, aliud singulis personis suas consonantias et dissonantias praescribere voluntarie acceptantibus, aliud per instrumenta mechanice ordinata ita distribuere, ut dato primo impulsu tota series decurrat, ubi nulli instrumento est voluntas etc.

LEIBNIZ: Quasi non ipsa voluntas sit instrumentum non quidem mechanicum admodum regulatum. Tota series rerum si sic optima est, jam singulorum virtutes et vitia in ea continentur.

L10. LEIBNIZ: Universum quodammodo Dei imago, ea nonnisi unica.

STENO: Bene additur *quodammodo,* deinde cum nondum sit demonstratum, esse Universum Dei imaginem, nihil inde potest inferri.

diversity, for harmony is unity in multiplicity, and it is greatest in the case where it is a unity of the greatest number of things disordered in appearance and reduced, unexpectedly, by some wonderful ratio to the greatest symmetry.[41]

TH: Now at last I see where you are going. Sins occur to bring forth a universal harmony of things, thus distinguishing the light by means of shadows. However, the universal harmony is a result not of the will of God but the intellect of God, or of the idea, that is, the nature of things. Therefore sins are to be ascribed to the same thing; accordingly, sins follow from the existence of God, not the will of God.[L9]

123 PH: You have divined it. For things are so arranged that were sins taken away, the entire series of things would have been very different. Take away or change the series of things, and the ultimate ground of things, that is, God, will be done away with or changed. It is no more possible that from the same ground—and a ground sufficient and entire, such as God is with respect to the universe[L10]—there should result opposed consequences, that is, that diverse things should follow from the same thing, than it is possible that the same thing should be different from itself. For if to the same you add or subtract the same, it will yield the same. And what is reasoning other than the addition and subtraction of concepts? If anyone continues to resist, a demonstration is at hand to overcome his pertinacity. For let God be *A,* and let this series of things be *B.* Now if God is the sufficient ground of things, that is, the self-sufficient being, and the first cause,

L9. STENO: It is one thing that from such-and-such a mixture of virtues and vices such a series of such a universe or whole can be constructed. It is another for particular individuals to be commanded or, if willing, permitted to have particular virtues and vices. Similarly, it is one thing to be able to construct a harmony from such-and-such a mixture of consonances and dissonances and another to prescribe to particular persons their own consonances and dissonances freely accepted by them, and yet another to distribute them through mechanically ordered instruments so that when the first impulse has been given the entire series will run its course in the situation in which no instrument has a will, etc.

LEIBNIZ: As if the will itself were not an entirely regulated, though certainly not mechanically regulated, instrument. The entire series of things, if it is thus the best, is such that the virtues and vices of particular things are contained in it already.

L10. LEIBNIZ: In a certain way the universe is the image of God, and this image is unique.

STENO: It is well to add "in a certain way." Since it has not yet been demonstrated that the universe is the image of God, nothing can be inferred from that.

sito Deo existere hanc rerum seriem,[L11] alioquin Deus non esset ratio sufficiens, sed accedere deberet aliquid aliud a Deo independens requisitum, ad efficiendum ut *haec* rerum series existat: Unde sequerentur plura rerum principia ex sententia Manichaeorum et vel plures essent dii, vel Deus non esset solus ens a se, et prima causa. Quorum utrumque falsum esse suppono. Ergo statuendum est posito Deo sequi hanc seriem rerum, ac
124 proinde veram esse hanc propositionem: *si A est, etiam B erit.* Jam constat ex regulis logicis syllogismi Hypothetici, locum habere conversionem per contrapositionem, et inde inferri posse, *si B non est, nec A erit.* Ergo sequetur sublata mutatave hac serie rerum, quae scilicet peccata comprehendit, tolli, mutarive Deum, quod erat demonstrandum. Peccata ergo, tota hac rerum serie comprehensa ipsis rerum ideis, seu existentiae Dei debentur: hac posita ponuntur, hanc sublata tollunt.

TH. Adamantina fateor demonstratio est, nec a quoquam mortalium cum ratione oppugnanda, non magis quam demonstratio existentiae Dei, sed vide an non sequatur tum caetera quoque omnia, etiam bona, perinde ac peccata, *non Voluntati Dei, sed naturae eius seu,* quod eodem recidit, harmoniae rerum *esse ascribenda,* tum *peccata esse necessaria.*

L11. STENO: Si Deus nihil est, nisi omnia ad hujus seriei existentiam requisita simul sumpta, procedit argumentum, sed hoc nondum demonstratum, si vero in idaea Dei sunt et harum rerum series aliae infinitae, et aliarum rerum series, non valet. unde non sequitur posito Deo, poni hanc rerum harum seriem, quia possunt poni aliae. nec ideo negatur, poni necessario hanc seriem, ac si aliquid aliud a Deo independens requireretur, sed quia potuisset non posita hac serie, aliam posuisse. unde non est verum si *A* est, etiam *B* est, sed potest esse *C* vel *D* etc. multo minus si *B* non est neque *A* erit. Imo si distinguimus inter idaeas rerum et res actu extra eas exsistentes, sequitur quidem posito *A* poni omnes possibiles rerum series in idaea Dei, at non sequitur, poni necessario potius hanc quam illam seriem in actu extra idaeas, vel ullam poni.

LEIBNIZ: Non ponitur series ob Deum positum nisi quia Deus sapientissimus non nisi optimum vult. Omnes series possibiles sunt in idea Dei, sed una tantum sub ratione optimae.

it follows that, God having been posited, this series of things exists;[L11] otherwise, God is not the sufficient ground, but rather some other requisite, independent of God, must be added in order to bring it about that just *this* series of things exists. If that were so, a conclusion would follow which is in accordance with the views of the Manichaeans, namely that there are several principles of things, and either there are several gods or God is not the only self-sufficient being, or first cause, both of which I hold to be false. Therefore, it must be held that God having been posited, this series of things follows, and, accordingly, this proposition is true; *if* A
124 *exists, then* B *will also exist.* Moreover, it is well known from the logical rules of the hypothetical syllogism that conversion by contraposition holds, from which it can be inferred that *if* B *does not exist, then* A *will not exist.* Therefore, it follows that were this series of things, sins included, taken away or changed, God would be taken away or changed—which is what was to be demonstrated. Therefore, the sins included in this total series of things are due to the ideas themselves of things, i.e., to the existence of God. In positing this, they are posited; this being taken away, so are they.

TH: I admit that the demonstration is hard as steel, and cannot be attacked with reason by any mortal, any more than the demonstration of the existence of God.[43] But see whether it does not follow[44] ⟨first that all *the remaining things,* even good things, as well as sins, *are to be ascribed to God's nature and not to His will* or, what is the same, *are to be ascribed to the harmony of things; second, that sins are necessary.*

L11. STENO: If God is nothing but all the requisites required for the existence of this series taken together at the same time then the argument succeeds, but this has not yet been demonstrated. If there are infinitely many other series of these same things, and series of other things, in the idea of God, then it is not valid. Hence it does not follow that God having been posited, this series of these things is posited, because others can be posited. Therefore, it is denied that this series is posited necessarily, but not as if some other thing independent of God is required, but because had he not posited this series he could have posited another. So it is not true that if *A* exists, so does *B;* rather *C* or *D,* etc., could exist. Much less is it true that if *B* does not exist, *A* will not exist. On the contrary, if we distinguish between the ideas of things and things existing in reality outside these ideas, it follows certainly that if *A* is posited all possible series of things are posited in the idea of God, but it does not follow necessarily that this series rather than that series is posited in reality outside of the ideas, or even that any is posited.

LEIBNIZ: The series is not posited because God is posited, except for the fact that God, who is the most wise being, wills nothing but the best. All possible series are in the idea of God, but only one under the aspect of the best.[42]

PH. Occupabo respondere *ad objectionem priorem,* ut posterior postea liberius decurrat. Ajo igitur *cur Deus res velit,* non Voluntatem eius in causa esse (nemo enim vult, quia vult, sed quia rem mereri putat) sed ipsarum rerum naturam, quae scilicet in ipsis earum ideis, id est Essentia Dei continetur. Sed *cur res faciat Deus* eius duas esse causas (ut semper etiam in actionibus aliarum mentium), quod velit scilicet, et quod possit. Peccata autem non sunt ex iis quae Deus aut vult aut facit, quia scilicet ipsa sigillatim seu per se considerata bona non reperit; sed sunt ex iis, quae Deus in tota rerum harmonia optima a se electa per consequentiam intercurrere deprehendit, et quia in tota harmoniae serie eorum existentia majoribus bonis compensatur, ideo ea tolerat seu admittit, etsi, modo absolute id fieri seu alia melior sine ipsis rerum series eligi posset, esset eliminaturus. Totam autem seriem, non permittere sed velle dicendus est, et peccata quoque quatenus non ipsa distincte, sed toti seriei confusa spectantur. Harmonia enim universalis cuius solius Existentia Deus absolute delectatur, non partium, sed totius seriei affectio est, caeteris omnibus praeterquam peccatis Deus delectatur etiam per partes in se spectatas. Nec tamen ideo magis delectaretur serie universali, si peccata abessent, imo minus, quia ipsa harmonia illa totius ex dissonantiis illis interpositis, et mira ratione compensatis, reddita est delectabilis.

125 TH. Perplacet institutum tuum, quo sic satis ostendis, Deum omnium existentium *rationem,* sed non nisi eorum, quae etiam per se spectata bona sunt, *autorem* esse dicendum. Sed vide jam, ut ad *alteram objectionem* redeam, an non sequatur *peccata esse necessaria.* Cum enim existentia Dei sit necessaria, et peccata existentiam Dei, seu Ideas rerum consequantur, necessaria et peccata erunt. Quicquid enim ex necessario sequitur, necessarium est.

PH. Eodem argumento collegeris, omnia esse necessaria, etiam quod ego loquor, et tu audis, nam haec quoque in rerum serie comprehenduntur, ac proinde contingentiam tolli e natura rerum, contra usum loquendi, a toto genere humano receptum.

PH: I will begin with a response *to the first objection,* so that afterward the second may be treated more easily. I say, therefore, that the will of God is not the reason why *God wills something* (for what leads someone to will is never his willing to will but rather his believing that the thing merits it); the reason *why God wills something* is rather the nature of the things themselves, contained in ideas themselves of these things, i.e., in the essence of God. There are two causes of *why God produces something* (as always also in the actions of other minds): first, because he wills it, and second, because he has the ability. Sins, however, are not among the things that God either wills or produces,[45] because he does not find these things good, considered one by one, or per se. Rather they are among those things that God finds mingled as a consequence in the best harmonious totality of things chosen by him,[46] because in this whole series characterized by harmony, their existence is compensated by greater goods. And, therefore, he tolerates or admits them, although he would have eliminated them if only, absolutely speaking, it were possible to do so, that is, to choose another series of things that is better without those evils. However, he must be said to will the entire series, not permit it, and the same for sins also insofar as they are not considered distinctly by themselves but are considered mixed in with the entire series. For the universal harmony, by whose existence alone God is absolutely pleased, is a characteristic of the entire series, not of the parts; with the exception of sins, God is pleased with all the others even with respect to the parts considered in themselves. Nevertheless, he would not be more pleased by the universal series were sins absent—in fact less, because this very harmony of the whole is rendered delightful by the dissonances which are interposed and compensated for in a marvelous manner.

125 TH: Your doctrine is immensely pleasing, by which you show so fully that God is to be called the *ground* of every existent, but not the *author,* except of those things that are good considered in themselves. But see now, to return to *the other objection,* whether it does not follow⟩ that *sins are necessary.* For since the existence of God is necessary and sins are a consequence of the existence of God, i.e., of the ideas of things, even sins will be necessary. For whatever follows from what is necessary is necessary.[47]

PH: By the same argument, you would conclude that all things are necessary, even that I am speaking and you are listening, for these situations also are included in the series of things, and accordingly, you would conclude that contingency is removed from the nature of things, contrary to the manner of speaking accepted by all mankind.

TH. Quid vero si stoicus aliquis fatalitatis patronus hoc tibi concedat?

PH. Non est concedendum, est enim contra usum vocabulorum, tametsi adhibita explicatione molliri posset, quo sensu etiam Christus dixit *oportet,* id est, necesse est, *scandala evenire.* Scandala autem utique peccata sunt. Nam *vae illi,* ut sequitur *per quem eveniunt.* Si ergo scandala necessaria sunt, etiam illud *vae,* seu damnatio necessaria erit: sed in communi sermone his consequentiis abstinendum; Usum enim vocabulorum in rebus ad vitam pertinentibus detorquere in arbitrio non est, ne dura et auditu scandalosa consequantur, quae homines significationis minus receptae imperitos turbent.

TH. Sed quid objectioni respondebis?

PH. Quid? nisi omnem eius difficultatem a detorto vocum significatu oriri. Hinc labyrinthus irremeabilis, hinc fundi nostri calamitas, quod vocabula necessitatis, possibilitatis item et impossibilitatis, voluntatis, autoris, aliaque id genus, omnium gentium linguae universali quodam sophismate in varios sensus detorsere. Quod ne a me tergiversationis causa dictum putes, evidens signum dabo: Omitte tantum vocabula ista in tota hac tractatione (credo enim si edicto vetita essent, posse homines [s]ensa animi exprimere etiam sine ipsis) et quoties opus est, substitue eorum significata seu definitiones, et quovis pignore tecum certabo, continuo, velut exorcismo quodam, ac quasi face illata, omnes tenebras disparituras, omnia spectra, et terriculamenta difficultatum tenues in auras abitura. Habes ecce *Secretum non vulgare,* formulamque medendi erroribus, abusibus, scandalis, qualem tibi nec Valerius Cordus, nec Zwelferus, nec ullius dispensatorii autor alius praescripserit. Scripsit aliquando Urbanus Regius *de formulis caute loquendi.* Huius ergo artis praecepta pene omnia hoc unico artificio contineri scito.

126 TH. Tantamne rem tam levi negotio confici posse?

PH. Me vatem puta. Vocabula saepe sunt quae nos vexant, torquent, mordent, irritant, acerbant. Si dicam tibi: Domine tu sciens damno meo asseris aliquid, quod aliter se habere nosti; non opinor valde indignabere, sed facile transmittes dicentis libertatem: sin te mentiri exclamem (quanquam nihil sit aliud mentiri, quam falsum damnose seu injuste dicere scientem) Deum immortalem, quam tempestatem excitabis! Ita si quis dicat:

TH: And what if some stoic, a patron of fatality, concedes this to you?

PH: It must not be conceded, for it is contrary to the use of language, although if we add an explanation, we can make it harmless. It is in this sense that even Christ said: *it must be* (i.e., it is necessary) *that inducements to sins occur.* But, without doubt, inducements to sin are sins. For *woe to him,* as the passage continues, *through whose efforts inducements to sin occur.*[48] If therefore inducements to sin are necessary, then so is this *woe;* that is, damnation will be necessary. But in ordinary speech one must abstain from those consequences. It is not at our discretion to distort the use of words in matters pertaining to life, lest things hard and scandalous to the ear result that trouble men who are unacquainted with the less usual meaning.

TH: But what will you respond to the objection?[49]

PH: What? Nothing but that its entire difficulty arises from a twisted sense of words. From this source arises the labyrinth from which one cannot escape; from this source arises the calamity of our estate because the languages of all people have twisted into different meanings the words for necessity, possibility, and, likewise, impossibility, will, author, and others of this kind by a certain universal sophistry. And so you don't think I say this as an evasion, I will give you a clear indication: omit only those words just mentioned from this entire discussion (for I believe that if they were prohibited by an edict, men could still express the thoughts of their minds without them) and as often as you need substitute their meanings or definitions, and I wager whatever you like that, as it were by a certain exorcism, as if a torch had been carried there, all the obscurities would disappear immediately, all apparitions and specters of difficulties would vanish like fine vapors. Here you have *an uncommon secret* and a prescription for curing the errors, abuses, scandals—a prescription such as you would not get from Valerius Cordus or Zwelfer or any other pharmacist. Urbanus Regius[50] once wrote "concerning the formulas for speaking cautiously." Well then, almost all the prescriptions of this art are contained in this single clever device.

126 TH: Can a matter of such importance be settled with so little trouble?

PH: Consider me a prophet. Often there are words which vex us, wrench us, sting us, irritate us, aggravate us. If I were to say to you, Sir, you assert, knowing it to be to my detriment, something that you know to be otherwise, I do not believe you would be very indignant, but you would easily pass over this license on the part of the speaker. On the other hand, if I were to exclaim that you lied (although *to lie* is nothing other than knowingly to say something false that is detrimental or unjust) immortal God,

peccata necessaria sunt, Deus est causa peccati, Deus vult nonnullorum damnationem; impossibile fuit Judam salvari, etc., utique Acheronta movebit. Tu haec substitue: cum *Deus* sit *ultima ratio rerum,* seu ratio sufficiens Universi, rationem autem Universi quippe rationalissimam consequatur, quod pulchritudini summae, seu harmoniae universali (omnis enim harmonia universalis summa est) consentaneum est: Harmoniae autem exquisitissimae sit discordantiam turbatissimam in ordinem velut insperato redigi, picturam umbris distingui, harmoniam per dissonantias dissonantiis in consonantiam compensari (quemadmodum ex duobus numeris imparibus par fit) peccata sibi ipsis (quod notandum est) poenas irrogare: consequens est, posito Deo existere peccata, peccatorumque poenas.[L12] Sed hoc necessario, hoc volente, hoc autore Deo fieri, imprudenter, inepte, falso, pro dicentis, audientis, intelligentis ratione dicetur.

TH. Patefecisti profecto arcanum mirabile, exeundi tot difficultates, nec est, quod ultra ire cogare. Si tamen possibile est, effice retentis vocabulis quod praestitisti eliminatis.

PH. Praestarem, si in mea potestate esset, efficere, ne homines vocabulis aliter quam honoris divini, et propriae quietis interest, uterentur.

TH. At tenta tamen.

PH. Tentabo, sed ea conditione, ut quicquid de illorum, quibus nos omnino carere posse ostendi, explicatione dicam, quasi re transacta pro superfluo, minimeque obligatorio aut captioso habeatur.

TH. Accipio conditionem.

PH. *Necessarium* ergo illud vocabo, cuius oppositum implicat contradictionem, seu intelligi clare non potest; Ita necessarium est ter tria esse novem, sed non est necessarium me loqui, aut peccare.[L13] Possum enim

L12. STENO: Posse existere, qui possunt voluntati ejus libere resistere, et actu resistent, adeoque coacti inobedientiae poenas luent.

L13. STENO: Quid juvat mihi non videri necessarium, si revera necessarium est etiam intuitu mei ab objecto et temperamento secundum ideam Dei necessario determinandi ad peccatum, aliud est necessario peccare, quia Deus praevidit me libere electurum peccatum, aliud, peccare quia sine electione mea debui peccare.

LEIBNIZ: Aliud est necessarium aliud certum, ut futura a Deo praevisa. Non de-

what a storm you would raise up! Thus, if someone were to say, Sins are necessary; God is the cause of sin; God wills the damnation of some; it was impossible for Judas to be saved, etc.; no doubt he would stir up the river Acheron.[51] Substitute this manner of speaking: since *God is the ultimate ground of things,* i.e., the sufficient ground of the universe, it follows that there is a ground for the universe, indeed the most rational of grounds, and this fact is consistent with supreme beauty, i.e., universal harmony (for all universal harmony is supreme). Moreover, just as in the most exquisite harmony the most turbulent discord is unexpectedly reduced to order, a painting is made more distinct by the shading, a harmony is made from dissonances in concert with dissonances (as an even number results from two odd numbers), so sins (remarkably) inflict on themselves their own punishments. The consequence is that God having been posited, sins and the punishments for sins exist.[L12] But to say that this is necessary, that God wills it, that this is brought about by God as author, is imprudent, uncalled-for, and false, with respect to those who speak, hear, and understand.[52]

TH: You have really brought to light a marvelous secret for guarding against many difficulties. You need not go further. Nevertheless, if it is possible, establish with the words retained what you displayed with these eliminated words.

PH: I would show it, if I could arrange it so that men do not use words other than in the service of the honor of God and their own tranquillity.

TH: Nevertheless, try it.

PH: I will try, but on the condition that whatever I say about the explication of those words, which I have shown we can do without entirely, is taken, as if by agreement, to be superfluous and by no means obligatory or sophistical.

TH: I accept the condition.

PH: So, I will designate that as *necessary,* the opposite of which implies a contradiction or cannot be clearly conceived.[53] Thus, it is necessary that three threes are nine, but it is not necessary that I speak or sin.[L13] For I can

L12. STENO: There can be beings who can freely resist his will, and will do so in fact, and thus will be forced to suffer punishment for their disobedience.

L13. STENO: What help is it that it does not seem necessary to me, if in fact it is necessary because I am determined to sin on the basis of the object and my temperament, in accord with God's idea? It is one thing to sin necessarily because God foresees that I will freely choose sin, and another to sin because I must sin without having chosen to sin.

LEIBNIZ: The necessary is one thing, the certain another, as in the case of future

127 intelligi esse *Ego* etsi non intelligar esse *loquens,* sed ter tria intelligi quae non sint novem, est ter tria esse, quae ter tria non sint, quod implicat, idque *numeratio,* id est reductio utriusque termini in definitionem, unitates scilicet, ostendit. *Contingentia* sunt, quae necessaria non sunt. *Possibilia* sunt, quae non est necessarium non esse. *Impossibilia* sunt, quae possibilia non sunt, vel brevius: *Possibile* est, quod intelligi potest, id est (ne vox *potest* in possibilis definitione ponatur) quod clare intelligitur, attendenti. *Impossibile,* quod possibile non est. *Necessarium* cuius oppositum impossibile est, *Contingens* cuius oppositum possibile est. *Velle* est existentia alicuius delectari.[L14] *Nolle* est existentia alicuius dolere, aut non existentia delectari. *Permittere* est, nec velle nec nolle, et tamen scire. *Autorem* esse, est voluntate sua esse rationem alienae. His ita positis asserere ausim, nullis consequentiarum fidiculis aliquid parum honorificum Justitiae divinae extorqueri posse.

TH. Quid ergo respondes illi argumento supra proposito, Dei existentia necessaria est, hanc peccata in rerum serie comprehensa consequuntur, quod ex necessario sequitur, necessarium est. Ergo peccata necessaria sunt.

PH. Respondeo falsum esse quod quicquid ex per se necessario sequitur, per se necessarium sit.[L15] Ex veris quidem constat sequi nonnisi verum: cum tamen ex meris universalibus possit sequi particulare, ut in *Darapti,*
128 *Felapton,* quidni ex per se necessario sequatur contingens seu ex alterius

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terminor necessario. Utrum autem illa certitudo oriatur ab idea Dei, an vero a praescientia Dei, quid ad rem facit? si libertas cum certitudine pugnat: nihil liberum est, quod absurdum.

L14. STENO: Ac si actus voluntatis non possent distingui a perceptione delectationis et doloris.

LEIBNIZ: Si intelligeret naturam voluntatis fateretur ei inesse.

L15. IN THE MARGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY STRUCK: Clarius ita respondebitur, distinctiusque si dicamus communiter necessaria intelligi ex quorum essentia sequitur existentia. Et hoc modo solae propositiones hypotheticae sunt necessariae; absolutarum vero haec unica: Deus est, sive ratio rerum est. Et hinc patet, quorum existentia ex aliena sequitur necessaria non esse.

127 be conceived to be *myself* even if I am not conceived as *speaking,* but three threes which are conceived not to be nine are three threes which are not three threes, which implies a contradiction, and a *calculation,* i.e., a reduction of both terms in the definition to unities, shows it. Those things are *contingent* that are not necessary; those are *possible* whose nonexistence is not necessary. Those are *impossible* that are not possible, or more briefly: the *possible* is what can be conceived, that is (in order that the word *can* not occur in the definition of possible), what is conceived clearly by an attentive mind; the *impossible* what is not possible; the *necessary* that whose opposite is impossible; the *contingent* that whose opposite is possible. *To will in favor* of something is to be delighted by its existence;[L14] *to will against* something is to be sad at its existence or to be delighted at its nonexistence.[54] *To permit* is neither to will in favor nor to will against, and nevertheless to know. *To be the author* is by one's will to be the ground of something else.[55] If we assume these definitions, I dare to assert that no instrument of torture, applied to their consequences will yield something insufficient to the honor of divine justice.

TH: What is your response going to be to the argument proposed previously: the existence of God is necessary; the sins included in the series of things follow from this; whatever follows from something necessary is itself necessary. Therefore sins are necessary.

PH: I reply that it is false that whatever follows from something necessary ⟨per se⟩ is itself necessary ⟨per se⟩.[L15, 56] Certainly it is evident that nothing follows from truths except what is true; nevertheless, since a particular proposition can follow from purely universal propositions, as in
128 Darapti and Felapton, why not something contingent ⟨or necessary on the

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things foreseen by God. For example, I am not determined necessarily. Moreover, what difference does it make whether this certainty arises from God's idea or from God's foreknowledge? If freedom is not consistent with certainty, there is no freedom, which is absurd.

L14. STENO: As if acts of the will cannot be distinguished from the experience of pleasure and pain.

LEIBNIZ: If he [Steno] understood the nature of the will, he would admit that it consists in this.

L15. IN THE MARGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY STRUCK: This response will be clearer and more distinct if we say that necessity is commonly understood of those things whose existence follows from their essence. And in this manner of speaking only hypothetical propositions are necessary. Of absolutes, just this one: God exists, i.e., there is a ground of things. And from this it is evident that those things whose existence follows from something else are not necessary.

hypothesi necessarium? Sed hoc ex ipsa necessarii notione conficiam: *Necessarium* enim definivi, cuius contrarium intelligi non potest, rerum ergo necessitas impossibilitasque non extra ipsas sed in ipsarummet ideis quaerenda est, et intelligine queant, an potius implicent, observandum; *necessarium* enim hoc loco a nobis illud appellatur tantum, quod *per se* necessarium est, quod rationem scilicet existentiae et veritatis suae habet intra se, quales sunt Geometricae veritates; ex rebus existentibus, Deus solus, caetera, quae ex hac rerum serie supposita, id est harmonia rerum, sive Existentia Dei, sequuntur, *per se contingentia,* et hypothetice tantum necessaria sunt, tametsi nihil sit fortuitum, cum omnia fato, id est certa quadam providentiae ratione decurrant. Ergo si rei essentia concipi tantum clare distincteque possit (Exempli causa *species animalium imparipedum, item brutum immortale*), jam possibilis habenda est, nec contrarium eius necessarium erit, tametsi fortasse existentia eius harmoniae rerum, existentiaeque Dei adversa, ac per consequens nunquam locum in mundo habitura sed per accidens impossibilis futura sit. Quare errant quicunque (absolute id est per se) impossibile pronuntiant, quicquid nec fuit, nec est, nec erit.

TH. At vero: nonne quicquid erit, absolute necessarium erit, quemadmodum quicquid fuit, necessario fuit, et quicquid est, utique necessario est?

PH. Imo falsum est, nisi reduplicativum esse, et ellipsin quandam hominibus, ne idem bis dicatur familiarem continere intelligatur: sensus enim est, quicquid est, id necessarium est, *si sit,* esse, seu (substituta pro *necessario,* eius definitione) quicquid futurum est, id intelligi non potest, *si futurum sit,* non futurum esse. Si reduplicatio omittatur, falsa propositio est. Nam quod futurum est, tamen intelligi potest non fore. Et quod non fuit tamen intelligi potest fuisse. Hoc ipsum poëtae elegantis est etsi falsa tamen possibilia comminisci.[L16] Barclaii *Argenis* possibilis, seu clare dis-

L16. IN THE MARGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY STRUCK: Clarius dicendum: Impossibile est, cuius essentia sibi ipsi incompatibilis est. *In congruum* sive Rejectum (qualia sunt, quae nec fuere, nec sunt, nec erunt), cuius essentia est existentiae incompatibilis: Existentiae, id est primo existentium, sive ei quod per se ipsum Existit, sive Deo.

hypothesis of another⟩ from something necessary ⟨per se⟩? But I will establish this from the very notion of necessity. Now I have defined *the necessary* as something whose contrary cannot be conceived; therefore, the necessity and impossibility of things are to be sought in the ideas of those very things themselves, not outside those things. It is to be sought by examining whether they can be conceived or whether instead they imply a contradiction. ⟨For in this place we call *necessary* only what is necessary *per se,* namely, that which has the reason for its existence and truth in itself. The truths of geometry are of this sort. But among existing things, only God is of this sort; all the rest, which follow from the series of things presupposed—i.e., from the harmony of things or the existence of God—are *contingent per se* and only hypothetically necessary, even if nothing is fortuitous, since everything proceeds by destiny, i.e., from some established reason of providence.⟩ Therefore if the essence of a thing can be conceived, provided that it is conceived clearly and distinctly (e.g., *a species of animal with an uneven number of feet, also a species of immortal beast*), then it must already be held to be possible, and its contrary will not be necessary, even if its existence may be contrary to the harmony of things and the existence of God, and consequently it never will actually exist, but it will remain *per accidens* impossible. Hence all those who call impossible ⟨(absolutely, i.e., per se)⟩ whatever neither was nor is nor will be are mistaken.

TH: Really? But isn't whatever will be such that it is ⟨absolutely⟩ necessary that it will be, just as whatever was, was necessarily, and whatever is, similarly, is necessarily?

PH: Absolutely not; that is false, unless it is understood that the proposition is really reduplicative, and your version contains an ellipsis, common among men, so that the same thing is not said twice over. For the sense of the proposition is that whatever exists, it is necessary that *if it exists,* then it exists, or (substituting for *necessity* its definition) whatever is about to exist, it cannot be conceived that *if it is about to exist,* then it will not exist. But if the reduplication is omitted, then the proposition is false. For something that will be nevertheless can be conceived not to be such that it will be. And what was not nevertheless can be conceived to have been.[57] It is the mark of an elegant poet that he fabricates something that is false but nevertheless possible.[L16] The *Argenis* of Barclay[58] is possible, i.e., is

L16. IN THE MARGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY STRUCK: It should be said more clearly. Something is impossible whose essence is incompatible with itself, that is, *incongruous,* or rejected (such as those things that were not, are not, and will not be) whose essence is incompatible with existence; with Existence, i.e., with the first of existent entities, that is, with that which exists through itself, that is, God.

tincteque imaginabilis est, etsi certum sit nunquam vixisse nec credo victuram esse, nisi quis sit in ea haeresi, ut sibi persuadeat temporum restantium infinito decursu omnia possibilia aliquando extitura, nec ullam
129 fabulam somniari posse quae non saltem exiguo quodam modulo aliquando in mundo futura sit. Quod etsi concederemus, manet tamen *Argenidem* non fuisse impossibilem, etsi nondum extiterit. Qui secus sentiunt, necesse est discrimen possibilis et veri, necessarii et contingentis tollant, et detorta vocabulorum significatione, usui sese Generis humani opponant. Ergo peccata, damnationesque, caeteraque contingentium series necessaria non est, etsi rem necessariam, existentiam Dei, seu harmoniam rerum, consequatur; neque ergo quicquid nunquam fiet, factumque est, seu cum harmonia rerum consistere intelligi non potest, simpliciter intelligi non potest, vel impossibile est. Unde constat non esse impossibile seu non repugnare in terminis Judam salvari, etsi verum, certum, praevisum, per accidens necessarium seu ex harmonia rerum consequens sit nunquam salvatum iri.

TH. At obrepsit hic mos omnibus gentibus linguisque, et universali aequivocatione invaluit, ut quae constat esse fuisse, fore, vel non, ea necessaria impossibiliaque appellentur.

PH. Sed hoc ellipsi quadam reduplicationis, in quam cum idem bis dici debet, taedio repetitionum, omnis gens prona est, contingere ostendi.

TH. Ergo hinc fortasse petenda vera et ratio et solutio est jactati ubique terrarum sophismatis illius ignavi (λόγου ἀργοῦ) quo jam olim Philosophi, et nunc in belli pestisve periculis utili rectoribus persuasione, Mahometani conficere inepte conantur: frustra resisti, nihil agendum esse; fatalia enim non vitari; negata coelitus nec a laborante, donata etiam ab ignavo obtineri.

PH. Recte ais, nam argumentum hoc tam formidandum, tam in animis validum putida illa ellipsi hypotheseos causae, vel ipsius existentiae praesuppositae nixum sophisma est. Verum est quicquid futurum est, *vere* futurum esse sed non *necessario* absoluta necessitate, seu *quicquid agas, aut non agas.* Neque enim effectus necessarius nisi ex hypothesi causae.

clearly and distinctly imaginable, even if it is quite certain that she never lived, nor do I believe that she will ever live, unless one professes the heresy that believes that in the infinite course of time to come all possibles
129 will be produced at some time or other, and that there is no story that can be imagined that will not come about in the world at some time or other, at least in some slight measure.[59] And even if we were to allow that, nevertheless the fact remains that the *Argenis* would not be impossible, although she had not yet existed. Those who think otherwise necessarily destroy the difference between truth and possibility, necessity and contingency, and, having twisted the meaning of the words, they oppose themselves to the ordinary use of words. Therefore sins, damnations, and the other elements of the series of contingent things are not necessary, even if they follow from something necessary—the existence of God or the harmony of things. Therefore, it is not true that whatever never will be, nor was, i.e., what cannot be conceived to be consistent with the harmony of things cannot be conceived *simpliciter,* that is, is impossible. On this basis it is established that it is not impossible, ⟨i.e., a contradiction in terms,⟩ that Judas be saved, even if it is true, ⟨certain, foreseen, necessary *per accidens,* i.e., follows from the harmony of things,⟩ that he never will be saved.

TH: But this usage has insinuated itself to all people and into all languages and is strengthened by universal equivocation with the result that those things that are known to be, to have been, or to be about to be are called necessary and those not in this category are called impossible.

PH: But I have shown that this happens by an ellipsis of a reduplication to which everyone inclines because they dislike repetition, even in those cases where the same thing should be said twice over.

TH: Perhaps then from this source one must seek the true reason and solution of that famous fallacy of lazy reason, which has spread over the entire earth, and by which philosophers in the past and Mohammedans at present—through a conviction useful to their leaders during the dangers of war and pestilence—ineptly make an effort to establish the following: it is vain to resist; there is nothing to be done; for what is fated cannot be avoided. He who strives does not obtain what the heavens deny; he who is lazy obtains what the heavens give.

PH: What you say is right, for this argument, so much feared, so powerful in its effect on minds, is a sophism based on that objectionable ellipsis of the hypothesis of the cause or of the existence of the thing itself, which is presupposed. It is true that whatever will be, *truly* will be, but not *necessarily,* ⟨by an absolute necessity,⟩ i.e., *whatever you do or don't do.* For the effect is not necessary except given the hypothesis of the cause.[60]

TH. Ego tam periculose delirantes ita increpare soleo: stulte si in fatis est ut non vites malum, etiam stultitia fortasse tua fatalis est, ut vitare non cures; nemini sine mediis finis decretus est, media, industria vel occasiones; illi soli fidendum, his si occurrant tantum utendum: At, inquis, certum est tamen quicquid Deus praevidet seu quicquid futurum est, futurum esse. Fateor sed non sine mediis, et plerumque non sine facto tuo, raro enim ingerit se fortuna dormienti, etiam jura vigilantibus scripta sunt. Cum ergo non constet tibi pro te, an contra te decretum sit, ideo fac quasi
130 pro te, vel age quasi nihil decretum esset, quando quod inexploratum est, sequi agendo non potes. Quare si rem tuam egeris, quicquid fato, id est per harmoniam rerum evenerit, nihil tibi apud Deum praejudicabit. Tota de praescientia, Fato, praedestinatione, termino vitae disputatio nihil ad vitam instituendam. Omnia perinde agenda sunt, etsi de his nec cogitemus: si quis Deum constanter amabit, ipse se praedestinatum ab aeterno fuisse eventu declarabit, *possumus ergo praedestinati esse si velimus* (et quid ergo ultra queramur aut flagitemus?), quanquam sit gratiae, ut velimus.

PH. Verissime, utinam disputatoribus nostris posset persuaderi!

TH. Superest quaestio, an Deus peccata velit nolitve. Ac primum non videtur existentia peccata nolle. Deus enim nullius existentia dolet, quia omnino dolere non potest.[L17] Ergo nec existentia peccatorum. Sed qui rei existentiam non dolet, nec nolle existentem dicendus est.[L18] Nihil ergo Deus nolle dicendus est, nisi quod omnino non existit, eius enim nonexistentia dici potest ei grata esse. Cuius autem nonexistentia delectamur, id dicendi sumus nolle; idque per eas ipsas definitiones, quas tute attulisti.

L17. STENO: Ac si Deus non posset sine dolore nolle.

L18. IN THE MARGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY STRUCK: Saepe *Nolo* idem est, quod *non volo,* ut: *Nolo mortem peccatoris.*

TH: I am accustomed to rebuke those who rave so dangerously in the following manner: Fool, if it is fated that you will not avoid evil, perhaps also your foolishness is fated, namely your not taking care to avoid it. In no case is the end decreed without the means. The means are either [your own] effort or favorable circumstances. Effort alone is to be trusted; favorable circumstances may be employed only to the extent that they present themselves. But, you will say, it is nevertheless certain that whatever God foresees, that is, whatever will be, will be. I agree, but not without the means and, more often than not, not without a deed of yours, for fortune rarely forces itself on one who is sleeping; laws are written for those who are vigilant. Therefore since it is not evident to you whether something has been decreed in your favor or against you, act as if it had been decreed in
130 your favor or act as if nothing had been decreed, since you cannot conform your action to what is unknown to you.[61] That is why, if you take charge of your affairs, nothing of what will come about from fate, i.e., from the harmony of things, will be held against you by God.[62] The entire debate concerning foreknowledge, fate, predestination, the end of life contributes nothing toward how we direct our lives. All things would have to be done in the same manner, even if we were not to think about these matters. If someone loves God constantly, he makes clear by that act that he was predestined from all eternity; therefore *we are able to be predestined, if we will it* (and therefore what more do we seek or demand), although it requires grace in order for us to will it.[63]

PH: Quite true. If only our opponents could be persuaded!

TH: The question remains whether God wills in favor of sins or wills against them. And in the first place, it does not seem that God wills against those sins that exist. For God does not suffer on account of the existence of anything, because he cannot suffer at all.[L17] Therefore, God does not suffer on account of the existence of sins. But whoever does not suffer on account of the existence of a thing cannot be said to will against the existence of that thing.[L18] Therefore, God should be said to will against the existence of nothing except what does not exist at all, for its nonexistence can be said to be pleasing to God. The thing in whose nonexistence we delight we are said to will against, and that is a consequence of the very definitions you introduced.

L17. STENO: As if God were not able to will against something without sadness.

L18. IN THE MARGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY STRUCK: Often "to will against" means the same as "not willing in favor," as in, "I do not will in favor of the death of the sinner."[64]

PH. Recte concludis: Deus ipsa per se peccata si non existere intelligantur, nolle; si ita ferente harmonia rerum, existant, permittere, id est nec velle, nec nolle dicendus est.

TH. Imo vero velle videtur. Nam harmonia rerum Deo grata est, peccatorum existentia est de harmonia rerum. Cuius autem existentia delectamur id volumus, per definitionem tuam; ergo peccata Deus velle dicendus est.

PH. Inest deceptio ratiocinationi: Etsi harmonia grata sit, non tamen statim quicquid de harmonia est, gratum est. Non, si totum gratum est, etiam pars grata est. Etsi integra harmonia grata sit, ipsae tamen dissonantiae gratae non sunt, quamvis ex regulis artis immisceantur. Sed inamoenitas quae in ipsis est, excessu, imo profecto inde augmento amoenitatis in toto aboletur. Fit ergo dissonantia in hac mixtura, ob compensationem, ex ingrata indifferens, ex rejecta permissa, solum totum gratum, solum totum harmonicum, sola totius velut configuratio, harmonia est. Beatitudine salvatorum Deus existente delectatur, amissa damnatorum non dolet, quia re nulla dolet, ob sublatum in universali harmonia, compensatione dolorem.

TH. Satisfecisti profecto supra spem meam maximae difficultati, ostendistique (quod hactenus vix quisquam) rationis esse ut peccata quae
131 eveniunt, Deus nec velle, nec nolle, sed *permittere* dicatur.

PH. Nihilne restat ergo?

TH. Praevideo quid de *autore peccati* dicturus sis.

PH. Non Deum scilicet sed hominem, diabolumve esse, qui soli volunt, id est malo delectantur.

TH. Recte hoc: *id est malo delectantur.* Nam alioquin opponi poterat etiam hominem diabolumve peccata permittere tantum. Facere eos quicquid rebus suis congruat, intercurrens damnum alienum non nisi ferre, sed hoc de mortaliter peccante dici non potest, in quo odium Dei, id est boni universalis, ergo ex contrario, seu peccato delectatio est. Sed quid de venialiter lapso imprudente potius quam malo, nonne permittere peccata dicemus?

PH: You argue correctly. God must be said to will against sins in their own right if they are understood not to exist.[65] If sins exist because the harmony of things brings them about, then it must be said that God permits them, i.e., he neither wills in favor of their existence nor wills against it.

TH: On the contrary, it seems that he wills in their favor. For the harmony of things is pleasing to God, and the existence of sins arises from the harmony of things. Moreover, we will in favor of the existence of that which delights us, according to your definition; therefore, God must be said to will in favor of sins.

PH: That is an illusion of reasoning:[66] even if harmony is pleasing, nevertheless it does not immediately follow that whatever arises from this harmony is pleasing. Because the whole is pleasing it does not follow that each part is pleasing. Even if the entire harmony is pleasing, nevertheless the dissonant aspects of it in themselves are not pleasing, in spite of the fact that they are combined according to the rules of art. But the unpleasantness that exists in these things considered in themselves is dispelled by the departure or, rather, actually by the increase from that source of the pleasantness of the whole. Hence, because of this compensation, the dissonant in this mixture is made indifferent from what was displeasing, the permitted from what was rejected. Only the whole is pleasing, only the whole is harmonious, only the configuration, as it were, of the whole is a harmony. God is pleased by the existing beatitude of those who are saved; he does not suffer because of the lost beatitude of the damned, because he does not suffer because of anything since suffering is canceled in the universal harmony by compensation.

TH: Actually, you have satisfied me beyond my hope concerning this very great difficulty, and you have shown (what up to now almost no one has shown) that it conforms with reason to say that God neither wills in favor of, nor wills against, those sins that occur, but rather *permits* them.[67]

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PH: Hence, no objection remains?

TH: I foresee what you would say concerning the *author of sin.*

PH: Namely, that it is not God but rather man, or the devil, who alone will in favor of sin, i.e., take delight in evil.[68]

TH: That is the right way to put the matter, that *they take delight in evil.* For otherwise it could be objected that men or the devil also only permit sins, that they do whatever coincides with their own advantage, and that they only allow the harm to another which accompanies this. But this cannot be said about a person who sins mortally, in whom there is hatred of God, that is, of the universal good, and therefore, on the contrary, there is delight in sin. But what about someone who commits a venial lapse imprudently rather than maliciously; shall we say that he permits sins?[69]

PH. Ne hunc quidem, quia *permittere* per definitionem supra positam, est nec velle, nec nolle, attamen scire, quod abest ex errore peccanti: vult, id quod peccatum est, id est actum; peccatum ipsum nec vult nec permittit, quia nescit. Breviter: Deus permittit peccata quia scit ea quae permittit, contra bonum publicum non esse, sed aliter hanc dissonantiam compensari. Homo vero mortaliter peccans scit id quod agit esse contra bonum publicum, quantum ipse judicare potest, *nec ei conciliari posse nisi poena sua,* quam cum oderit, et actum tamen velit, necesse est eum bonum publicum vel regimen mundi odisse, adeoque mortaliter peccat.

TH. Satisfecisti mihi profecto, voluntatemque Dei a peccatis egregie absolvisti. Nam ut contraham quae dixisti, si peccamus quia *possumus volumusque,* et potentiae nostrae ratio tum a connatis, tum receptis est, connata a parentibus, recepta ab alimentis, utraque ergo ab externis erunt. Porro si volendi causa intellectio, intellectionis causa sensio, sentiendi causa est objectum, objecti status est ab externis; erit ergo et potentia et voluntas peccandi ab externis, id est statu rerum praesente, status rerum praesens a praecedente, praecedens ab alio praecedente, et ita porro: status ergo praesens a serie rerum, series rerum ab Harmonia universali, Harmonia universalis ab ipsis illis aeternis, immutabilibusque ideis, ideae intellectu divino contentae a se ipsis nullo voluntatis divinae intercursu, neque enim Deus intelligit, quia vult, sed quia est. Peccata ergo quia propria harmonia grata non sunt, non nisi ob alienam, id est universalem, non aliter sibi constantem a voluntate divina tantum permittentur.

132 PH. Quid ergo porro objicis?

TH. Non pauca certe, nondum enim omnes difficultates exivimus. Nam quid refert peccata conciliari bonitati divinae, si nequeant libertati nostrae? quid prodest Deum absolvi, si improbi cum illo; quo fructu eximemus voluntatem divinam, si extinguimus omnem? Quae enim obsecro libertas humana est si ab externis pendemus, si sunt quae nos efficiunt

PH: No, not even of this person, because *to permit* according to the definition above is not to will in favor nor to will against but to know. This knowledge is lacking in the one sinning through error. He wills what is sinful, i.e., the act. The sin itself he neither wills nor permits because he does not have knowledge of it. In brief: God permits sins because he knows that what he permits is not contrary to the general good, for this dissonance is compensated for in another way. However, a man, sinning mortally, knows that what he does is contrary to the general good, as far as he is able to judge, and that what he does *cannot be reconciled with the general good except through his own punishment.* Since he hates his own punishment and yet wills the action, it follows that he hates the general good, i.e. the governance of the world, and so he sins mortally.

TH: You have surely satisfied me, and you have splendidly absolved the will of God from sins. Drawing together what you said: if we sin because *we are able to do so and we will to do so,* and if the basis of our power is in the first place from what is innate and then from what we have taken in, the innate from our parents, what we have taken in from our nature, then in either case it is from external things. Furthermore, if the exercise of the intellect is the cause of willing, perception the cause of the exercise of the intellect, the object the cause of perception, and if the condition of the object depends on external things, then both the power and the will for sinning depend on external things, that is, on the present state of things. The present state of things depends on the preceding state of things, the preceding state on another state preceding it, and so forth. Therefore the present state depends on the series of things. The series of things depends on the universal harmony. The universal harmony depends on those well-known eternal and immutable ideas themselves. The ideas contained in the divine intellect do not depend, by themselves, on an intervention of the divine will. For God does not understand because he wills but rather because he exists. Therefore, since sins are not pleasing because of their own harmony, they are permitted by the divine will solely because of a harmony foreign to them, i.e. the universal harmony, which cannot be realized otherwise.

132 PH: What further objections do you have?

TH: Many, for certainly we have not warded off all the difficulties yet. For what is the importance of reconciling sins to the divine goodness, if they cannot be reconciled with our freedom? What's the good of absolving God, if the wicked are absolved with him? What is the gain in exempting the divine will if we extinguish all will? For what, I implore, is human freedom if we depend on external things, if they are what causes us to will,

velle, si fatalis quaedam connexio non minus cogitationes nostras quam atomorum flexus ac concursus regit.

PH. Ne excandesce quaeso in sententiam parum recte intellectam, parum dextre expressam; propositum a te ipso est, et concessum supra nihil esse sine ratione sufficiente, erit ergo ratio quaedam sufficiens, etiam ipsius actus volendi; Ergo vel actui ipsi inerit, erit ille ergo Ens a se seu Deus, quod est absurdum; vel ratio eius sufficiens quaerenda est extra ipsum. Ut ergo rationem actus volendi sufficientem inveniamus, definiendum est quid sit velle. Quid est ergo *velle aliquid*?

TH. Eius existentia delectari, uti tute supra definivisti, sive reapse existens sentiamus, sive non existentis existentiam imaginemur.

PH. Delectatio autem est sensus harmoniae, per superiora; nihil ergo volumus nisi quod harmonicum apparet. Quid autem harmonicum appareat a sentientis et objecti et medii dispositione pendet. Quare etsi sit in potestate nostra facere quae volumus, non est tamen in potestate velle quae volumus, sed quae grata sentimus, sive quae bona esse statuimus. Statuere autem aliquid vel non statuere, non est in potestate, nemo ne si se ruperit quidem volendo nolendove, sine rationibus effecerit, ut quod credit, non credat. Cum ergo non sit opinio in potestate voluntatis, erit nec voluntas in potestate voluntatis. Et pone nos velle quia velimus, cur volumus velle? rursusne ob aliam voluntatem, an ob nihil, id est sine ratione?

TH. Non habeo quid respondeam rationi tuae, sed nec tu quod objectioni meae, liberum arbitrium nobis ita periisse.

PH. Fateor, si cum nonnullis id definias: potentiam quae potest agere et non agere positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis omnibusque extra intraque agentem existentibus paribus.

TH. Quid? an vitiosa haec definitio est?

PH. Prorsus nisi explicationem recipiat.[L19] Aliquid (hoc loco actionem)

L19. STENO: Fiat analysis requisitorum quae necessario concurrunt ut res sensu destituta moveatur, et requisitorum quae necessario concurrunt ut homo aliquid moveat, sane ibi positis omnibus materialibus ad motum requisitis necessario sequitur motus, hic positis omnibus materialibus ad motum requisitis et intra corpus

if a certain fatal connection guides our thoughts no less than the turnings and collisions of atoms?[70]

PH: I ask that you not flare up at a view seldom understood correctly, seldom expressed accurately. It was proposed by you yourself and agreed to earlier that nothing exists without a sufficient reason. Therefore, there will be a certain sufficient reason even for an act of will either in the act of will itself—hence it will be the self-sufficient being, i.e., God, which is absurd—or its sufficient reason is to be sought outside itself. Hence in order for us to discover the sufficient reason of an act of will, we must define what it is to will. So, what is it *to will something?*

TH: To be delighted by its existence, as you yourself defined it earlier, whether we actually experience its existence or we imagine the existence of what does not actually exist.

PH: Now by our previous definitions delight is the experience of harmony. Therefore, we will nothing except what appears harmonious. However, what appears harmonious depends on the disposition of the percipient, the object, and the medium. That is why even if it is in our power to do what we will, nevertheless it is not in our power to will what we will. Rather, we will what we experience as pleasing, i.e., judge to be good. But to judge or not judge that something holds is not in our power. No one, not even if he were to tear himself apart by willing in favor or willing against, would bring it about without a reason that what he believes he would no longer believe. Therefore, since opinion is not under the power of the will, the will itself will not be under the power of the will.[71] And suppose that we will because we will to, then why do we will to will? Is it on account of yet another will or on account of nothing at all, i.e., without reason?

TH: I do not know how I should respond to your argument, but you have not responded to my objection that according to your position, free choice is destroyed in us.[72]

PH: I admit it if you define free choice as some do thus: a power that can act and not act, all the requisites for acting having been posited and, moreover, everything both outside the agent and inside the agent being equal.[73]

TH: What? Can it really be that this definition is faulty?

PH: Certainly, unless we explain it.[L19] That something (in this case the

L19. STENO: Let there be an analysis of the requisites that necessarily concur so that something lacking sensation is moved, and an analysis of the requisites that necessarily concur so that a man move something. To be sure, in the former case once all the material requisites for motion have been posited, the motion will necessarily follow. In the latter case, once all the material requisites for motion have

133 non existere existentibus licet omnibus suis requisitis, quid aliud est, quam definitum non existere, existente licet definitione, vel idem simul esse, et non esse? Si quid non existit, requisitum profecto aliquod deesse necesse est, quia nihil aliud est definitio, quam enumeratio requisitorum.

TH. Emendanda ergo definitio est: *Liberum arbitrium* est potentia agendi, aut non agendi, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, scilicet externis.

PH. Ergo sensus erit, etsi omnia agendi adminicula sint in promptu, posse me tamen omittere actionem, si scilicet agere nolim. Quo nihil verius, nihil mihi minus adversum. Etiam Aristoteles *spontaneum* definivit cum principium agendi in agente est, et *Liberum,* spontaneum cum electione. Unde unumquodque eo magis suae spontis est, quo magis eius actus ex eius natura fluunt, et quo minus ab externis immutantur; et eo magis liberum, quo magis capax electionis, id est quo plura intelligit pura et quieta mente. Spontaneum ergo a potentia, libertas a scientia. Sed posita intra nos opinione bonitatis non velle, posita voluntate suppetentibusque simul adminiculis externis cognitis non agere impossibile est. Nihil ergo alienius quam liberi arbitrii notionem in nescio quam inauditam absurdamque potentiam agendi, aut non agendi sine ratione, transformare velle, qualem nemo sanus sibi optet. Sufficit ad tuendum liberi arbitrii privilegium ita nos in bivio vitae collocatos esse, ut non nisi quae volumus facere, non nisi quae bona credimus velle; quae autem bona habenda sint amplissimo dato rationis usu, indagare possimus:[L20] ita minus habemus

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et extra corpus, etiamnum pro mentis arbitrio potest vel non fieri vel aliter fieri motus, ponendo inter materialia corporis etiam phantasmata imaginationis.

LEIBNIZ: Concedo de materialibus requisitis, sed ad liberam actionem requiruntur et immaterialia, quanquam ea quodammodo ad materialium quoque motus requirantur.

L20. STENO: At si ad indagandum etiam requiritur arbitrium? vel ergo frustra laudatur amplissimum rationis donum, vel admittenda utendi eo libertas.

LEIBNIZ: Quasi vero hanc libertatem utendi quisquam neget. Non capio imaginationes quas—censor sibi haec legens finxit.

133 action) does not exist although all its requisites exist—how is this different from the thing defined not existing although what defines it does exist or that one and the same thing, at one and the same time, exists and does not exist? If something does not exist, certainly some requisite must be lacking because a definition is nothing but an enumeration of requisites.[74]

TH: So we must correct the definition as follows: *free choice* is the power of acting or not acting, all the requisites—that is, all the external requisites—for acting having been posited.

PH: Hence, the sense will be: even if all the aids for acting are at my disposal, I can nevertheless omit the action, if in fact I will not to do it. Nothing is truer, nothing less opposed to my position. Indeed, Aristotle defined *spontaneity*[75] as obtaining when the principle of action is in the agent, ⟨and *freedom*[76] as spontaneity with choice. From which we may conclude that each person is all the more spontaneous the more his acts flow from his nature, and the less they are altered by external matters, and all the more free the greater his capacity for choice, that is, the more he understands many things with a pure and tranquil mind. Therefore spontaneity comes from power, freedom from knowledge.⟩ But having posited that we believe something good, it is not possible that we do not will it; having posited that we will it and at the same time that we know that the external aids are available, it is not possible that we do not act.[77] Therefore, nothing is more unsuitable than to want to transform the notion of free choice into I do not know what kind of unheard of and absurd power of acting or not acting without reason—such a power no sane person would select for himself. It is sufficient for protecting the privilege of free choice that we are placed at a crossroad of our lives so that we can do only what we will, to will only what we believe good, and to investigate by the most ample use of reason what things are to be considered good.[L20] Thus, we have less

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been posited, both within the body and outside the body, even then, because of the choice of the mind the motion can either not occur or occur differently, even placing among the material requisites of the body the phantasms of the imagination.

LEIBNIZ: I concede this with respect to material requisites, but for a free action immaterial ones are also required, although in some way, these are also required for the motion of material things.

L20. STENO: But what if choice is required even for investigation? Therefore, either the most ample gift of reason is praised in vain or it is necessary to admit the freedom to make use of it.

LEIBNIZ: As though someone would deny this freedom to make use of it. I cannot imagine what my critic supposed while reading these things.

cur naturam incusemus, quam si nobis monstrosam illam potentiam rationalis cuiusdam irrationalitatis dedisset.

134 TH. At sunt quidam qui tantam sibi libertatem asserunt ut posse se dicant facere aliquid aut omittere scientes prudentesque sine ulla ratione (*par caprice*).

PH. Hos ego decipere aut decipi audacter dico. Haec ipsa ex caperatae frontis pertinacia voluptas (nunquam Voluntas sola) pro ratione est.

TH. At propone me tibi manu ad gesticulandum parata, nonne absolute possum vertere huc illuc?

PH. Potes flectere quovis.

TH. Quae ergo ratio est cur nunc ut vides potius dextrorsum vertam?

PH. Ne dubita subesse quasdam rationes subtiles, nam forte ita tibi primum in mentem venit, quia primum in sensum: fortasse suetior illuc manus, aut molestus nuper in alteram partem, in hanc felix ictus, quaeque sunt aliae minutiae circumstantiarum nullo calamo depingendae.

TH. Praedic tu, praedicat Angelus, imo Deus in quam me partem versurus sim, statim in contrariam flectam, asseramque ingratiis Prophetae, libertatem meam.

PH. Non ideo liberior eris, ita enim ipsa contradicendi voluptas tibi pro ratione est, quod propheta ille, si infallibilis est, etsi tibi non praedicat, si te praedictionis contrarium acturum sciat, tamen tacitus praevidebit, aut etiam apud tertium, te inscio vaticinabitur.

TH. Ergone mihi ipsi verum praedicere non potest? Sed quidni possit, si veritatem praenovit: quivis enim quod scit dicere potest, audiente quovis. At ipso dicente contrarium faciam; ergo non praenovit quid facturus essem, quod est contra Hypothesin. Ergo aut praescientia aut libertas tolletur.

PH. Subtilis haec argutatio est, sed qua illud tantum concludit, Mentem quae eius sit naturae, ut velit possitque contrarium facere vel velle, eius quod praedici possit a quocunque, ex eorum esse numero quae sunt incompatibilia Existentiae Entis omniscii seu harmoniae rerum, adeoque nec fuere nec sunt nec erunt.

reason for blaming nature than if it had given us this monstrous power of some rational irrationality.

134 TH: But there are certain persons who claim so much freedom for themselves that they say they can do something or omit it, with knowledge and prudence, without any reason (capriciously).

PH: I say confidently that they either deceive or are deceived. This very pleasure derived from pig-headed obstinacy serves as a reason (never the will by itself).

TH: But imagine that I am ready to wave my hand at you; am I not able absolutely to turn it this way or that?

PH: You can direct it as you like.

TH: Well then in your opinion what is the reason why I now turn it to the right rather than otherwise?

PH: Do not doubt that there are some subtle reasons that form a basis, for perhaps it first came into your mind in this manner because it first came into your senses that way. Perhaps this motion is more usual for this hand, or perhaps recently motion in the opposite direction was annoying and in this direction auspicious. The minutiae of circumstances are different in each case; no pen can portray them.

TH: You predict, let an angel predict, let even God predict, in which direction I will turn my hand; immediately I will turn it in the opposite direction, and contrary to the prophet I will assert my freedom.

PH: You will not therefore be more free, for in this case the pleasure itself of contradicting serves as a reason for you. And this situation will nevertheless be silently foreseen by that prophet, if he is infallible, even if he does not announce it in advance to you, since he knows that you would do the opposite of his prediction. Nevertheless, he will foresee it silently, or without your knowing it, he will prophesy it in the presence of a third party.

⟨TH: Then can he not predict the truth to me personally? But why can't he, if he foreknows the truth? For anyone can say what he knows to anyone who listens. But I will do the contrary of the very thing he says; therefore, he did not foreknow what I would do, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, either foreknowledge or freedom will be destroyed.

PH: This piece of reasoning is subtle, but only insofar as it reaches the following conclusion: a mind which is of such a nature that it would want and be able to do or to will the opposite of what can be predicted is among those things that are incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being, i.e., the harmony of things, and so neither has existed, exists, or will exist.⟩[78]

TH. Sed quid dices ad vulgatum illud, *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*

PH. Quid? nisi si parum recte intelligatur absurdum esse. Medea, cuius apud Ovidium haec verba sunt, hoc sibi vult, videre se injustitiam facti, cum liberos ipsa suos trucidat, sed tamen voluptatem ex vindicta velut majus bonum quam scelus malum est, praevalere; vel paucis: peccare se contra conscientiam. Melius ergo ac deterius in illo versu usurpatur pro justo et turpi, [non] ergo hinc probari poterit, eligi unquam quod deterius esse in summa, eligens opinetur. Qui contra sentit, omnia rei moralis principia evertit, et ne dicere quidem potest, quid sit velle.

TH. Prope persuades.

PH. O ergo stultos nos, qui spretis naturae Deique privilegiis, chimaeras quasdam imperceptibiles postulamus, nec rationis usu contenti, vera radice libertatis; nisi potestas brutalitatis fiat, satis nos liberos esse non putamus! quasi non summa libertas sit, et intellectu suo et voluntate perfectissime uti, ac proinde a rebus ad agnoscenda, intellectum, ab intellectu ad amplectenda vera bona, voluntatem cogi; veritati irresistibilem esse, puros recipere radios objectorum, et irrefractos, nec affectuum nube decoloratos. Qui si absint tam nobis impossibile est cogitando errare, volendo peccare, quam attento animo, apertis oculis, nullo vitio depravatis objectum coloratum justae magnitudinis distantiaeque in medio perspicuo illustrato non videre. Certe Dei libertas summa est, etsi errare in delectu optimorum non possit, et Angelorum felicium aucta, cum labiles esse desiere. Libertas ergo a rationis usu est, quae prout pura infectave est, aut recti incedimus regia officiorum via, aut per avia titubamus.

TH. Ergo peccatum omne ab errore.

PH. Fateor.

TH. Ergo peccatum omne excusandum.

PH. Minime, nam in mediis tenebris illabente quadam, velut per rimas luce, evadendi ratio in potestate est, modo uti velimus.

TH. Sed cur alii volunt uti, alii non volunt.

PH. Quia non volentibus ne in mentem quidem venit, se uti cum fructu posse, aut ita in animo est, quasi non esset, id est absque *reflexione* sive *At-*

TH: But what will you say to the well-known expression "I see the better and approve it, but I follow the worse."[79]

PH: What? Just this—if it is not correctly understood, it is absurd. Medea, whose words those are, as written by Ovid, meant this by them. She saw the injustice of her deed when she slaughtered her own children, but nevertheless the pleasure of revenge prevailed as if it were a greater good than the wicked deed was evil. In short, she sinned against her con-
135 science. Therefore, in this verse *better* and *worse* are used in place of *just* and *shameful*. Therefore, from this one cannot prove that sometimes something is chosen which, in the opinion of the chooser, is worse, taken as a whole. Whoever believes the opposite subverts all principles of morality and cannot even say what willing is.[80]

TH: You have almost persuaded me.

PH: Well then, how foolish we are, who, having spurned the privileges of God and nature, demand a kind of unknown chimera, not being content with the use of reason, the true root of freedom. Unless an irrational power is given to us, we believe that we are not sufficiently free, as if it were not the highest freedom to use our own intellect and will perfectly and, accordingly, for the intellect to be constrained by things to recognize true goods, and for the will to be constrained by the intellect to embrace them—to be unable to resist the truth, to receive pure rays from objects, not refracted or discolored by a cloud of passion. If those passions are absent it is as impossible for us to err in thinking, to sin in willing, as it is for an attentive mind, with eyes open, not distorted by some fault, not to see in a transparent, illuminated medium a colored object at its proper distance and magnitude. Certainly the freedom of God is the highest kind, even though he cannot err in selecting the best, and that of the blessed angels was augmented, when they were no longer able to fall. Therefore, freedom comes from the use of reason, and insofar as reason is pure or, on the other hand, infected, we proceed correctly on the royal road of duties, or we stagger through a wasteland.[81]

TH: So all sin arises from error.

PH: I agree.

TH: Therefore all sin must be excused.[82]

PH: By no means, for like a light penetrating through cracks in the darkness, the means of escaping is in our power, provided we will to make use of them.

TH: But why is it that some will to use them, and others do not?

PH: Because in the case of those who do not will to make use of them, it does not even come into their minds that they are able to profitably do so

tentione, ut videntes non videant, audientes non audiant. In quo sita initia sunt *negatae gratiae,* ac velut scriptura sacra appellat indurationis. Quotusquisque nostrum non millies audivit illud: *dic cur hic* seu *respice finem* sive *vide quid agas,* et tamen certum est una sola sententia eiusmodi recte percepta, et quibusdam velut legibus poenisque severe sancitis constanter praefixa,[L21] hominem unumquemque, velut oculi quodam ictu, *momentanea metamorphosi,* fore infallibilem et prudentem, et beatum, supra omnia paradoxa sapientis Stoicorum.[L22]

TH. Nonne ergo omnes mali denique sunt in ultima resolutione censendi
136 infelices, quia obversantem sibi tam facilem expeditamque felicitatis viam non animadvertere.

PH. Fateor.

TH. Et miserandi.

PH. Non possum negare.

TH. Et malitiam infortunio debentes.

PH. Manifestum: est enim ultima ratio voluntatis extra volentem. Et demonstratum est in seriem rerum, seu harmoniam universalem haec denique omnia refundi.

TH. Et similes insanis.

PH. Prope verum, sed non omnino. Insani recolligere sese et cogitare illud: *dic cur hic,* quo omnis prudentia continetur, ac si in mentem veniat, insistere ei, ne si velint quidem possunt, non magis quam ebrii, aut somniantes. At stulti, errantes, malitiosi, utuntur sane sed non ad summam rerum; deliberant sed de quovis potius quam felicitate. Insanos morbus et materia quaedam nervis spiritibusque inimica, et quaedam velut insomnia turbant. Stultis malisque rationem ratio alia pervertit, minor majorem, certa quaedam, temperamento, educatione, usu inolita, universalem, nec dubium tamen malos tam stultos apparere angelis, quam stulti nobis.

L21. IN THE MARGIN: NB. NB. NB.

L22. STENO: Scriptu dictuque facilia, sed quomodo cum systemate concilianda? LEIBNIZ: Signum est censorem hoc systema non bene percipere.

or it comes into their souls in such a way that it is as though it were not there, that is, without *reflection* or *attention,* so that while seeing they do not see, while hearing they do not hear.[83] In this is found the origin of that *refusal of grace,* or as sacred Scripture calls it, hardening of the heart.[84] How many of us have not heard a thousand times the saying "Say why you do this now" or "Pay attention to your goal" or "Watch what you do,"[85] and nevertheless it is certain that by means of a single, unique maxim of this type, correctly understood, and constantly set in front of us—as if ratified in earnest by certain laws and punishments[L21]—each man, as if in the blink of an eye, *by an instantaneous metamorphosis,* will become infallible and prudent and blessed beyond all the paradoxes of the wise person of the stoics.[L22]

TH: Is it not true then that all who are evil, in the last analysis must be considered unhappy because they have not turned their attention toward
136 the way of happiness, so easily and expeditiously observed by them?

PH: I agree.

TH: And are they not to be pitied?

PH: I cannot deny it.

TH: And so they owe their badness to misfortune.

PH: It is manifest, because the ultimate ground of the will is outside the one who wills. It has been demonstrated that in the end, all these matters come back to the series of things, that is, the universal harmony.[86]

TH: And similar remarks hold for the insane.

PH: Almost true, but not entirely. Pulling themselves together and thinking "Say why you do this now," in which all prudence is contained, and if the thought came to mind, holding on to it—these are things that insane people cannot do even if they want to, no more than drunks or dreamers. The foolish, the mistaken, the evildoers use their reason in a sane way but not with an eye on the most important things; they deliberate about everything but happiness. A sickness and a matter harmful to the nerves and animal spirits, along with a certain insomnia, so to speak, disturb the insane. In the case of fools and evildoers reason is perverted by reason of another kind, a lesser reason perverts the greater reason, a certain particular reason, fixed in the mind by temperament, education, and use perverts universal reason. ⟨And so it cannot be doubted that evildoers appear as foolish to angels as fools do to us.⟩

L21. IN THE MARGIN: NB. NB. NB.

L22. STENO: Things easy to write and say, but how are they to be reconciled with the system?

LEIBNIZ: This is a sign that my critic does not grasp my system well.

TH. Ergo similes saltem erunt quarta ut ajunt luna natis, male educatis, seductis conversatione, conjugio perditis, adversitate efferatis, qui se negare non possunt sceleratos, habent tamen cur sive de fortuna, sive de hominibus, desperatae vitae occasione, querantur.

PH. *Ita est omnino, imo ita necesse est esse, nemo ipse se volens malum fecit, alioquin antequam fieret esset.*

TH. At vero *nunc animis opus est, nunc pectore firmo, ventum ad supremum est,* venimus ad fastigium difficultatis nec sentientes, si te hic fortuna non deseret, in perpetuum vicisti. Nam objicit se nobis indeclinabilis illa, et quicquid etiam cavillemur justa species querimoniae damnatorum: ita natos sese, ita in mundum missos, in tempora, in homines, in occasiones incidisse, ut non potuerint non perire; occupatam praemature vitiosis cogitationibus mentem, fuisse quae foverent malum, quae stimularent; defuisse quae liberarent, quae retinerent, velut conspirantibus in miserorum interitum fatis. Si qua monita salubria intervenerint, attentionem eos, atque illam ipsam *reflexionem,* sapientiae animam; illud: *dic cur hic;* illud: *Respice finem,* maximum *gratiae* donum, quo solo recte percepto evigilamus, destituisse. Quam iniquum illud, in communi somno aliquos excitari, caeteros mactationi relinqui! Si necesse erat tot creaturas perire, si non aliter constabat ratio mundi, at sorte fuisse ducendos infelices.

PH. Ita factum est quoque, idem enim est fato aliquid seu sorte, et ob harmoniam universalem contingere.

137 TH. Ne interpella quaeso, dum omnia audias. Quam crudele enim, miseriam, qui fecerit, immotum intueri, patrem, qui male genuerit, qui pessime educaverit, puniendum ipsummet, etiam punire velle. Maledicent naturae rerum, ut perderet foecundae, Deo aliorum miseria felici, sibi quod extingui non possint, seriei universi, quae se quoque implicuit, denique ipsi illi aeternae immutabilique possibilitati Idearum, primae scaturigini malorum suorum; harmoniae universalis, et in ea existentiae rerum, determinatrici; ac proinde in non alium ex tot possibilibus statum

TH: Therefore, at any rate, they will be similar to those born on the fourth day after the new moon, as they say, to those poorly educated, to those led astray by social intercourse, to those destroyed by a marriage, to those embittered by adversity.[87] They cannot deny that they are wicked. Nevertheless, they have occasion to complain, either about their fate or about people, because of their desperate lives.

PH: *It is entirely so; indeed, it must be so. No one voluntarily makes himself evil, otherwise he would already be evil before he made himself evil.*[88]

TH: But truly *we now need our whole understanding and a firm heart, for we have reached the summit*;[89] we have arrived at the chief point of the difficulty without noticing it. If fortune does not desert you here you will have won forever. For this inexorable difficulty is placed before us, whatever sophistry we may employ: the apparent justice of the lament of the damned, that they were born in such a way, sent into the world in such a way, came upon such times, persons, and occasions that they were not able not to perish; their minds, occupied prematurely by vicious thoughts, existed in circumstances that favored evil, that stimulated evil; they lacked circumstances that would have released them, that would have restrained them, as if the fates conspired in the ruin of the wretched. If any helpful advice had intervened, they would have lacked the attention, and that very *reflection,* which is the soul of wisdom, namely, "Say why you are doing this now"; and "Pay heed to the goal," the greatest gift of *grace.* Only by perceiving this correctly are we vigilant. How unfair that in the shared sleep some are awakened while others are left to the slaughter! If it were necessary for so many creatures to perish, if otherwise the foundation of the world would not stand, at least those who are to be unhappy should have been chosen by lot.

⟨PH: That is how, in fact, it has happened. For it is all the same whether something takes place by fate, by lot, or because of the universal harmony.
137 TH: I ask that you not interrupt until you hear all of it.⟩ How cruel when the one who has brought about the misery contemplates it unmoved—the father who procreated badly, who provided the worst education, who ought to be punished himself actually wishes to punish. The damned curse the nature of things, fruitful for bringing about their destruction; they curse God who is happy at the misery of others; they curse themselves because they cannot be annihilated; they curse the series of the universe, which also involves them; and finally they curse the eternal and immutable possibility itself of the Ideas, which is the first source of their ills, the determiner of the universal harmony, and therewith of the existence of things, which accordingly bursts forth from so many possibilities in just

universi erumpenti, quam [quo] ipsorum miseria, ut aliorum felicitas scilicet conspectior esset, contineretur.

PH. Satis tragice, non aeque juste: quod tibi tum signis quibusdam, tum certa ratione luculenter, Deo cuius interest, vires animumque ministrante, demonstrabo. Quam vana ergo querela sit, vel hinc aestimes, quod jactari potest a damnato, non a damnando, etsi ea omnia quae damnatus sciet, iam tum praenosset. Potestne obsecro ipsum per se tempus, si nihil aliud immutetur, ex injusto facere justum? Non, opinor, neque enim temporis sed rerum in tempore decurrentium efficacia est. Ergo si injusta damnandi eadem omnia scientis, querela est, erit et damnati. Propone igitur tibi hominem damnandum, fac eius oculis animoque, quantus horrore ac profunditate est, infernum exhiberi, adde ipsimet monstrari angulum illum, aeternis eius, si sic agat, tormentis destinatum. Poteritne queri vivus vidensque de Deo, aut natura rerum, damnationis suae causis?

TH. Non poterit tunc quidem, quia statim responderi ei potest, posse eum, si velit, non damnari.[L23]

PH. Hoc volebam scilicet. Ponamus igitur, eundem nihilominus pergere, et (ex hypothesi) damnari, poteritne tunc ullo juris colore recurrere ad easdem querelas jam tum explosas, poteritne miseriam suam alteri imputare quam voluntati suae?

TH. Vicisti potius quam satisfecisti.

PH. Faxo ut re clare percepta, etiam satisfactum tibi fateare.

TH. Fateor, omnia imputabit voluntati suae, sed voluntatem suam fortunae, id est Deo, vel saltem, ut tu vis, naturae rerum.

L23. STENO: At hoc ex posita serie rerum ipsi non licet.

LEIBNIZ: Dico posse si velit. At non volet. Ita est tam ex mea quam communi opinione, utique enim Deus praevidit quod non volet.

the state of the universe that contains their misery, so that the happiness of others is the more conspicuous.

PH: That sounds tragic, but it is not equally well-founded. I will clearly demonstrate this to you both by certain indications and by precise reasoning, provided that God, whom this concerns, supplies the strength and the spirit. You may perhaps judge how empty this complaint is from the fact that it can be pronounced by the damned, not by those who are damnable—those currently worthy of being damned—even though all that the damned will come to know the damnable at this time already anticipate.[90] I ask you, can time itself, if nothing else is altered, make what is just from what was unjust? I don't think so, for efficacy is not a matter of time but of things passing through time. Therefore, if the complaint of the damnable is unjust because they have the same knowledge as the damned, so also will be the complaint of the damned. Imagine, then, a person currently worthy of damnation; let hell in all its horror and depth be exhibited to his eyes and soul, add that he himself is shown that corner destined for his eternal torments, if he continues to act in the same way. Will a person, living and seeing these things, be able to complain about God or the nature of things as the cause of his damnation?

TH: In those circumstances, he will certainly not be able to do so because one can immediately reply that he can avoid being damned if he wills it.[L23]

PH: That is exactly what I meant. Therefore, let us suppose that this same person nevertheless proceeds and (*ex hypothesi*) is damned. In that case, will he be able to return to these same complaints already discredited of any appearance of justification? Will he be able to impute his misery to anything other than his own will?

TH: You have overwhelmed, rather than satisfied me.[91]

PH: I'll see to it that you admit yourself satisfied, once you have perceived the matter clearly.

TH: I admit that he will impute everything to his own will, but he will impute his will to fortune, i.e., to God, or at any rate, as you would have it, to the nature of things.

L23. STENO: But this is not open to him, given the series of things that has been posited.

LEIBNIZ: I say he can, were he to will it. But he will not will it. Thus, on this point, my opinion is the same as the common opinion, for in any event God foresees that he won't will it.

PH. Praedixi tibi, contrarium implicare contradictionem, neminem se volentem facere malum, alioquin esset malus antequam fieret; Neminem esse causam voluntariam voluntatis suae, nam quod quis vult velle, jam
138 vult, quemadmodum, ut Regula Juris ait, *qui potest facere ut possit jam potest.* Si haec ergo excusatio recipienda est, tollenda est poena de natura rerum; nemo malus erit, nemo puniendus, nemo inexcusatus.

TH. Quid ergo?

PH. Quid? nisi in omnibus judiciis ad poenam infligendam; cognitam pessimam, deliberatamque voluntatem, undecunque profectam, sufficere censeri. Quae ergo haec Censorum Justitiae Divinae stultitia est, in poena defendenda ultra voluntatem compertam scelerati, id est in infinitum, ire velle?

TH. Persuasisti, nullum excusandi colorem damnatis superesse, nec habere eos cur querantur, habere tamen cur indignentur; aut potius habere eos cur querantur, non habere de quo querantur; habere iram canis in lapidem; ineptorum alea ludentium, in fortunam; desperatorum in se ipsos; talem esse eorum iram in harmoniam universalem ipsi rerum naturae, seu ideis consentaneam, huius rerum cursus effectricem; iram profecto tam stultam, quam si quis male computans et examina operationi minime respondere sentiens, indignaretur Arithmeticae potius, quam sibi, doleretque incassum, ter tria non decem potius (nam talibus proportionibus necessariis etiam harmonia rerum innititur) quam novem esse. Habere igitur eos iram sine objecto, dolorem sine fuga, querelam denique quam nec ipsi sibi approbare, nec tamen deponere possint, sane accessiones ingentes acuendae illi rabiosae infelicitati, qua potissimum damnatio condietur.

PH. Egregie illud, dolorem eis sine fuga ac propemodum, si dicere liceret, gratum esse, nec posse damnatos approbare sibi ipsis querelas suas: Hoc erat quod tibi denique dicturus eram, ut plene convincereris. Addo enim nunquam eos per omnem aeternitatem prorsus damnatos esse, semper damnandos, semper eos posse liberari, nunquam velle, conscientia ergo perpetuo reclamante ne queri quidem constanter unquam posse sine contradictione.

TH. Mysteria loqueris.

PH: I said to you before that the contrary implies a contradiction, that no one willingly makes himself evil, otherwise he would be evil before he became evil. No one is the voluntary cause of his own will, for what someone
138 wills to will, he already wills, just as, according to the rule of law, "he who is able to bring it about that he is able, is already able." Therefore if this excuse is to be accepted, punishment must be removed from the nature of things; no one will be evil, no one deserving of punishment, no one without an excuse.

TH: What then?

PH: What then? Nothing except that in every judgment concerning the infliction of punishment it is enough to believe that there is a will, recognized as deliberative and evil, whatever its source.[92] Hence, what foolishness it is on the part of those who criticize divine justice in order to avoid punishment to want to go beyond the ascertained will of the evil person, i.e., into infinity.

TH: You have persuaded me that no pretext for excusing the damned remains, nor do they have any reason for complaint. Nevertheless, they have reason to be indignant, or, more exactly, they have reason to complain, but they do not have anything to complain about. They have the anger of a dog against a stone, of the inept gambler against fortune, of the desperate against themselves. Such is their anger against the universal harmony, which agrees with the very nature of things, i.e., with the ideas, and which is the cause of this course of things. Undoubtedly this anger is as foolish as that of someone who computed badly and, realizing that the answers did not correspond with his operation, became indignant at arithmetic rather than himself and vainly took offense that three threes are not ten instead of nine (for the harmony of things is also based on such necessary proportions). Hence, they have anger without an object, sadness without escape, and finally a complaint that they can neither render acceptable to themselves nor put aside—truly remarkable additions to sharpen that frenzied unhappiness by which their damnation will be primarily preserved.

PH: That's splendid. Their sadness is without escape and, if one may put it this way, almost pleasant to them, nor can the damned satisfy their own complaints in a way acceptable to themselves. This was indeed what I was about to say to you, in order that you might be fully convinced. In fact, I would add that at no time are they henceforth damned for all eternity. They are always damnable; they are always able to be set free, but they never will it. Hence, because their conscience perpetually protests, they cannot ever even consistently complain without contradiction.

TH: You are speaking in riddles.

PH. Vel, ut alii mavolent, paradoxa.

TH. Nihil refert, nos soli sumus, detrahe velum.

PH. Imo si animum advertas, detraxi. Memineris paulo ante inter nos de natura peccati mortalis, seu ratione damnationis, convenisse.

TH. Repete quaeso, et accommoda loco praesenti.

PH. An oblitus es, quid tibi rationem damnati Judae postulanti responderim? operae pretium est ipsa verba resumere, quia luculenta. Quaerebas quae ratio damnationis. Respondi: *status morientis, odium scilicet Dei, quo flagrans obiit. Anima enim cum a mortis momento novis sensibus ex-*
139 *ternis, dum corpus reddatur, non pateat, cogitationibus tantum postremis insistit, unde non mutat sed auget statum mortis. Odium autem Dei, id est felicissimi, sequitur dolor maximus: est enim, ut amor delectari, ita odium dolere felicitate, ergo maxime maxima. Dolor maximus est miseria seu damnatio, unde qui odit Deum moriens, damnat seipsum.* Quae verba nescio an multum absint a demonstratione, nam et magnitudinis miseriae ab odii, odii ab objecti magnitudine rationem reddunt.

TH. Sed hic paulo amplius aliquid dixisti, semper esse damnandos, nunquam damnatos.

PH. Hoc ita intelligo, quemadmodum quod movetur nunquam constanter est in loco; semper tamen tendit in locum, ita eos nunquam esse damnatos (ut nequeant si velint, desinere esse) semper damnandos, id est de novo damnari a se ipsis.

TH. Id ego probari desidero.

PH. Perfacile fiet: si quis damnat seipsum odio Dei, is continuatione, imo augmento odii continuabit augebitque damnationem sui. Et quemadmodum beati continuo in omne infinitum incremento, in Deum, id est Harmoniam universalem rationemque summam semel admissi, eamque velut uno visionis ictu concentratam complexi, habent tamen indesinenter, cur distinctiore in gaudii partes reflexione infinitiplicent delectationem, quia cogitatio ac proinde voluptas sine perpetua novitate ac progressu nulla est;

PH: Rather, as others prefer to put it, in paradoxes.

TH: It doesn't matter. We are alone. Remove the veil.

PH: In fact I did remove it, if you were paying attention. You will remember that a little while ago we reached agreement concerning the nature of mortal sin, i.e., the basis of damnation.

TH: Please repeat it, and apply it to the present case.

PH: Have you forgotten how I answered you when you asked for the reason of the damnation of Judas? It is worthwhile to repeat the very words, because they are excellent for the purpose at hand. You had asked what is the reason of the damnation. I responded:[93] *The state of the dying man, namely his burning hatred of God—the state in which he died. For since the soul is not open to new external sensations from the moment of death*
139 *until its body is restored to it, it concentrates its attention only on its last thoughts so that it does not change but rather extends the state it was in at death. But from hatred of God, that is, of the most happy being, the greatest sadness follows. For just as to love is to be delighted by happiness, similarly to hate is to be saddened by happiness. Therefore the greatest sadness arises from hatred of the greatest happiness. The greatest sadness is misery, or damnation. Hence, he who dies hating God, damns himself.* I don't know whether these words fall much short of a demonstration, for they even provide a reason for the magnitude of the misery based on the magnitude of the hatred, and for the magnitude of the hatred based on that of its object.

TH: But here you have said something a bit more comprehensive, namely that they are always damnable but never damned.

PH: I understand this in the following way. Just as whatever is moved never stays in place but nevertheless always tends toward a place, in the same way they are never damned in such fashion that they could not stop being worthy of damnation if they willed it, i.e., they are always damning themselves anew.[94]

TH: I would like to see that proved.

PH: That will be easy to do. If someone damns himself because he hates God, he, by the continuation and, indeed, the augmentation of that hatred will continue and augment his own damnation. And just as the blessed by an increase continuous throughout all eternity, after they have been admitted to God, i.e., to the universal harmony and the supreme reason, and have grasped it as if concentrated in a single stroke of vision, nevertheless have delight without end because they multiply their delight to infinity by a more distinct reflection on the elements of their joy—since there is no thought and, accordingly, no pleasure without perpetual novelty and

ita furiosi illi osores naturae rerum, quanto provectiores erunt in cognitione creaturarum diabolico scientiae exitu, tanto magis nova indignationis, odii, invidiae, et ut verbo dicam, rabiei materie, perpetuo irritabuntur.

TH. Perbelle tu quidem pingis hypotheses tuas, sed patere ut duo quaeram.

PH. Etiam centum si lubet.

TH. Alterum obiter incidens, alterum principale. Ais crescere perpetuo, ut miseriam, ita et felicitatem, sed quomodo divinae essentiae visio crescere possit non capio, nam si essentiae est, exacta est; si exacta est, crescere non potest.

PH. Potest crescere etiam exacta cognitio, non materiae sed reflexionis novitate; si novem unitates expositas habeas, exacte novenarii essentiam comprehendisti, proprietatum autem omnium etsi materiam haberes, at non formam tamen seu reflexionem, nam etsi ter tria, quatuor et quinque, sex et tria, septem et duo esse novem et mille alias combinationes non observes, non eo minus essentiam novenarii cogitasti. Nihil addo de collatione novenarii cum aliis extra ipsum unitatibus, quia ita non forma tantum sed et materies cogitationum variatur, et sunt hae potius totius ex numero utroque quam novenarii proprietates, quod in Deo, qui cum omnia intra se habeat, nulli extra se comparari potest, locum non habet. Dabo igitur exemplum rei finitae, infinitas proprietates, sine ulla cum rebus extraneis
140 comparatione, praebentis. Ecce circulum intuere, si scias omnes lineas a centro ad circumferentiam esse aequales, satis lucide opinor essentiam eius, non ideo et theoremata innumerabilia comprehendisti, nam tot figurae diversae, eaeque regulares, circulo inscribi possunt (id est etsi non designentur, jam tum insunt) quot sunt numeri, ergo infinitae, quarum nulla est, quae non ingentem theorematum materiem suppeditaret indaganti.

TH. Fateor me saepe miratum qua ratione voluptas in visione beatifica esset, animo velut stupente, et in uno obtutu immobili haerente; hanc tu nubem satis mihi feliciter discussisti, et cum *omnitate novitatem* concili-

progress—similarly, those furious haters of the nature of things, the more they become advanced in their knowledge of creatures, by virtue of a diabolical outcome of that knowledge, so much the more will they be perpetually irritated by new material for indignation, hatred, envy, and, in a word, madness.

TH: You certainly paint your hypotheses very charmingly, but permit me to ask two questions.

PH: Even a hundred, if you wish.

TH: One occurs in passing; the other is fundamental. You say that just as misery increases perpetually in the one case, so happiness increases perpetually in the other. But I do not grasp how vision of the divine essence can increase, for if it is of the essence, it is complete; and if it is complete, it cannot increase.

PH: Even knowledge that is complete can increase, not through new material but through new reflection.[95] If you consider nine units displayed before you, then you have comprehended completely the essence of the number nine. However, even if you had knowledge of the material basis for all its properties, you would nevertheless not have knowledge of their form or reflection. For even if you do not observe that three times three, four plus five, six plus three, seven plus two, and a thousand other combinations are nine, you have nonetheless thought of the essence of the number nine. I say nothing about the comparison of the number nine with other unities outside itself because in this way not only the form but the material of the thoughts is changed, and also because these are properties of the composite formed from both numbers rather than properties of the number nine. This does not hold true in the case of God, who cannot be compared with anything outside himself, since he has everything within himself. Therefore I will give an example of a finite thing displaying infinite properties, without any comparison with external things. Here is a circle: If you know that all the lines from the center to the circumference are equal, then in my opinion you have comprehended its essence sufficiently clearly. Still, that does not mean that you have comprehended innumerable theorems, for as many diverse figures and, indeed, regular ones can be inscribed in the circle (i.e., even if they are not marked out, they are already contained therein) as there are numbers. Thus there are infinitely many figures contained therein of which there is none that does not supply the investigator with prodigious material for theorems.

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TH: I admit that I have often wondered what pleasure in the beatific vision is based on when the soul is, as it were, paralyzed and fixed in a single, unchanging gaze. You have rather auspiciously dispersed this cloud

asti. Sed hoc obiter, alterum est quod potissimum quaerere instituerem, unde illud divortium animarum, cur aliae in amorem Dei ardescant, aliae in odium sibi exitiale ferantur. Quod illud punctum separationis, atque ut sic dicam divergentiae centrum. Cum saepe credibile sit tam esse similem, externa specie, damnandum beando, ut alterum pro altero non raro accipiamus.

PH. Magna petis, amice, et in quae se sufficere dubitat Philosophia.

TH. At tenta tamen, eousque enim progredi fas est rationi, quousque praesidia suppeditat ipsamet sibi, neque enim hactenus, nondum initiatus, profanis manibus, toto colloquio Revelata attigisti.

PH. Accipe quae multa meditatione tandem expressi:[L24] Scito igitur ut in Republica, ita et in mundo, duo summatim hominum genera esse, *alios contentos, alios statui praesenti inimicos.* Non quod illi ipsi contenti et quieti non quotidie moliantur aliquid, lucrari, percipere, augere, fortunas, amicos, potentiam, voluptates, famam quaerant, futuri alioquin stupentes potius quam contenti, sed quod successibus frustrati, non ideo in obstantem consiliis suis Reipublicae formam odia transfundant, et de rebus novandis consilia capiant, sed tranquilla mente pergant in decursu vitae, non commoti magis, quam si subtrahentem se Muscam irrito ictu appetiissent. Hoc bonorum malorumque civium verissimum discrimen majore etiam severitate Reipublicae universali, cuius rector Deus est, applicandum.

TH. Ita certe, nam in Republica nisi optima, qualis in humanis desperata est, non cavebitur, quin aliquando ab ipsis Legibus subditorum quorundam miseria derivetur, quos de mutatione cogitare, quia necessarium eis, etiam Justum est. In Republica universi, id est in Optima Republica, cuius Rex Deus est, miser est, non nisi qui velit.

L24. AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE OF L^B: Fragmentum colloquii inter Theophilum et Epistemonem De Justitia DEI circa praedestinationem aliisque ad hoc argumentum spectantibus.

for me and united *novelty* with *completeness.* But this was by the way. It is the other question that I chiefly introduced for investigation: What is the source of that partition of souls that makes some aflame with the love of God while others are driven to a hatred that is fatal to them? What is this point of separation and, if I may put it this way, center of divergence, given that often based on external appearances those to be damned are so similar to those to be blessed that it is not uncommon for us to take one for the other?[96]

PH: You seek answers about important matters, my friend, concerning which Philosophy has doubts about its adequacy.

TH: Nevertheless, try it, for reason is permitted to advance as far as its own remedies are available.[97] For up to now, though not yet initiated, you have not touched matters of revelation with profane hands during the entire discussion.[98]

PH: Listen to what I have finally put forward after much thought.[L24] You must know that there are generally in the world, as in a republic, two kinds of persons, *those who are content with the present situation, others who are hostile to it.* Not that the former, content and at peace, do not labor to bring about something every day; that they do not seek to gain, possess, and increase their fortunes, friends, power, pleasures, and renown; for otherwise they would be stupefied, rather than content.[99] Rather, when they are prevented from succeeding, they do not on that account transfer their hatred to the form of government that stands in the way of their plans, and they do not make plans for a revolution. Instead, with a tranquil mind they go on with the course of their lives uninterrupted, no more disturbed than they would be if they tried in vain to reach a fly that managed to escape a swat. This entirely valid distinction between good and bad citizens must be applied with even greater strictness to the universal republic, whose ruler is God.

TH: Yes, certainly. For in a republic, with the exception of the best one, which is not to be hoped for among humans, it is not guaranteed that the misery of some subjects will never be derived from the laws themselves. It is even just that they will think of changing them, because changing them is necessary for them. In the republic of the universe, i.e., the best republic, whose king is God, no one is miserable unless he wills it.[100]

L24. AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE OF L^B: Fragment of a discussion between Theophil and Epistemon concerning the justice of God with regard to predestination and other aspects of this problem.

PH. Recte, in mundo ergo nulla unquam indignatio justa est, nullus animi motus extra tranquillitatem, criminis expers.[L25,L26] Etiam ita desiderare, ut si negetur doliturus sis, peccatum est, et occulta quaedam ira in
141 Deum, in statum rerum praesentem, et unde ille pendet seriem harmoniamque universalem.

TH. At impossibile est, destitutum successu non dolere.

PH. Quod in corpore est conatus, id in mente affectus, sunt autem conatus alii vincentes, alii contrariis conatibus elisi; si corpus tendat ab oriente in occidentem, et eodem tempore in eadem linea, vi aequali retroagatur ab occidente in orientem, ob mutuam conatuum contrariorum aequalitatem, utrinque quiescet; ita affectus quoque et motus primi tolli non possunt, at contrariis affectibus elidi possunt, ut efficacia careant. Ergo frustratus voto, non potest quin momento doleat, sed non potest, si gubernatione mundi contentus est, perseverare in dolendo, nam statim cogitabit, *quicquid est optimum esse, non in se tantum, sed et agnoscenti, et proinde omnia in bonum cedere Deum amanti*.[L27] Quare pro certo habendum est, illos omnes, quibus non placet regimen orbis, quibus Deus aliqua rectius facere potuisse videtur, et eos quoque, qui ab ea quam fingunt sibi, rerum perturbatione pro atheismo argumenta summunt, esse osores Dei; Unde patet etiam in Atheos cadere odium Dei; quicquid enim credant dicantve, modo eis rerum natura statusque displiceat, Deum ipso facto odere, etsi quod odere, Deum non appellent.

TH. Si sic philosophamur, ne in emendandis quidem rebus laborare fas erit.

PH. Imo non jus fasque tantum sed et necesse, alioquin redibitur ad sophisma ignaviae supra explosum.[L28] Igitur Deum, id est harmoniam

L25. In the margin of L^A, next to the footnote that follows: NB. NB. NB.

L26. Steno: At qui hoc cum systemate conciliandum?

Leibniz: Signum est censorem systema non percipere.

L27. Steno: At unde illi haec cogitatio secundum systema propositum.

Leibniz: Necesse est censorem valde fuisse in legendis praecedentibus festinum.

L28. Steno: Frustra sophisma ignaviae accusas si aliter nequeo propter rerum seriem.

PH: Exactly. Therefore in the world no indignation is ever just, and no
141 emotion of the soul, other than tranquillity, is free from fault.[L25,L26] Even to desire in such a way that makes you suffer, if it is not satisfied, is a sin and a kind of concealed anger against God and against the present state of things and against the series and universal harmony on which the present state of things depends.

TH: But it is impossible for someone deprived of success not to suffer.

PH: What a *conatus* is in a body, an affect is in a mind.[101] However, some conatuses prevail while others are nullified by contrary conatuses. If a body strives to move both from east to west and along the same line, it is thrust backward by an equal force from west to east, then, because of the equality of the contrary conatuses, it will move in neither direction. In the same way the initial affects and motions of the mind cannot be destroyed, but they can be nullified by contrary affects, with the result that they lack efficacy. Hence, someone frustrated in a desire cannot help suffering at that moment, but he cannot continue to suffer if he is content with the governance of the world, for he will immediately think that *whatever exists is best, not only in itself but also for the one acknowledging it, and, accordingly, that all things turn out well for one who loves God.*[L27] For this reason, it must be held as certain that all those who are not satisfied with the governance of our world, to whom it seems that God could have made some things better, and in addition those who purport to find an argument for atheism based on the assumed disorder of things are haters of God. From this it is evident that hatred of God accrues even to atheists. For whatever they think and say, given only that the nature and state of things is displeasing to them, by that very fact they hate God, even if they do not call what they hate God.

TH: If we philosophize this way it will not even be permissible to try to improve things.

PH: On the contrary, it will be not only right and permissible but even necessary, otherwise we will fall back into the sophism of the lazy reason rejected before.[L28] Hence, it is characteristic of one who loves God, i.e.,

L25. IN THE MARGIN OF L^A, NEXT TO THE FOOTNOTE THAT FOLLOWS: NB. NB. NB.

L26. STENO: But how is this to be reconciled with this system?

LEIBNIZ: This is an indication that my critic does not grasp my system.

L27. STENO: But from what source would this thought come to him according to the proposed system?

LEIBNIZ: My critic must have been in a great hurry while reading the preceding.

L28. STENO: You *accuse* the sophism of the lazy reason in vain if I am unable to do otherwise because of the series of things.

universalem amantis est, praeteritis contentum esse; haec enim, quia infecta esse nequeunt, certum est Deum voluisse, ac proinde optima esse: at circa futura, cum nihil praejudicatum sit quantum nobis constat, relictus
142 est industriae ac deliberationi et conscientiae cuiusque locus. Unde si de vitio aliquo aut malo, suo alienove, privato vel publico aut tollendo aut corrigendo Dei amans consultet, pro certo habebit heri emendari non debuisse, at cras emendari praesumet debere. Praesumet, inquam, donec eventu rursus destituente, contrarium probetur; quae tamen frustratio nihil eius conatus imposterum fatigabit frangetve, neque enim Deo tempora praescribere nostrum est et soli perseverantes coronabuntur. *Deum ergo amantis est boni consulere praeterita, optima reddere conari futura.* Qui sic affectus est, is demum animi tranquillitatem, quam Philosophi severi; resignationem omnium in Deum, quam Theologi Mystici, urgent, assecutus est: qui aliter sentit, quicquid etiam fidem, caritatem, Deum, proximum, in ore habeat; nec novit Deum quem summam omnium rationem esse nescit, nec amat. Nemo qui Deum ignorat recte amare potest, potest tamen odisse. Odit ergo Deum, qui naturam, qui res, qui mundum: qui haec alia vult, alium sibi Deum optat. *Qui male contentus moritur, moritur osor Dei*: jamque velut in praeceps datus persequitur iter quod ingressus est nec amplius revocantibus externis, occluso sensuum aditu, animam in se reductam, coepto rerum odio atque ipsa illa miseria fastidioque, indignatione, invidia, displicentia, magis magisque increscente, pascit. Corpore redunito, reversis etiam sensibus novam perpetuo contemtus, improbationis, irarum materiam invenit, tantoque magis torquetur, quanto minus mutare ac sustinere potest displicentem sibi torrentem rerum. Sed transit dolor quodammodo in voluptatem, gaudentque miseri invenire, quo torqueantur. Quemadmodum in humanis quoque infelices simul et felicibus invidentes quaerunt quod carpant non alio fructu quam ut tam ineptos, ut putant, rerum potiri liberiore et magis effuso et in harmoniam quandam seu speciem rationis tornato dolore indignentur. Est enim in

the universal harmony, that he is content with events in the past. Because these things cannot now not have occurred it is certain that God willed them, and accordingly, they are best. But concerning future events, since no prior judgment is to any great degree evident to us, a place remains for
142 the diligence of each with respect to deliberation and conscience.[102] From this it follows that if someone who loves God considers carefully some vice or evil deed—either his own or that of another, private or public, in order to remove or to correct it—he will hold as certain that it ought not to have been remedied yesterday, but he will presume that it ought to be remedied today. He will presume that, I say, until the contrary is established by his being unsuccessful. Nevertheless, this failure will not fatigue or crush his effort for the future, for it is not our place to prescribe the right season to God, and only those who persevere will be victorious. *Hence, it is characteristic of one who loves God to be satisfied with the past and to strive to make the future the best possible.* Only one who is disposed in this way has attained the peace of mind that rigorous philosophers urge, and that resignation of all matters in God that the mystical theologians urge. Whoever thinks otherwise—whatever words, *faith, charity, God, neighbor,* he has on his lips—neither knows God, whom he does not recognize as the highest ground of all things, nor loves him.[103] No one can love God properly who does not know him, but someone who does not know him can nonetheless hate him. Thus, whoever hates nature, the present state of things, the world, hates God. Whoever wants things to be otherwise prefers a different God. *Whoever dies malcontent dies a hater of God.* And now he follows along the road on which he began, as if he were headed for the precipice; and not being held back by external things, since access to his senses has been closed off, he nourishes his soul, which has withdrawn into itself, with that hatred of things already begun, and with that misery and disdain, and with indignation, envy, and displeasure, all of them increasing more and more. When he has been reunited with his body and his senses have returned, he endlessly finds new material for contempt, disapproval, and anger; and he is the more tormented the less he can change and endure the torrent of things that are displeasing to him. But pain in some way is transformed into pleasure; and these wretched ones rejoice at finding something by which they are tormented. Just as among human beings, too, those who are unhappy, while envying those who are happy, seek to criticize them with no other outcome than that they become incensed because, according to their point of view, those who are so inept are in control of matters; and thus their pain, more uncontrolled and unrestrained, is turned into a kind of harmony, i.e., a semblance of reason. For in the case

ejusmodi invidis et indignantibus et malecontentis mixta voluptas dolori, mira quadam ratione, ut enim sapientiae suae opinione sibi placent, delectanturque, ita potentiam, sibi ut putant, debitam, deesse, aut in aliis indignis esse, tanto furiosius dolent. Habes ergo explicata illa tam mirabilia paradoxa, neminem nisi qui velit non dicam damnari, sed nec damnatum manere, neminem nisi a se damnari, damnatos esse nunquam prorsus damnatos, semper damnandos; damnatos ea pertinacia ac perversitate ap-
143 petitus esse, ea a Deo aversione, ut nihil gaudeant magis, quam habere quo doleant, nihil quaerant magis quam invenire cur irascantur; hunc summum esse gradum rabiei rationalis, voluntarium, inemendabilem, desperatum, aeternum: damnatos ergo querimoniis illis, quas eis supra tribuebamus, atque incusationibus naturae, harmoniae universalis, Dei, velut autorum miseriae suae, uti nec posse unquam, nec velle.

TH. Deum immortalem! quam tu paradoxa tua endoxa fecisti. Agnosco nec *sanctos Patres* ab hoc explicandi genere abhorrere. Et pia antiquitas simplici quadam, sed prudenti fabula, indolem damnatorum ad hunc pene modum complexa est: Eremita nescio quis profunditate contemplationum velut inebriatus, dolere serio coepit, esse tam multis creaturis pereundum.[L29] Ergo Deum precibus aggreditur, exponit sinceritatem desiderii sui, et o Pater, inquit, potesne exitium tot infantum siccus intueri? Ah recipe in gratiam miseros illos daemonas, tot animas secum in barathrum trahentes. Cui ita vociferanti, placide Omnipotens, vultu quo coelum tempestatesque serenat, video fili simplicitatem cordis tui, et ignosco exuber-

L29. IN THE MARGIN OF L^B: De concordia ineunda Christi cum diabolo ex *Antiquitatibus Franciscanis* Philippi Bosquierii prima parte speculi cap. 97. fol. 186 (edit. Colon. 1625): *Vos audivistis pluries fratrem Iacobum de Pocali praedicantem Bononiae quod S. Macarius voluit facere pacem inter Deum et diabolum. Et Dominus dixit Macario: si diabolus vult dicere culpam suam coram me, parcam sibi. Reversus Macarius ad diabolum retulit sibi quae dixerat Dominus. Respondet diabolus: imo ipse crucifixus debet genu flectere ante me, et dicere mihi culpam, quod tot annos fecit nos stare in inferno. Tum dixit Macarius: vade Satana, et expulit ipsum: ille vero nunquam apparuit sibi.*

of the envious, the indignant, and the malcontent of this kind, pleasure is mixed with pain in a strange way, so that just as they are pleased and delighted by their belief in their own wisdom, so they suffer that much more uncontrollably because they lack the power, which they believe is due them and which they believe is possessed by others who are unworthy. Hence, you now have the explanation of that amazing paradox, namely that, as I would say, not only is it true that no one is damned unless he wills it but also that no one remains damned unless he continues to damn himself. The damned are never damned absolutely; they are always worthy of damnation. They are damned by such a pertinacity, such a perversion of
143 appetite, such an aversion to God that they enjoy nothing more than having something through which they suffer, and they seek nothing more than to discover a reason to be angry. This is the highest degree of the madness of reason; it is voluntary, incorrigible, desperate, eternal. Therefore, the damned neither want to employ, nor can ever employ, those complaints that we attributed to them above, nor can they employ accusations against nature, the universal harmony, or God as the author of their misery.

TH: Immortal God! How you turn paradoxes into probabilities. I recognize that *the Holy Fathers* did not shun this kind of explanation. And pious antiquity has summed up the innate character of the damned almost exactly in this way, in a simple but sagacious fable. A hermit—I don't know which one—as if inebriated by the profundity of his contemplations, began to lament in earnest that so many creatures had to perish.[L29] Hence, he approached God with his prayers, revealed the sincerity of his petition and said, "O Father, can you contemplate the destruction of so many infants without tears? Admit into grace those wretched demons who drag so many souls with them into the abyss." To him, who thus cried out, the Omnipotent being said calmly, with an expression by which the sky and the storm were quieted, "I see the simplicity of your heart, my son, and I make al-

L29. IN THE MARGIN OF L^B: Concerning an agreement to be undertaken between Christ and the devil, from *Antiquitates Franciscanae* by Philippe Bosquier, first part, chapter 97, page 186 (published in Cologne, 1625): "You have several times heard Brother Jacob preaching over the chalice in Bologne that Saint Macarius wanted to make peace between God and the devil. And the Lord said to Macarius, 'If the devil wishes to state publicly his guilt, then I will forgive him.' Returning to the devil, Macarius reported what the Lord had said. The devil replied, 'On the contrary, the one who was crucified must bend his knee before me and state *his* guilt, because for so many years he has made us remain in the inferno.' Then Macarius said, 'On your way, Satan.' And he threw him out. And the devil never appeared to him again."

antiae affectus tui, et in me quidem mora nulla est: fac ut sint qui veniam quaerant. Tum Eremita adorabundus, benedictus sis o Pater omnis misericordiae, o inexhauste fons gratiae! Et nunc eo venia tua, ut conveniam illum sibi aliisque miserum, huius diei felicitatem adhuc nescientem. Digressus, in Principem diabolorum, hospitem sibi non rarum, incidit, et continuo invadens, o te felicem, inquit, o fortunatum hunc diem quo tibi salutis aditus pene a mundi primordio occlusus aperitur! I nunc, et de Dei crudelitate querere apud quem miseri eremitae pro rebellibus tot saeculorum deprecatio valuit. Ille indignanti similis similisque minanti: et quis te constituit procuratorem nostrum, quis tibi tam stultam misericordiam per-
144 suasit? Scito, inepte, nec nos te intercessore, nec Deo condonatore egere.

EREMITA: O pertinaciam! o coecitatem! subsiste obsecro ac patere tecum agi.

BEELZEBUB: Tu me scilicet docebis.

EREMITA: At quantula aliquot momentorum jactura est quae audiendo homuncioni optime omnibus cupienti impendes.

BEELZEBUB: Quid vis ergo?

EREMITA: Scito me de salute vestra cum Deo egisse.

BEELZEBUB: Tene? cum Deo? o dedecus coeli, o infamiam mundi, o indignitatem universi! Et hunc praeesse rebus, hunc tam prostitutae apud hos terrae vermes autoritatis, tremorem ab angelis postulare? Rumpor ira, rabieque.

EREMITA: Ah parce maledictis in hoc confinio reconciliationis.

BEELZEBUB: Extra me sum.

EREMITA: Reverteris in te ipsum, cum perceperis quanta patris teneritate reducem filium Dei sinus exspectet.

BEELZEBUB: Et possibile est reconciliationem velle qui tot nos injuriis efferavit? resipisci, qui toties laesit? agnoscere errorem, qui se omniscium, submittere sese, qui omnipotentem vult haberi? Et hem tibi, quo pretio putas pacem coituram?

EREMITA: Unica deprecatio erit, quae iras extinguat, odia sepeliat, memoriam ipsam priorum velut maris profundo demergat.

lowances for the exuberance of your emotion, and on my side there is indeed no impediment. See that those who seek pardon come forward." Then the Hermit, full of adoration, said, "Blessed be you, O Father of all mercy, O inexhaustible font of grace! And now, with your permission, I'll go to meet him who is wretched both to himself and to others and who, as yet, does not know the happiness of this day." Having departed, he came upon the prince of the devils, a not unusual guest of his, and assailing him immediately, he said, "Oh, you are the happy one; oh, fortunate this day on which the entrance to salvation is opened for you that has been closed almost from the beginning of the world. Come now, and complain about the cruelty of God, with whom the supplication of a poor hermit prevailed on behalf of those who have rebelled for so many centuries!" The prince of the devils, like someone indignant and threatening, said, "And who established you as our representative? Who induced in you such a foolish sym-
144 pathy? Know, fool, that we need neither you as our mediator nor God as our forgiver."

THE HERMIT: O pertinacity! O blindness! I beg you, stop, and allow me to discuss matters with you.

BEELZEBUB: No doubt you will teach me.

THE HERMIT: How insignificant is the sacrifice of a few moments for you to listen to a poor man who desires the best for everyone.

BEELZEBUB: So what do you want?

THE HERMIT: You should know that I have discussed your salvation with God.

BEELZEBUB: You? with God? O disgrace of heaven; O infamy of the world; O indignity of the universe! And it is he who presides over things, he who demands the trembling of angels before an authority thus prostituted among the vermin of the earth? I erupt with anger and rage.

THE HERMIT: Ah, spare your taunts at this threshold of reconciliation.

BEELZEBUB: I am beside myself.

THE HERMIT: You will come back to yourself when you realize with how much paternal tenderness the breast of God awaits the return of a son.

BEELZEBUB: Is it possible that he who has brutalized so many of us unjustly really wants reconciliation? That he who harmed us so many times has come to his senses? That he who wants to be considered omniscient admits error? That he who wants to be considered omnipotent lowers himself? And, alas, at what price do you believe this peace will be concluded?

THE HERMIT: It will be a single appeal for clemency, which would extinguish anger, consign hatred to oblivion, and submerge the very memory of past actions, as if in the depths of the sea.

BEELZEBUB: Hac conditione me amicitiae paratum renunciato.

EREMITA: Serione?

BEELZEBUB: Ne dubita.

EREMITA: Ne ludificare.

BEELZ.: Ito tantum, et rem effectam dato.

EREMITA: O me felicem, o diem serenum, homines liberatos, Deum benedictum!

DEUS: Quid tanto cum tripudio affers?

EREMITA: Rem confectam, o Pater! nunc regnum, et potentia, et salus et robur, et honor, et gloria Dei nostri, et Christi eius, nam conversus est qui nos accusabat quotidie, qui in exitum nostrum noctu diuque rugiebat.

DEUS: Quid? etiamne deprecandi conditionem addidisti?

EREMITA: Approbavit.

DEUS: Vide ne decipiare.

EREMITA: Eo ut adducam praestiturum.

DEUS: Sed heus tu, formulam praeformemus.

EREMITA: Excipiam.

DEUS: His ergo conceptis verbis apud thronum meum usuros denuntia, qui in gratiam recipi velint: Ego ore fateor, et corde agnosco, me malitia mea miseriae meae causam fuisse, eamque aeternam fuisse redditurum, nisi ineffabilis miseratio tua stultitiam meam discussisset: nunc postquam pacata mente discrimen lucis ac tenebrarum sensi, malim extrema potius omnia pati quam repetita offensa in eum statum redire, quo nihil foedius habere rerum natura potest.

EREMITA: Habeo, et nunc ibo, aut potius volabo.

BEELZEBUB: An alatus es?

EREMITA: Affectus tam celerem fecit. Ecce formulam deprecationis.

BEELZEBUB: Legam, placet. Sed quando praestabitur conditio?

EREM.: Cum tu voles.

BEELZ.: Quasi in me mora sit.

EREM.: Age ergo ad thronum Dei eamus.

BEELZ.: Quid? Satin' sanus es, egone ad illum, an ille ad me?

BEELZEBUB: Under this condition, you may announce that I am ready for friendship.

THE HERMIT: Seriously?

BEELZEBUB: Do not doubt it.

THE HERMIT: Do not make sport of this.

BEELZEBUB: Just go, and bring the matter to closure.

THE HERMIT: Oh, I am happy; O joyous day, you men are liberated, God is praised.

GOD: What do you bring me with such leaps of joy?

THE HERMIT: The matter is completed, O Father! After all this, the reign, the power, the salvation and might, the honor, and the glory of our God and his Christ, for he, who accused us daily, who cried out night and day for our destruction, has been converted.

GOD: What? Have you also taken into account the condition about the appeal for clemency?

THE HERMIT: He has accepted it.

GOD: See to it that you are not deceived.

THE HERMIT: I shall bring him to fulfill the condition.

GOD: But pay heed, let us set out the wording beforehand.

THE HERMIT: I will take it down.

GOD: Therefore, announce to those who wish to be welcomed back into my grace that they are to use these solemn words before my throne: "I confess with my words, and acknowledge in my heart, that because of my own badness I have been the cause of my own misery, and I would have rendered it eternal had your ineffable compassion not put an end to my foolishness. Now after I have perceived the difference between light and darkness with a tranquil mind, I prefer to suffer every desperate situation rather than, because of repeated offenses, revert to this state, than which the nature of things can hold none more horrible."

THE HERMIT: I have it, and now I will go, or rather, I will fly.

BEELZEBUB: Do you have wings?

THE HERMIT: The emotion has made me so fast. Here is the wording for the pardon.

BEELZEBUB: If you please, I will read it. But when will the condition be discharged?

THE HERMIT: Whenever you want.

BEELZEBUB: As if the impediment rests with me.

THE HERMIT: Come then, let us proceed to the throne of God.

BEELZEBUB: What? Are you quite well? Should I go to him, or should he rather come to me?

EREM.: Ne lude in re tanta.
BEELZ.: Ibit qui deprecaturus est.
EREM.: Eamus ergo.
BEELZ.: Insanis.
EREM.: Nonne tu deprecaturus es?
BEELZ.: Hoccine tu spopondisti?
145 EREM.: Quis aliud vel somniabit?
BEELZ.: Egone qui laesus sum? illine Tyranno supplex fiam? O bellum intercessorem! O pestem hominis! O exemplar praevaricatoris!
EREM.: Ah quid facis?
BEELZ.:

Intrat venenum membra, jamque omnes furit
Rabies per artus: scelere cumulandum est scelus.
Sic expiamur. Sola furibundo hostia,
Mactatus hostis. Spargere in ventos juvat,
Laceramque vivi, mille tractam partibus,
Totidem doloris speciminibus actam mei,
Ipsi vocantis ad resurgendum tubae,
Subtrahere carnem.

EREM.: Deus in adjutorium meum intende.
BEELZ.: *Pallidi fauces Averni, vosque Taenarei lacus.*
EREM.: Evanuit, respiro: quo iret miser, novissimis verbis testatum reliquit. O desperatum! o hostem Deo! universo, sibi. Valeant maledicti, sibique habeant insaniam deliberatam: at Tibi, laus honor gloria, o Deus meus, qui misericordiam tuam justitiamque simul tam luculenter servo tuo patefacere dignatus es, Omnesque illas dubitationum tentationes sustulisti, quae aut injustum te, aut impotentem efficere conabantur. Nunc quiescit anima mea, et in luce pulchritudinis tuae inexhaustis delitiis apricatur. Haec Eremita noster, et ego cum illo.

PH. Severitatem argumenti nostri jucundo interscenio distinxisti aut potius Epilogo obsignasti. Iam enim ni fallor possumus tuto finire.

TH. Patere ut adhuc unum quaeram. Agnosco demonstratum a te damnatos de Deo, de mundo, de ulla re queri nec posse nec posse velle. Unum restat ut Deus aliis mentibus ad arcanum hoc judicium stupentibus

THE HERMIT: Do not joke in such a serious matter.

BEELZEBUB: He who appeals for clemency is the one who should go.

THE HERMIT: So let's go.

BEELZEBUB: You are insane.

THE HERMIT: Aren't you going to appeal for clemency?

BEELZEBUB: Is this what you have promised?

145 THE HERMIT: Who would think otherwise, even in a dream?

BEELZEBUB: Is it not I who have been offended? I should become humble before that tyrant? Oh, what a beautiful mediator! Oh, what a trouble-maker of a man! Oh, what a model of a prevaricator!

THE HERMIT: Ah, what are you doing?

BEELZEBUB:

Poison penetrates our limbs, and already rage rushes furiously
Through all our joints; wicked deeds must be piled upon wicked deeds.
Thus we are purified. The only offering for the enraged
Is the affliction of the enemy. It pleases me to scatter him to the winds,
Mangled alive, torn into a thousand pieces,
Made into so many examples of my own sadness,
So that, when the trumpet calls for the resurrection,
He is deprived of flesh.[104]

THE HERMIT: God, come to my aid.

BEELZEBUB: *Ashen mouth of Avernus, and you lakes of Taenarum.*[105]

THE HERMIT: He has disappeared; I can breathe again. This wretched one left a testament to where he would go in his last words. O desperado! O enemy of God, of the universe, of himself. Let the accursed ones be gone, and let them keep the madness they have resolved upon to themselves. But to you, praise, honor, and glory, O my God, who thought it worthy to reveal so splendidly to your servant in one and the same action your mercy and justice. You have removed all those temptations to doubt that endeavor to make out that you are either unjust or lacking in power. Now my soul is at peace and it basks in the light of your beauty in inexhaustible delights.

Thus spoke our Hermit, and I along with him.

PH: You have embellished the severity of our argument with a charming interlude, or, rather, you have signed and sealed it with an epilogue. For now, if I am not mistaken, we can finish it safely.

TH: Permit me to ask one more question. I recognize that you have demonstrated that the damned are neither able to complain nor able to want to complain about God, the world, anything. One problem remains,

satisfaciat, imo ut sibi: quanquam enim ex positis prospicere mihi videar, velut e longinquo, conficiendi negotii rationem, malo tamen a te recollectam audire.

PH. Quid est ergo quod quisquam etiamnum queri possit? Nam nec Deus, nec beatus quisquam beatus esset, imo esset, nisi series rerum sic esset.

TH. Nemo queri fateor, quidam mirari poterunt tantum duo: *primum cur non constiterit sibi ratio mundi, sine quorundam damnatione; deinde cur hanc potius quam illam, in hac potius quam illa carnis massa, animam, rerum circumstantiae tulerint, se reddere, imo velle infelicem.*

146 PH. Quaestio prior est facillima simul difficillimaque. Facillima si mihi ita optimum, et harmoniae universali consentaneum fuisse asserenti, acquiescis; quod ex effectu, et ut scholae loquuntur, a posteriori, ostenditur eo ipso quia factum est. Quicquid enim existit, optimum vel ἁρμονικώτατον esse invicta demonstratione conficitur, quia rerum prima, et unica causa *efficiens* mens; mentis, ut agat, causa, seu *finis* rerum, harmonia; mentis perfectissimae, summa.[L30] Sed si non contentus ea ratiocinatione, aperiri tibi illam ipsam harmoniam tam mirabilium causatricem, et a priori demonstrari velis, rationis fuisse ita in mundo evenire, rem homini, nondum ad arcana visionis Dei admisso, impossibilem petis.

TH. Utinam quam liquido a te evictum est, tam persuaderi posset orbi: Quicquid est, si rerum summam spectes, optimum esse. Certe si crederent hoc omnes, minus peccatorum haberemus; si meminissent semper, nihil.[L31] Amaret unusquisque Conditorem; obstructum os Atheismo esset, et

L30. STENO: At harmonia rerum unde? quidni ab ipsa mente res diversas ordinante? et quidni consensuum et dissensuum praevisionem perfectissimae scientiae argumentum admittere licet?

LEIBNIZ: Non intelligit. Harmonia rerum est ideale quiddam seu jam in possibilibus spectatur. Quia series possibilium alia ἁρμονικώτερος.

L31. STENO: Ergo haberemus aliam seriem. Ergo ipse autor non est contentus una serie, dum aliam optat.

namely for God to satisfy other minds that are astonished at this secret judgment, and, indeed, for him to satisfy himself.[106] For although, from what has been posited, I seem to see in the distance, as if a long way off, the method of completing this matter, nevertheless, I prefer to hear you summarize it.

PH: Well, then, what is there that someone can complain about even now? For neither God nor anyone blessed would be blessed, nor would even exist, unless the series of things were as it is.[107]

TH: I admit that no one can complain, but some could wonder about just two points: *first, why the order of the world was not established without the damnation of anyone; second, why the circumstances of things brought it about that this soul rather than that, placed in this mass of flesh rather than that, rendered itself unhappy, indeed, willed its unhappiness.*

146 PH: The first question is at the same time both the easiest and the most difficult. It is the easiest if you are satisfied when I assert that it was best that way and conforms to the universal harmony, which is shown by its creation, and a posteriori, as they say in the schools, by the very fact that it exists. For what exists is the best, or harmonious.[108] This is established by an invincible demonstration, because the first and unique *efficient* cause of things is mind; the cause of mind, that is, the cause of its action, or the *end* of things, is harmony; and in the case of the most perfect mind, the cause is the greatest harmony.[L30] But if you are not content with this reasoning, and you want this harmony itself, which causes so many marvelous things, to be revealed to you, and you want it to be demonstrated a priori that it was a matter of reason that this harmony came about in this manner in the world, then you seek something impossible for man, who is not yet admitted to the secrets of the vision of God.[109]

TH: If only the world could be persuaded as unequivocally as you have established it: whatever exists, if one considers the totality of things, is the best. Certainly if everyone believed this, we would have less sin; if they remembered it always, none.[L31] Each one would love the creator. The

L30. STENO: But what is the source of the harmony of things? Why not from the mind itself ordering diverse things? And why is it not permitted to admit foreknowledge of agreements and disagreements as evidence of the most perfect knowledge?

LEIBNIZ: He does not understand. The harmony of things is something ideal, i.e., it is already to be seen in the possibles, because one series of possibles is more harmonious than others.

L31. STENO: Well then we would have another series. Therefore the author himself is not content with one particular series, as long as he may choose another.

silere cogerentur illi stulti providentiae censores qui paucis carminis pulsibus auditis, de tota melodia judicium incivile praecipitant, ignari in hac pene infinitate rerum, ac ut sic dicam replicatione mundorum in mundis (continuum enim in infinitum divisibile est), totum melos mortali nondum purgato mente complecti impossibile esse; nec agnoscentes, has interspersas dissonantias partium, exquisitiorem reddere consonantiam universi, quemadmodum duae imparitates in unam paritatem colliguntur, imo de essentia harmoniae esse unitate quadam velut insperata pensare mirifice distortam diversitatem.[L32] Quod non melodiarum tantum, sed et historiarum illarum ad oblectationem confictarum quas Romanas vocant, concinnatores pro lege artis habent. Hoc tamen alterum expedias superest, cum animae sibi per se sint simillimae, vel ut scholae loquuntur, solo numero aut certe gradu differant, ac proinde solis externis impressionibus varientur, quae possit in harmonia illa universali ratio diversitatis esse, cur haec potius quam illae circumstantiis voluntatem depravaturis obiiciatur, vel (quod idem est) hoc tempore constituatur in hoc loco.

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PH. Difficilis videtur quaestio, sed a detorta potius quaerendi ratione, quam natura rei. Tangitur enim spinosissima tractatio *de principio individui,* seu solo numero differentium discriminatione. Sint duo ova, ita sibi similia ut ne Angelus quidem (ex hypothesi summae similitudinis) observare differentiam possit, et differre tamen quis neget? saltem eo quod unum est hoc, alterum hoc, seu *haecceitate,* vel quod sunt unum et alterum, seu *numero.* Sed quid volumus nobis cum numeramus, seu cum dicimus *hoc* (numerare enim est repetitum *hoc*), quid est *hoc?* seu determinatio? Quid? nisi sensus temporis et loci, seu motus aut rei datae, ad

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LEIBNIZ: Ridicula objectio. Optamus futura, quia nescimus quid de illis Deus statuerit, ergo non optamus aliam seriem.

L32. IN THE MARGIN OF L^B: 1 plus 3 facit 4.

atheist's mouth would be shut, and those foolish critics of providence who, having heard a few beats of a song, rush headlong to an unreasonable judgment of the whole melody, would be forced to be silent.[110] For they are not aware that in this near infinity of things and, so to speak, replication of worlds in worlds (for the continuum is divisible to infinity), it is impossible for a mortal, who is not yet purified, to grasp the whole melody. They do not recognize that these dissonances interspersed in the parts make the consonance of the universe more exquisite. Just as two odd numbers are combined into one even number, so it is with the essence of harmony that the discordant diversity is redeemed wonderfully by a seemingly unexpected unity.[L32] This is taken as a rule of art not only by those
147 who write songs but also by those who write stories concocted to delight, which are called novels. Nevertheless, this other question remains for you to clear up: since souls are in themselves very similar to one another, or, as they say in the schools, they differ only numerically or surely only in degree and hence are differentiated solely by external impressions, what reason for diversity can there be in that universal harmony, why is this soul rather than those exposed to circumstances that will corrupt the will, or (what is the same) why is it assigned at this time to this place?[111]

PH: This question seems difficult, but more because of the tortured manner of asking the question, than from the nature of the problem. It touches upon the very thorny consideration of the *principle of individuation,*[112] that is, of the discrimination of things differing solely in number. Let there be two eggs so similar to each other that not even an angel ⟨(on the hypothesis of the greatest possible similarity)⟩ can observe a difference, yet who can deny that they differ?[113] At least they differ in this: that one is this one, the other, that one, that is, they differ in *haecceity,*[114] or because they are one thing and another thing, i.e., because they differ *numerically.* But what do we mean when we count, that is, when we say *this* (for to *count* is to repeat *this*). What is *this*? What is it to determine something? What is it except the perception of time and place, i.e., of motion either, on the one hand, of a given thing in relation to us or to a thing already determined, or, on the other hand, of our own movement (e.g., the motion of our hand or the finger by which we point), or the motion of some already determined thing, like a stick, in order to point to a given thing? There you have it,

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LEIBNIZ: This is a ridiculous objection. We make a choice concerning future matters because we do not know what God has determined about them. We do not thereby choose a different series.

L32. IN THE MARGIN OF L^B: 1 plus 3 equals 4.

nos vel rem jam determinatam, aut noster (manus puta aut digiti quo demonstramus) vel rei jam determinatae, ut baculi, ad rem datam demonstrandam; En ergo tibi quod mireris, principia individuationis, extra rem ipsam: neque enim inter illa ova aliud discrimen assignare vel Angelo vel ut audacter dicam Deo possibile est (ex hypothesi summae similitudinis) quam quod praesenti tempore hoc est in loco *A,* illud in loco *B,* quare ut discernere ea perpetuo possis, in quo *designatio* (id est determinatio perpetua) sita est, necesse est haec ova (posito quod nihil ipsis illinere, alligare notae, signive imprimere liceat, quo desinant simillima esse) vel in loco immobili reponas, ubi et ipsa quiescant, vel efficias, ut locus eorum seu vas, si sit mobile, non sit tamen frangibile, et ipsa in eo ita sint firmata, ut ad determinatas jam certis quibusdam notis impressis partes vasis, eundem semper situm retineant; vel denique si omnem eis libertatem relicturus es, necesse erit, ut motum uniuscuiusque toto temporis tractu per omnia loca oculis manibusve aut alio contactus genere, persequare.

148 TH. Mira narras, et quae nulli, credo, Scholasticorum vel per somnium in mentem venere, sed quae tamen nemo diffiteri possit, sunt enim sumpta ex usu vitae, neque enim aliter homines in rebus simillimis distinguendis ratiocinantur. Sed quid inde ad animas intuleris?

PH. Quid? nisi animas quoque, seu ut appellare malo, mentes, loco et tempore velut individuari seu fieri, *has.* Hoc posito tota quaestio evanescit. Quaerere enim cur haec anima prae alia his loci temporisque circumstantiis (unde tota vitae mortis salutisque aut damnationis series oritur) sit primum objecta, et per consequens ex aliis in alias, serie rerum extra ipsam ita ferente, transeat; est quaerere, cur haec anima sit haec anima. Finge aliam animam in corpore hoc (seu eiusdem loci temporisque) eodem, quo haec inceperat, loco et tempore, existere incepisse; illa ipsa anima quam tu aliam vocas, erit non alia, sed haec.[L33] Si quis indignaretur

L33. STENO: Hoc dicis, sed unde probatur? quidni alia anima in iisdem locorum et temporum circumstantiis aliter se gereret? sed et hinc secundum ipsum omni culpa damnationis suae caret anima, si omnis anima in iisdem cum ipsa circumstantiis idem egisset, nec valet quia in animabus non invenio causas diversitatis. Ergo nullae ibi sunt, a mea ignorantia ad rei negationem quaeritur consequentia?

what may amaze you, the principle of individuation, outside the thing itself.[115] For between these eggs no difference can be assigned either by an angel or, I have the audacity to say, by God (given the hypothesis of the greatest similarity possible) other than that at the present time this one is at place *A,* and that one is at place *B.* That is why, in order for you to be able to distinguish them continuously—which is what a *designation* (i.e., a continuous determination) consists in (supposing that nothing can be written on them, no mark attached to them, no sign printed on them, by which they cease to be similar)—it is necessary either that you keep these eggs in some immobile container, where they themselves remain unchanged, or that you make their site or container, if it is mobile, unbreakable, and fix them in it, so that they retain the same relation always to certain previously determined marks imprinted on parts of the container, or, finally, if you are going to allow them total lack of restraint, you must continuously follow the motion of each, during the entire time period and through every place, either with your eyes or your hands or by some other kind of contact.

148 TH: You speak of astounding things, which, I believe, have not come into the mind of any scholastic even in a dream, but which, nevertheless, no one can disavow, for they are taken from practical experience. For no man reasons otherwise when he must distinguish things that are entirely similar. But what do you infer from that concerning souls?

PH: What? Just this: souls, or as I prefer to call them, minds, are also individuated, or, as it were, become *these,* by place and time. This being posited, the entire question vanishes. For to ask why this soul rather than another is subjected from the beginning to these circumstances of time and place (from which the entire series of life, death, salvation, or damnation arises), and why, consequently, it passes from one set of circumstances to others—the series of things external to itself bringing things forth in this manner—is to ask why this soul is this soul. Imagine that another soul began to exist in *this* same body (that is, a body located at the same time and place) at the same time and place as that in which this one had begun; then this very soul that you call another will not be another but will be *this one.*[L33] If someone is indignant that he was not born of a queen, and, on

L33. STENO: You say this, but from what source is it proved? Why would not another soul act differently in the same circumstances of place and time? But also it follows from this, according to the author himself, that a soul lacks all blame for its own damnation if every soul would have acted the same in the circumstances it was in. Nor does it follow that because I do not discover the causes of diversity in the soul, therefore there are none. Isn't that trying to infer the denial of a proposition from my ignorance of its truth?

quod non e Regina aliqua natus ipse, Rex contra non e sua matre esset; indignaretur, quod non ipse esset alius, imo indignaretur nihilo, nam omnia eodem modo evenirent, neque ipse tunc Regius puer, de se nunc rustici filio, somniaret. Eodem modo aliquando eos elusi qui indignabantur quod Deus Adamum et Evam, semel lapsos, non statim e mundo (ne labes in posteros propagaretur) sustulisset, melioribus aliis substitutis. Admonui enim, si hoc fecisset Deus, sublato peccato longe aliam rerum seriem, longe alias circumstantiarum, hominum, matrimoniorum conjunctiones, longe alios homines prodituros fuisse, ac proinde sublato aut extincto peccato ipsosmet in mundo non fore. Neque ergo habere eos cur Adamo aut Evae peccantibus, multo minus cur Deo peccatum ferenti indignentur, cum potius huic ipsi peccatorum tolerationi acceptam ferre debeant existentiam suam. Vides quam vanis quaestionibus homines ipsi se vexent, perinde ac si quis seminobilis patri quod conjugem imparem duxisset, irasceretur (quanquam non desint hominibus affectus similes, imo stultiores) non cogitans si aliam duxisset, non se sed alium hominem fore in mundo.

149 TH. Non habeo amplius quod quaeram, querar, obiiciam, mirer, nisi explicati negotii totius claritatem inexspectatam. Subiicerem plura in commendationem, nisi vererer, ne homines nos colludere suspicarentur.

PH. Judicent igitur alii potius, modo probi et intelligentes, qui attendant, qui sensum verborum accipiant positum, non inferant alienum, qui detortas consequentias autori nec per somnium cogitanti imputatas, qui mor-

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LEIBNIZ: Facilis responsio. Eadem anima plane non imbuta, in iisdem circumstantiis posita idem ageret, revera enim non esset alia sed eadem, quia nullum discrimen.

the other hand, that his own mother did not give birth to a king, then he is indignant that he himself is not another. Indeed, he is indignant at nothing at all, for everything would come about in the same way, and he himself as the son of a king would not have dreamed of himself as the son of a peasant.[117] In the same way, finally, I parried the arguments of those who were indignant that God did not eliminate Adam and Eve from the world at once when they first sinned (so that their stain would not be propagated to their posterity) and that God did not substitute others better than they were. For I have drawn attention to the fact that if God had done that, sin having been taken away, an entirely different series of things, entirely different combinations of circumstances, persons, and marriages, and entirely different persons would have been produced and, consequently, sin having been taken away or extinguished, they themselves would not have existed. They therefore have no reason to be indignant that Adam and Eve sinned and, much less, that God permitted sin to occur, since they must rather credit their own existence to God's tolerance of those very sins. You see to what extent men vex themselves with vain questions. It is as though someone of half-noble birth were irritated with his father because he had married a woman unequal in rank (although men do not lack similar feelings, or even more foolish ones), not thinking that if his father had married someone else, not he, but some other man, would have come into the world.[118]

149 TH: I do not have more to ask, to complain about, to object to, to wonder at except the unexpected clarity of the entire matter as you have disentangled it. I would put forward more by way of commendation, except that I fear that men would suspect our collusion.

PH: So then, let others judge in your place provided they are honest and intelligent, that they are attentive, that they accept the stipulated sense of the words and do not introduce another, that they dislike distorted conclusions attributed to the author that he did not think of even in dreams, that they dislike caustic cavils, which indicate perturbations of the soul, that

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LEIBNIZ: It is easy to respond. The same soul posited in the same circumstances, but not fully characterized, would act the same, for actually it is not another but the same because no difference is given.[116]

daces cavillos perturbationum animi notas, oderint, qui pari vindicandae divinae gloriae et illustrandarum mentium zelo inflammentur.[L34]

L34. At the end of both L^A and L^B, subsequently struck:

TH: Sed esto erraveris, suffecerit ne ipsam quidem calumniam invidiamque exculpere quod haereticum sit, aut qui sic loquatur, sic credat, sic moriatur, damnandum esse, pro filio Ecclesiae matris communis, seu quod idem est fratre, haberi non debere, evincere posse.

PH. Id confido certe, et huius spei plenus catholico. Ecclesiae, Reipublicae Christianae, antiquitatis, consensui, nostri quoque saeculi receptis sententiis, denique unicuique rectius ratiocinanti, me submitto. Ut accuser, impedire non possum; praejudicari deprecor: Spero enim effecturum me si audiar, aut potius, si attente legar, ut fateantur omnes, si sublatis verborum praestigiis quae plerumque rebus magis turbant humanum genus, quanta maxima fieri potest simplicitate omnia exponantur, nihil a me pronuntiatum esse, quod non agnoscere necesse sit universos. De Christi merito, de Spiritus Sancti auxiliis, et extraordinario divinae gratiae concursu, rebus a divina revelatione pendentibus, nunc quidem dixi nihil, ita enim convenit inter nos, ut ego Catechumenus, tibi Philosophi Theologiam exponerem, antequam tu me vicissim christianae sapientiae revelatis mysteriis initiares: Ut minueretur tibi, Theophile, confessa apud me et agnita probandi labor, et fidei rationisque harmonia clarior, et insipientia illorum omnibus conspectior esset, qui aut doctrina inflati religionem contemnunt, aut revelationibus jactatis superbi Philosophiam ignorantiae suae detectricem odere.

TH. Laudo modestiam tuam, agnosco fructus, quos ex hac collatione percepi, et gaudeo habere me per te quo os obturem illis, qui per summam proterviam nec scripturae sacrae reverentia, nec sanctorum Patrum consensu, autoritate, et exemplis commoventur, nescio quibus rationibus freti, quas tu frivolas esse, luce meridiana clarius ostendisti. Erit tempus (sic auguror, precorque) quo praeparatius ad majora instrumentum in te habebo ut interiora quoque fidei ingressis nobis, rectae rationis luce tenebrae omnes, et spectra vanissimarum difficultatum, quibus turbantur animae, et in avia seducuntur, quasi exorcismo quodam exterreantur. Vale.

they are inflamed with the same zeal for vindicating the divine glory as for illuminating minds.[L34]

L34. At the end of both L^A and L^B, subsequently struck:

TH: But suppose that you have erred. It is enough that not even false charges and jealousy can elicit something heretical, nor can they demonstrate that one who speaks, believes, and dies in this manner is worthy of damnation and must not be considered a son of the common mother church or, what amounts to the same thing, a brother.

PH: In any case, I am confident, and being full of hope, I submit myself to the universal consensus, to the received views of the church, of the Christian republic, of antiquity, and also of our own century, and, finally, to anyone who reasons correctly. I cannot prevent someone from finding fault; I ask not to be prejudged. For I hope that if I am heard, or, rather, if I am read attentively, I will have brought it about that everyone acknowledges that nothing has been said by me that it is not necessary for all to admit, if only—with the verbal tricks removed that frequently confuse humankind more than the subject matter—everything is explained with the greatest possible simplicity. Admittedly, up to now I have said nothing concerning the merit of Christ, the aids of the Holy Spirit, and the extraordinary concourse of divine grace—matters depending on divine revelation. For we agreed that I, as a catechumen, would expound to you the theology of a philosopher, before you, in turn, initiated me into the revealed mysteries of Christian wisdom. We proceeded this way, Theophilus, in order to minimize your task of proving those things confessed and acknowledged in my writings, to make clearer the harmony of faith and reason, and to make more conspicuous to all the foolishness of those who, puffed up with learning, have contempt for religion or who, proud in the pronouncement of revelations, hate philosophy, the revealer of their ignorance.

TH: I commend your modesty, and I acknowledge the benefits I have derived from this meeting. And I rejoice that I have available from you the means by which to shut the mouth of those who, through supreme impudence, are not influenced by reverence for sacred Scripture, nor by the consensus, authority, and examples of the holy fathers, and who rely on I don't know what kind of reasons, which you have shown to be frivolous more clearly than the midday sun. The time will come (I predict and pray that it will be so) when I will have in you an instrument more prepared for yet greater things, so that when we have penetrated into even the inner matters of the faith, all the obscurities and apparitions of entirely illusory difficulties, which disturb souls and lead them into the wasteland, may be frightened off by the light of right reason, as if by a kind of exorcism. Farewell.

150 Touchant cette grande Question *de l'Auteur du Peché,* on croit communement esquiver la difficulté, en disant, que le Peché dans son essence n'est qu'une pure privation sans aucune realité; et que Dieu n'est pas l'auteur des privations. Pour cet effect, on a introduit cette fameuse distinction entre le physique, et le moral du peché, dont on abuse un peu, quoyque elle soit bonne en elle même.

Le Physique ou reel du Vol, par exemple, est l'object, ou la proye qui irrite l'indigence du Voleur, les rayons visuels qui frappent ses yeux, et qui entrent jusque au fond de son ame; les imaginations, les inquietudes et les deliberations qui se forment là dessus, et qui se terminent en fin à la conclusion, qui est de profiter de l'occasion, et d'entreprendre l'execution du crime.

On ne sçauroit nier que tout cela ne soyent des realitez, et il faut même avouer que la derniere determination de la volonté, apres avoir balancé long temps, et examiné toutes les circomstances, est un acte reel, qui est dans le Predicament de l'Action, aussi bien que la Pensée et le mouvement: et pourtant cette derniere determination est ce qui nous rend criminels.

Où est donc ce Moral du Peché dont on parle tant? On dira peut estre, qu'il consiste dans l'Anomie, comme la sainte Écriture l'appelle, ou dans la difformité de l'Acte à l'égard de la Loix; qui est une pure privation. J'en demeure d'accord, mais je ne vois pas, ce que cela contribue à l'éclaircissement de nostre question. Car de dire que Dieu n'est pas l'auteur du peché, par ce qu'il n'est pas auteur d'une privation: quoyque il puisse estre appellé auteur de tout ce qu'il y a de reel et de positif dans le peché, c'est
151 une illusion manifeste; c'est un reste de la philosophie visionnaire du temps passé, c'est un faux-fuyant dont un homme raisonnable ne se laissera jamais payer. Je m'en vay le declarer par un exemple. Un peintre fait deux tableaux, dont l'un est grand pour servir de modelle d'une tapisserie, l'autre n'est qu'une petite miniature. Prenons la miniature et disons qu'il y a deux choses à considerer là dedans, premierement son positif et reel, qui est, la table, le fonds, les couleurs, les traits; et son privatif qui est la disproportion au grand tableau, ou sa petitesse. Ce seroit donc se moquer du monde, que de dire, que le peintre est l'auteur de tout ce qu'il y a de reel dans les deux tableaux, sans estre pourtant l'auteur du privatif, ou de la disproportion qui [est entre] le grand et le petit, car par la meme raison ou plus tost par plus forte raison on pourroit dire, qu'un peintre peut estre auteur d'une copie, ou d'un pourtraict, sans estre l'auteur de la disproportion entre la copie et l'original, ou sans estre l'auteur de sa faute. Car en effect

4. The Author of Sin[1] A VI.iii

[1673?]

150 Concerning the important question of *the author of sin,* it is commonly believed that one may avoid the difficulty by claiming that sin in its essence is nothing but a pure privation without any reality, and that God is not the author of privations.[2] To that end, the famous distinction between the physical aspect and the moral aspect of sin was introduced, a distinction that has been abused somewhat, although it is good in and of itself. For example, the physical or real aspect of a robbery is the object or the plunder that irritates the thief's sense of poverty, the visual rays that strike his eyes and penetrate to the depths of his soul, or the imaginings, the uneasiness, and the deliberations that arise thereby, which finally terminate in the conclusion to take advantage of the situation and commit the crime.[3]

It cannot be denied that all of that is real, and it is even necessary to assert that the last determination of the will, after it has been balanced for a long time and it has examined all the circumstances, is a real act, which is in the category of action, just as much as the thought and the movement. Nevertheless, it is this final determination that renders us criminal.

Where then is this moral aspect of sin of which so much is said? Perhaps it will be said that it consists in anomie, as holy Scripture calls it, or in the lack of conformity of the action with respect to the law, which is a pure privation. I agree with that, but I do not see what it contributes to the clarification of our question. For to say that God is not the author of sin, because he is not the author of a privation, although he can be called the author of everything that is real and positive in the sin—that is a manifest illusion. It

151 is a leftover from the visionary philosophy of the past; it is a subterfuge with which a reasonable person will never be satisfied.[4] I am going to make it clear by an example. A painter creates two paintings, one of which is large so that it may be used as a model for a tapestry, while the other is only a miniature. Consider the miniature. Let us say that there are only two things to consider with respect to it, first its positive and real aspect, which is the table, the background, the colors, the lines; and then its privative aspect, which is the disproportion with respect to the large painting, in other words, its smallness. Now it would be a joke to say that the painter is the author of everything that is real in the two paintings without, nevertheless, being the author of the privative aspect, i.e., the disproportion between the large one and the small one. For by the same line of reasoning, or rather by stronger reasoning, it could be said that a painter can be the author of a copy, or of a portrait, without being the author of the disproportion between the copy and the original, i.e., without being the author of this fault.

le privatif n'est rien qu'un simple resultat ou consequence infallible du positif, sans avoir besoin d'un auteur à part. Je m'estonne que ces gens ne passent plus avant, et ne tachent de nous persuader, que l'homme même n'est pas auteur du peché, par ce qu'il n'est auteur que du physique ou reel, la privation estant une chose dont il n'y a point d'auteur.

Je conclus de ce que je viens de dire, que ceux qui disent, que Dieu est auteur de tout ce qu'il y a de reel ou de positif dans le peché; et qui avouent, que Dieu est l'auteur de la loix, et qui nient pourtant, que Dieu est l'auteur du resultat de ces deux choses, c'est à dire, de la difformité entre la loix et le positif du peché; ne sont eloignez de Calvin, que dans la façon de parler; et qu'ils font Dieu auteur du peché, sans le dire, quoyque ils protestent de faire le contraire.

Conversatio cum Domino Episcopo Stenonio de libertate A VI.iv

1375 *Conversatio cum Domino Episcopo Stenonio de libertate*

7. December. 1677

Ajo Dei existentiam non posse demonstrari, sine hoc principio, *nihil esse sine ratione.* Id principium non locum habet tantum in mechanicis, quando scilicet agitur, utrum ex data magnitudine figura et motu sequatur alia magnitudo, figura, motus, sed etiam in rationibus, quas necesse est mechanicas non esse, quod sic ostendo. Series rerum potuit aliter esse, absolute loquendo, seu non implicat contradictionem ipsam esse aliter, hinc etsi causa una in aliam resolvatur in infinitum, v.g. ego sum talis, ob talem causam, quae rursus talis ob talem, etc., et ita in infinitum, tamen, semper utcunque progrediamur nova manet quaestio, nec uspiam in serie reperitur ratio sufficiens. Ergo ea debet esse extra seriem. Haec ratio non est corporea, alioqui intra corpora ista seu in serie fuisset jam comprehensa. Ergo necessarius est usus hujus principii etiam extra mechanica.

Nihil est sine ratione, intelligitur de causa efficiente, materiali, formali, finali. Causa formalis est ipsa rei essentia, seu si ratio cur res aliqua sit, vel talis sit, sit intra rem ipsam. Causa materialis et efficiens, ut in motu movetur quid semper eodem modo, nisi ratio sit mutationis, vel in re, vel in alio in rem agente. In finali, ut ratio debet esse eligendi ex duobus hoc, vera vel apparens.

For, in fact, the privation is nothing but a simple result or infallible consequence of the positive aspect, without requiring a separate author. I am amazed that these people did not go further and try to persuade us that man himself is not the author of sin, since he is only the author of the physical or real aspect, the privation being something for which there is no author.[5]

I conclude from what I have just said that those who say that God is the author of everything that is real and positive in sin, and who claim that God is the author of the law, and who nevertheless deny that God is the author of what results from these two things, i.e., the lack of conformity between the law and the positive aspect of sin, are removed from Calvin only in a manner of speaking; and they make God the author of sin without saying so, although they claim to do just the opposite.[6]

5. Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom[1] A VI.iv

1375 *Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom*

7 December 1677

I claim that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated without this principle: *nothing exists without a reason.*[2] This principle holds not only in mechanics, where it concerns whether from a given magnitude, figure and motion, another magnitude, figure and motions, follows, but also in matters that of necessity are not mechanical, which I show as follows. The series of things could have been otherwise, absolutely speaking (i.e., its being otherwise does not imply a contradiction). For this reason, even if one cause is resolved into another to infinity, e.g., I am such because of such and such a cause, which in turn is such because of such and such a cause, and so on to infinity; nevertheless, however far we proceed a new question always remains, and a sufficient reason cannot be found in the series. Hence, it must be outside the series. This reason is not corporeal, otherwise it would have been among those bodies already included, i.e., in the series.[3] Hence, this principle must be employed outside mechanics also.

Nothing is without a reason is understood concerning efficient, material, formal, and final causes. The formal cause is the very essence of the thing, i.e., if the reason why something exists or is such and such is in the thing itself. It holds for the material cause and the efficient cause so that anything that begins in motion always continues in the same way unless there is a reason for change either in the thing itself or in another acting on it. It holds in the case of a final cause, so that there must be a true or apparent reason for choosing this one from among two things.

Voluntas nunquam agit nisi ob finem. Finis autem est bonum apparens. Movetur semper ab apparentia boni. Ergo Electio ex duobus non potest fieri nisi appareat bonum esse sic eligi.

1376 Perfectius est agere ob rationem, quam sine ratione.

Nihil agit quin ratio sit ex qua posita sequatur hoc potius fieri quam oppositum.

Non est humilitas tam fidenter supponere se rectam habere sententiam et alios erroneam, et ipsis dicere se Deum precari ut eos mutet. Aut si hoc cum humilitate stare potest cur aliis exprobratur?

Voluntatis sunt gradus, unum enim magis volumus quam alterum. Et magis volumus quod melius apparet, ergo quanto major aequalitas tanto minus aliud prae aliquo volumus, et cum summa, nihil. Nemo mortalium de talibus dubitaret, aut haesitaret. Nisi jam praenosset contra suas praeconceptas opiniones adhibitum iri. Ponamus differentiam esse data qualibet minorem, erit et excessus volendi. Id est nullus.

Certum est tunc cum eligimus optimum apparens nos velle propter cognitionem, et tamen libere. Eodem modo et Deus, tametsi ergo sic ageret, seu etsi casus aequalium perfectionum nunquam eveniret tamen ageret libere.

Si omnes series possibiles aeque essent perfectae, sequeretur etiam illam esse aeque perfectam, qua salvarentur omnes impii, et damnarentur omnes pii.

Respondes: est impossibilis.

Quaero cur?

Ais quia contra justitiam.

Optime, id est quia contra perfectionem, id est non omnes series aeque perfectae. In se est possibilis, sed executio ejus fit impossibilis, quia cum Dei perfectione pugnat, et hoc est quod volebam, inde patet, redire tandem omnia ad mea. Et quia aliud sibi dicere videntur, ⟨tum⟩ premuntur nonnihil, ad idem confugere non sentientes.

Difficultas major in invenienda sententia Augustini, quam in invenienda veritate. Jansenius tricies legit Augustinum, et tamen dicunt eum in legendo Augustino errasse. At ajunt glaucoma ante oculos habuit.

The will never acts except on account of the end. The end, however, is the apparent good. The will is always moved by the appearance of good. Therefore, a choice between two things cannot be made unless it appears that there is a good to be chosen in this way.

1376 It is more perfect to act for a reason than without a reason.

Nothing acts unless there is a reason, which, having been posited, it follows that such and such is going to occur rather than its opposite.

It is not humility to assume confidently that one has the correct view and others an erroneous view, and to say to these persons that one entreats God to change them. If this is consistent with humility, why is it used as a reproach to others?

There are gradations of willing, for we will one thing more than another. And we will more strongly that which appears better. Therefore, the more equality, the less we will one thing rather than another, and when the equality is at a maximum, we will nothing. No mortal would doubt or hesitate concerning these matters unless he already knew beforehand that they were going to be used against his own preconceived opinions. Let us suppose the difference to be less than any given difference; then there will be a loss of willing, i.e., none.

It is certain that when we choose the apparent best, we will because of knowledge, and yet freely. In the same way even God, even though he were to act in this way, i.e., even if the case of perfect equilibrium never happened, nevertheless acts freely.[4]

If all possible series were equally perfect, then it would follow that even one in which all the impious are saved and all the pious are damned would be equally perfect.

You reply, It is impossible.

I ask, Why?

You say, Because it is contrary to justice.

Splendid—that is, because it is contrary to perfection. That is, not all series are equally perfect. It is possible in itself, but carrying it out becomes impossible because it is contrary to God's perfection, and this is what I maintained, from which it is evident that in the end all views reduce to mine.[5] And since some seem to themselves to say something different, they are somewhat pressed, not realizing that they have recourse to the same thing.

It is more difficult to discover the views of Augustine than to discover the truth. Jansen read Augustine three times, and nevertheless they say that he erred in his reading of Augustine. And they say that he had a cataract before his eyes.

Respondeo, unde sciam postea nec me habere, ubi Augustinum etiam tricies legero, itaque sub finem aeque ero incertus ac ab initio.

Ait Deum introduci mechanicum.

Est odiosa expressio, et metaphorica, loquamur proprie. Sensus est, Deum aeque certo agere, ac horologium, imo contra potius quod horologium certo agit ratio referenda est ad certum modum quo Deus operatur nempe perfectissimum.

1377 Objicit si nihil sine ratione, Mundus erit aeternus, quia nulla ratio cur Deus non ante coeperit.

Respondeo *primum,* omnia creantur ex nihilo non ex praeexistente materia quovis momento, nam et materia ipsa creatur, nec refert, quod antea jam aliqua alia fuerint, nam postea sunt annihilata. Itaque etiamsi semper aliquae fuissent creaturae, seu etiamsi fuisset Mundus alius ante hunc mundum, ut erit alius post hunc mundum, quid tum? quod inde malum? Respondeo *secundo,* non tamen id tam facile hinc concludi, quia in se tempus nihil est, nisi rerum ipsarum jam existentium tractus. Atque ita si Mundus incepit, otiosa est quaestio cur nunc inceperit non ante, quia nullum est tempus ante ipsum. Sed si quaeras potuisset durare diutius, v.g. si mundus est natus sex mille annos, cur non potius decem mille annos, tunc respondeo *tertio* etiam aliquam subesse posse rationem proportionemque harmoniae, nobis incognitam.

Necessitas peccati Judae futuri, fuit antequam existeret Judas, ergo non est orta a Judae voluntate. Deus praevidit Judam peccaturum esse. Ergo certum, infallibile, inevitabile, necessarium erat Judam esse peccaturum, antequam existeret Judas. Judas non fuit in intellectu divino, sed Judae peccaturi idea. Judae peccaturi idea non orta est a Juda, quia Judas nondum erat. Judae peccaturi idea non erat tantum in intellectu divino ut idea rerum possibilium, sed ut idea rerum actu futurarum. Idea haec ita affecta non orta est a Juda, sed potius Judam peccaturum esse, necessario secutum est ex hac idea. Tunc cum deliberaret Judas utrum Christum traditurus esset an non, jam necessarium erat Judam eligere traditionem, alioqui falsa fuisset scriptura etc. Necessitate scilicet ex hypothesi non ex ipsa re.

Qualis necessitas est etiam quae a me inducitur ex electione boni.

I reply that from this I will know hereafter not to bother reading Augustine three times, since I will be as uncertain in the end as in the beginning.[6]

He says that a mechanical God is introduced.

The expression is odious and metaphorical; let us speak precisely. The sense is this: God acts in a manner as regular as a clock, indeed in a more regular manner, because the reason the clock acts in a regular manner is to be referred to the regular manner in which God operates, namely the most perfect.

1377 He objects that if nothing is without a reason, the world will be eternal, because there is no reason why God would not have undertaken to create it earlier.

I reply *first* that all things are created ex nihilo, not from preexisting matter at any moment whatever, for even matter itself is created; and it is of no consequence that some other things might have existed already in the past for in that case they would have been annihilated later. Therefore, even if creatures always have existed, or even if some other world existed before this world just as there will be another after this world—what then? What's the problem? I reply *second* that it is still not so easy to conclude something from this because in itself time is nothing but the continuation of things already in existence. And so if the world began, the question why it began at this time and not before is idle, since there is no time before then. But if you ask whether it could have lasted for a longer time—e.g., if the world is 6,000 years old, why not 10,000 years old—then I reply *third* that there can be some underlying reason and proportion of harmony, unknown to us.[7]

The necessity of the future sin of Judas existed before Judas existed. Therefore, it did not arise from Judas's will. God foresaw that Judas would sin. Therefore, it was certain, infallible, inevitable, and necessary that Judas would sin before Judas existed. Judas was not in the divine intellect, but the idea of a Judas who would sin was. The idea of a Judas who would sin did not arise from Judas, since Judas did not yet exist. The idea of a Judas who would sin was in the divine intellect not only as the idea of something possible but as also the idea of something actually to come. This idea so construed did not arise from Judas. Rather, that Judas would sin follows necessarily from this idea. Then when Judas deliberated whether he would betray Christ or not, it was already necessary for Judas to choose betrayal, otherwise Scripture would be false. I mean, of course with a necessity based on a hypothesis, not based on the thing itself.[8]

Such necessity is introduced according to me on the basis of the choice of the good.

Necessitas absoluta est, cum res [aliter] ne intelligi quidem potest, sed in terminis contradictionem implicat, v.g. ter tria esse decem.

Necessitas hypothetica est cum res quidem aliter esse intelligi potest per se, sed per accidens ob alias res extra ipsam jam praesuppositas, talis necessario est, v.g. necesse erat Judam esse peccaturum, supponendo quod Deus id praeviderit. Vel supponendo quod id Judas putaverit esse optimum.

Series rerum non est necessaria necessitate absoluta. Sunt enim plures aliae series possibiles, id est intelligibiles, etsi actu non sequatur earum executio.

1378 *Intelligi potest series rerum impossibilis, hypothetica necessitate,* v.g. series Mundi talis, ut in ea eveniat omnes pios damnari, et omnes impios salvari.

Ista quidem series intelligi seu concipi potest, sed ejus existentia actualis est impossibilis impossibilitate Hypothetica, non quidem quod id in terminis implicet contradictionem, sed, quod id sit incompatibile, cum praesupposita Dei existentia, cujus perfectio (ex qua justitia sequitur) tale quid pati non potest.

Tripliciter rem videmus, per experientiam, per ratiocinationem et per speculum. Deus vidit ab aeterno Judam esse peccaturum; non per experientiam, quia experientia non est nisi praesentium; non per ratiocinationem, quia ea Deus non indiget, ergo per speculum, id est in idea quae est in intellectu Divino, et futuritionem includit.

Causa peccati immediata est homo prout scilicet tunc intellectu ac voluntate constitutus est ex positis externis. At causa peccati praecedens seu mediata est status hominis et objectorum praecedens praesentem; et catena harum causarum mediatarum est series rerum. Sed causa ejus prima est eadem quae seriei, nempe idearum in intellectu divino constitutarum et rerum possibilium naturam exprimentium constitutio talis, ut optimum sit in summa hanc potius quam illam seriem eligi.

Quemadmodum Musicus non vult dissonantias per se, sed per accidens tantum, quando ipsis, postea correctis, melodia perfectior redditur quam sine ipsis fuisset; ita Deus non vult peccata nisi sub conditione poenae corrigentis, et per accidens tantum, ut requisita ad complendam seriei perfectionem.

Quisquis habet pravam voluntatem, is jure punitur. Prava voluntas nihil

Absolute necessity is when a thing cannot even be understood to be otherwise, but it implies a contradiction in terms, e.g., three times three is ten.[9]

Hypothetical necessity is when a thing can be understood to be *otherwise* in itself, but, *per accidens,* because of other things already presupposed outside itself it is necessarily such and such. For example: it was necessary for Judas to sin, supposing that God foresaw it, or supposing that Judas believed that it would be best.

The series of things is not necessary by an absolute necessity. For there are many other series that are possible, i.e., intelligible, even if they are not actually performed.

1378 *An impossible series of things can be understood by hypothetical necessity.*[10] For example, a series of the world in which all the pious are damned and all the impious are saved.

Certainly this series can be understood or conceived, but its actual existence is impossible by a hypothetical impossibility, not because it implies a contradiction in terms but because it is incompatible with the presupposed existence of God, whose perfection (from which his justice follows) cannot allow such a thing.

We perceive things in three ways: through experience, through reasoning, and through a representation. God saw from eternity but not through experience that Judas would sin because experience is only of what is present, and not through reasoning because God does not require it. Therefore God sees it through a representation, i.e., in the idea that is in the divine intellect and that includes future situations.[11]

The immediate cause of sin is the man as he is then constituted with respect to intellect and will based on the external things that are posited. But the preceding or mediate cause of sin is the state of the man and of objects preceding the present. And the chain of these mediate causes is the series of things. But its first cause is the same as that of the series, namely an order of ideas established in the divine intellect expressing the nature of possible things in such a way that it was best in the end that this series was chosen rather than another.[12]

Just as a musician does not seek dissonances per se but only per accidens, when, through these very dissonances, subsequently resolved, a more perfect melody is created than would have existed without them, similarly, God does not want sins, except under the condition of punishment that corrects, and per accidens only, as a requirement for completing the perfection of the series.[13]

Whoever has a depraved will is deservedly punished. A depraved will is

aliud est quam pravae circa res morales sententiae vel opiniones. Quicunque pravas circa res practicas habet opiniones, easque exequitur, is jure punitur, ob hanc solam causam, quia scelus ejus non ex errore facti, sed ex errore juris, id est ex pessimis opinionibus deliberatisque rationibus ortum est. Unde patet nihil aliud requiri ad puniendum scelus, quam ut quis admittat scelus, et sciat tamen esse scelus. Nulla ergo alia opus est libertate. Nec refert, quod ille putat, scelus sibi esse bonum, seu utile; et ideo ipsum elegit, quia impune se laturum, vel poenam longe minorem fructu inde sperato, credebat. Nam nihilo minus punietur, tametsi ratio eligendi fuerit haec opinio.

1379 Nec poterit peccator aliquando in extremo judicio dicere, non fuisse in sua potestate opinionem suam mutare. Nam et in rebus humanis juste faciunt judices cum puniunt sceleratos, etsi scelerati illi postea poenitentes, queri possint, se ad pessimas istas opiniones quas cum peccarent, habebant quadam adversitate devenisse.

Damnandorum autem querelis adhuc aliud obstat, quod scilicet ne tunc quidem sunt poenitentes, cum damnantur, adeoque nunquam queri possunt.

Nemo se volens malum fecit, alioqui antequam fieret, esset.

Si peccatores tempore judicii adhuc revera poenitentes essent non damnarentur aeternum, sed casus iste non evenit unquam.

Puto fuisse tempus quo homines non minus vage de Geometricis loquebantur, quam nunc de Metaphysicis. Itaque mirum non est quod hodie Geometria ita bene constituta est, Metaphysica vero tam incerta vagatur. Credo enim fortasse tempus venturum, quo non minus bene constituta erit Metaphysica ac Geometria. Quod a tot seculis nondum constituta est Metaphysica, ex eo non debet de successu desperari. Nam fortasse in quadam adhuc Mundi infantia sumus. Et quemadmodum Pythagoram (si ille primus est) a Geometria rigidis demonstrationibus constituenda non absteruit antecessorum balbuties, ita nec nos praesens confusio a Metaphysica constituenda deterrere debet.

Objectio: Si omnia certa praevisa inevitabilia sunt, frustra preces adhibentur, sive ut ille ait: *Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando.*

Respondeo, imo preces utiles sunt ad id quod desideramus obtinendum, ut aqua vel ventus ad molendinum circumagendum. Ut enim Deus cum

nothing but depraved judgments or opinions on moral issues. Whoever has depraved opinions on practical matters and acts on them is deservedly punished for this reason alone because his crime did not arise from an error of fact but from an error about morality, i.e., from deplorable opinions and carefully considered reasons. From this it is evident that nothing else is required in order to punish a crime than for someone to commit the crime and know that it is a crime. Therefore no other freedom is needed. It doesn't matter that he believes that the crime is good for him, or useful, and that he chose it because he believed that he could carry it out with impunity or because he believed that the punishment would be much less than what he hoped to get from that source, for he will be punished nonetheless, even if the reason for his choice was this opinion.

1379 Nor will the sinner ever be able to say at the Last Judgment that it was not in his power to change his own opinion. For even in human affairs judges act correctly when they punish criminals, even if the criminals, feeling regret, lament that they came to their deplorable opinions, which they had when they sinned, by a certain misfortune.[14]

Moreover something else besides this stands in the way of the complaints of the damned, namely that they are not even penitent at the time they are damned, and thus they can never complain.[15]

No one voluntarily makes himself evil, for otherwise he would be evil before he made himself evil.[16]

If sinners were in fact penitent up until the time of judgment they would not be damned for eternity, but this never happens.

I believe that there was a time when men spoke no less vaguely about geometry than they now do about metaphysics. And so it is not surprising that today, while geometry is well established metaphysics makes its way so uncertainly. For I believe that the time may come when metaphysics will be no less established than geometry. Just because metaphysics has not yet been established after so many centuries, one must not despair of success. For perhaps we are still in what might be called the infancy of the world. And just as the babble of his predecessors did not drive away Pythagoras (if he is the first) from establishing geometry by means of strict demonstrations, so the present confusion ought not to deter us from establishing metaphysics.

Objection: if all things foreseen as certain are inevitable, then prayers are useless, or, as that famous author wrote, *Give up hoping that the fates are changed by praying to God.*[17]

I reply, prayers indeed are useful for obtaining that which we desire, just as water or wind is useful for turning a millstone. For just as God, when he

praevidit molendinum circumactum iri, id vidit futurum per ventum vel aquam. Ita cum praevidit Te gratiam aliquam assecuturum, vidit id futurum per preces.

Principium omnis ratiocinationis primarium est, nihil esse aut fieri, quin ratio reddi possit, saltem ab omniscio, cur sit potius quam non sit, aut cur sic sit potius quam aliter, paucis *Omnium rationem reddi posse.*

1380 Definitio libertatis, quod sit potestas agendi aut non agendi positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, omnibusque tam in objecto quam in agente, existentibus paribus est chimaera impossibilis, quae contra primum principium quod dixi pugnat.

Haec notio libertatis ignota fuit antiquitati; nulla ejus in Aristotele vestigia reperiuntur, Augustini systema plane evertit, a Magistro Sententiarum, Thoma, Scoto, ac plerisque Scholasticis veteribus aliena est; celebrata primum a Scholasticis posterioribus, eludendis potius quam tollendis difficultatibus apta.

Apud Veteres liberum a spontaneo differt, ut species a genere, nimirum libertas est spontaneitas rationalis. Spontaneum est cujus agendi principium in agente est, idque et in libertate contingit. Nam positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis *externis,* mens libera agere potest aut non agere, prout scilicet ipsamet disposita est.

Voluntatis objectum esse bonum apparens, et nihil a nobis appeti nisi sub ratione boni apparentis, dogma est vetustissimum communissimumque.

Quicquid est, aut per se est, aut per aliud. Si per se est, tunc ejus ratio existendi ex ipsius natura sumitur, seu essentia ejus continet existentiam, quod in omnibus illis veritatibus locum habet, quae ex terminis demonstrantur, seu quarum contrarium implicat contradictionem. Si vero aliquid per aliud est, tunc existendi rationem habet extra se, id est habet causam. Omnia ergo rationem habent, vel in se et ex terminis, ut per se necessaria, vel aliunde, ut libera et contingentia, seu ut ita dicam per accidens sive ex hypothesi necessaria.

Cum dicitur exempli gratia, potuisse Judam non peccare, seu non fuisse necesse eum peccare, hoc intelligitur de necessitate prioris generis seu absoluta sive per se, nihil enim involvit haec propositio quod repugnet. Tametsi id ex hypothesi, id est aliunde, necessarium esset, ut scriptura im-

foresaw that the millstone was about to be turned, saw that this would come about through wind or water, similarly when he foresaw that you would obtain something favorable, he saw that it would be through prayer.

The first principle of all reasoning is this: nothing exists or comes about unless a reason can be given, at least by an omniscient being, why it exists rather than doesn't, or why it is this way rather than otherwise. In a word, *a reason can be given for everything.*[18]

1380 The definition of freedom—that it is the power of acting or not acting, all the requisites for acting having been posited, and all things existing in the object as well as in the agent being equal—is an impossible chimera, which is contrary to the first principle I stated.[19]

This concept of freedom was unknown in antiquity. No vestige of it is found in Aristotle. The system of Augustine completely rejects it. It is alien to the Master of Sentences, Thomas, Scotus, and a great part of the older scholastics. It was first proclaimed by later scholastics; it was adapted to avoid rather than remove the difficulties.[20]

According to the ancients the free differs from the spontaneous as species from genus; surely, freedom is rational spontaneity. The spontaneous is something whose principle of action is in the agent. This holds in the case of freedom also. For if all the *external* requisites for acting have been posited, a free mind can act or not act, just as it is itself disposed.[21]

A very ancient and common dogma holds that the object of the will is the apparent good, and that nothing is desired by us except on the basis of the apparent good.

Whatever is, either is per se, i.e., exists through itself, or per aliud, i.e., exists through another. If it is per se, then the reason for its existence is derived from its own nature, i.e., its essence contains existence. This holds in all truths that can be demonstrated on the basis of terms or whose contrary implies a contradiction. If something is per aliud, then it has the reason for its existence outside itself, i.e., it has a cause. Therefore, all things have a reason, either in themselves and from terms, such as what is necessary ⟨per se, i.e., through itself⟩, or from another source, such as what is free and contingent, or, as I shall say, per accidens or necessary based on a hypothesis.

When it is said, for example, that it was possible for Judas not to sin—that is, that it was not necessary for him to sin—this is understood with respect to the first type of necessity, i.e., absolute or per se necessity, for this proposition involves nothing that is inconsistent. Nonetheless, it would be necessary ex hypothesi, i.e., from another source, so that what Scripture

pleretur.[L1] Cum dicitur *oportet,* id est necesse est scandala esse (scandala autem utique peccata sunt sive in accipiente, sive in dante), utique dicitur necessaria esse peccata, sed hoc intelligitur haud dubie de necessitate non per se, seu in terminis; sed per accidens, seu in externis circumstantiis posita.[L2]

1381 Omne futurum non minus certo ac necessario futurum est, quam praeteritum necessario praeteritum est. Non quod per se id sit necessarium, sed quod ex positis circumstantiis praesentibus (exempli causa praescientia Dei, item serie rerum) id consequatur. Quicquid futurum est utique *verum* est fore, quicquid *verum* est (scienti) certo verum est. Ergo quicquid futurum est certum est fore. Quicquid certum est inevitabile est. Quicquid inevitabile est, necessarium est. Ergo omne futurum necessarium est. Sed necessitate per accidens seu hypothetica qualem dixi, quae certe contingentiam seu libertatem non tollit.

Argumentum de praescientia eodem redit. Quicquid est futurum id Deus praescit, quod Deus praescit id Deus infallibiliter praescit, quod Deus infallibiliter praescit infallibile est. Quod infallibile est inevitabile est, quod inevitabile est, necessarium est. Ergo omne futurum necessarium est. Necessitate tamen, quae libertatem ac contingentiam non tollit. Nam quamvis omnia futura sint necessaria, non tamen sunt per se et absolute necessaria, seu ex terminis, sed per accidens, seu secundum quid.

Nullam aliam concedo necessitatem in actionibus liberis, quam eam quam illi qui Divinam praescientiam admittunt, concedere coguntur in omnibus futuris contingentibus.

Ex complexis omnes veritates, Metaphysicae, Geometricae, et aliae quaecunque, quae ex terminis demonstrari possunt, per se necessariae sunt, omnes vero veritates historicae, seu ut ita dicam facti, quae non demonstratione, sed experientia a nobis sciri possunt, sunt per se contingentes per accidens tantum necessariae.

Ex terminis incomplexis solus Deus est Ens per se seu absolute neces-

L1. In the margin: Quo major necessitas, eo major perfectio. Scaligerus lib. 11 *de caus. l. l.* c. 166.

L2. In the margin: De necessario per accidens. Quod non est per se necessarium est per accidens necessarium. Scal. *exerc.* 39.

says would be fulfilled.[L1] When it is said that it *must* be, i.e., it is necessary that there are inducements to sin (which themselves are certainly sins in either the giver or receiver), then at least it is said that sins are necessary. But this is understood without doubt concerning necessity that is not per se, or through terms, but per accidens, through the external circumstances that have been posited.[L2]

1381 Every future thing is no less certainly and necessarily future than past things are necessarily past.[24] Not because it is necessary per se but because it follows from the present circumstances that have been posited (e.g., because of the foreknowledge of God; similarly, because of the series of things). Whatever will be, it is *true* at any rate that it will be; whatever is *true* is true with certainty (for one who knows). Therefore, whatever will be is such that it is certain that it will be. Whatever is certain is inevitable. Whatever is inevitable is necessary. Therefore everything that will be is necessary. But this is true because of a necessity per accidens, or hypothetical necessity, as I said, which certainly does not destroy contingency or freedom.[25]

The argument concerning foreknowledge reduces to the same thing. Whatever will be is foreknown by God. Because God foreknows it, he foreknows it infallibly. Because God knows it infallibly, it is infallible. Because it is infallible, it is inevitable. Because it is inevitable, it is necessary. Therefore everything that will be is necessary. Nevertheless, this is true because of a necessity that does not destroy freedom or contingency. For although all future things are necessary, nevertheless they are not necessary per se and absolutely necessary, i.e., from terms, but they are necessary per accidens, or *secundum quid,* i.e., relative to something.

I concede no other necessity in free actions than that which all who admit divine foreknowledge are compelled to concede in all future contingencies.

With respect to propositions, all metaphysical and geometrical truths and any others that can be demonstrated on the basis of terms are necessary per se. But all historical truths, or as I would say, truths of fact, which can be known by us through experience, and not through demonstration, are contingent per se and only necessary per accidens.[26]

With respect to nonpropositional entities, only God is a self-sufficient

L1. In the margin: The greater the necessity, the greater the perfection. Scaligerus lib. 11 *de caus.* l. l. c. 166.[22]

L2. In the margin: Concerning necessity per accidents. What is not necessary per se is necessary per accidents. Scal. *exerc.* 39.[23]

sarium, cujus [essentia] scilicet involvit existentiam. Caetera omnia sunt per accidens necessaria ex voluntate scilicet Dei si bona sunt, ex permissione autem, si mala sunt, ut postea dicam.

Si non datur praedeterminatio physica actuum liberorum, si Deus non influit in substantiam actus liberi, seu si non cooperatur omni actui libero sequitur Deum non esse omnium creaturarum causam primam. Quod est revera Deum tollere a rebus. Actus liber cum sit aliqua creatura, debet suam existentiam a Deo accipere.

Non potest dici Deum auxilia dare, seu influere in actum ex praeviso quid homo esset electurus, quia homo ne electurus quidem est sine alio auxilio ad ipsam electionem necessario.

1382 Proprie et accurate loquendo non tam dicendum est Deum concurrere actui quam potius Deum producere actum. Ponamus enim Deum concurrere actui cuilibet, sed ita ut non solum producatur a Deo, sed partim etiam ab homine, hinc sequeretur saltem istum concursum hominis non indigere cooperatione Dei, quod est contra hypothesin, nam concursus iste est etiam actus, sequitur ergo tandem omnes actus in solidum a Deo produci, uti creaturas in universum omnes. Qui bis rem dimidiam producit, integram producit; vel clarius qui rem dimidiam producit, et residuae dimidiae rursus dimidiam, et residuae dimidiae a dimidia rursus dimidiam, in infinitum, is producit integram. Id autem contingit in actu quolibet ratione Dei. Nam ponamus Deum et hominem concurrere ad actum, necesse est Deum rursus concurrere ad ipsum concursum hominis, et ita vel ibitur in infinitum (nec eo minus tamen res eodem redibit); vel statim ab initio sufficiet dicere Deum revera producere actum, etsi homo sit qui agat.

Peccatum est creatura, omnis creatura a Deo continue creatur, ergo et peccatum. Scilicet quoad substantiam actus; seu secundum id quod in eo est positivum. Deus in nobis operatur tam ipsum velle, quam ipsum facere.

Posito quod conservatio idem sit quod continua creatio, sequitur idem. Nam cum quolibet momento Deus hominem quasi de novo creet, ideo hoc momento quo peccat, creat hominem peccantem, seu peccatum producit cum homine.

being, i.e., an absolutely necessary being, whose [essence] involves existence. All others are necessary per accidens through the will of God, if they are good, and, through the permission of God, if they are evil, as I will explain later.

If there is no physical predetermination of free acts—if God does not penetrate into the substance of a free act, i.e., if he does not cooperate in every free act—it follows that God is not the first cause of all created entities. And that is actually to remove God from things. Since a free act is a created entity, it must receive its own existence from God.[27]

It cannot be said that God gives aid or penetrates into an action because he foresaw what the person would choose, because the person could not even choose without another aid necessary for the choice itself.[28]

1382 Properly and accurately speaking, the correct thing to say is not so much that God concurs in an action but rather that God produces the action. For let us suppose that God concurs in any given action but in such fashion that it is not produced by God alone but in part by the person. From this it follows that at least this particular concurrence of the person does not require the cooperation of God—which is contrary to our hypothesis. For that particular concurrence is also an act; therefore it follows in the end that all acts are produced in full by God, in the same way as are all creatures in the universe. He who twice produces half the thing produces the whole. Or, more accurately, he who produces half the thing, and in turn half of the remaining half, and in turn half of the remaining half of the half—to infinity—produces the whole. This takes place in any act whatsoever, according to God's manner of operation. For let us suppose that God and a person concur in some action; it is necessary that God concur with this very concurrence of the person, and either it will proceed to infinity (nevertheless it will not any the less reduce to the same thing) or it will suffice to say right from the start that God actually produces the action, even if it is the person who acts.[29]

Sin is a created thing; every created thing is continuously created by God. Therefore, the same thing holds even for sin, i.e., as far as the substance of the act is concerned⟨—in other words, with respect to what is positive in the thing.⟩ God operates in us in the willing as much as in the doing.[30]

The same conclusion follows if we suppose that conservation is the same as continued creation. For since at any given moment God creates the person as if anew, therefore at the moment at which the person sins, God creates the person sinning, i.e., he produces the sin with the person.[31]

Nihil absolute loquendo malum, seu Deo ingratum contingere potest, alioqui Deus non esset omnipotens.

Cum Deus peccata nolle seu ipsis irasci dicitur, sensus est Deum permittere peccata sed non nisi sub conditione poenae.

Dici quodammodo potest Deum esse autorem peccati per accidens, seu Deum velle peccatum per accidens, quemadmodum Musicus dissonantiam. Ponamus enim casum, quo ipsa perfectio Melodiae exposcat dissonantias immisceri, rursusque compensari, sive ponamus longe gratiorem fieri harmoniam incidentibus dissonantiis, insperatoque in consonantiam redactis, quam si non nisi consonantiae fuissent. Eo casu arbitror dici posse Musicum esse autorem dissonantiarum per accidens, seu velle eas per accidens, id est permittere potius quam velle. Nam ipsas per se dissonantias non vult, sed si commode id pateretur perfectio melodiae declina-
1383 ret. Permittit autem, et quidem non invitus, sed volens, per accidens tamen, id est non ob ipsarum naturam, sed quia earum interventu deprehenditur in summa majorem existere perfectionem. Ita Deus peccata, tolerat, permittit, et non invitus quidem, per accidens tamen vult, quia intelligit, seriem universi ipsis intercurrentibus et mirifica ratione compensatis fore perfectiorem. Peccatorum ergo ratio ultima est non voluntas Dei ipsa diligentis, sed natura perfectionis rerum universalis exigentis ut pictura umbris distinguatur, et melodia dissonantiis ipsa compensatione voluptatem augentibus, animetur.

Si necessitas eligendi optimum tolleret libertatem, sequeretur Deum, angelos, beatos, nos ipsos libere non agere, cum a majore bonitate, vera vel apparente, ad agendum determinamur.

Cum Deus necessario et tamen libere eligat perfectissimum, quandocunque unum alio perfectius est, sequitur salvam ejus libertatem fore, si id semper contingeret seu etiamsi nunquam existeret, aut existere posset casus sine ratione eligendi unum ex duobus aeque perfectis.

Si Deus aliquid vult sine ratione, sequitur eum agere et velle imperfecte quia omnis substantia intelligens in quantum non ex intellectu agit, imperfecte agit.

Eligere est proprie ex pluribus legere sive capere quod optimum videtur. Proponitur casus duorum oppositorum *A* et *B,* quae scilicet non possunt stare simul. Ponitur porro necesse esse ut alterutrum eligatur, ac tertio

Absolutely speaking, nothing is evil, i.e., nothing can occur that is displeasing to God, otherwise God is not omnipotent.[32]

When God is said to will against sins or to be angered by them, the sense is that God permits sins, but only under the condition of punishment.

It can be said in a certain way that God is the author of sin per accidens, i.e., God wills sins per accidens, as a musician wills dissonance. For let us consider the case in which the very perfection of the melody requires that dissonances are mixed in and in turn are compensated for; or let us suppose that a much more pleasing harmony comes about when these dissonances occur and then consonance is unexpectedly restored than if nothing but the consonances existed. In this case I believe it can be said that the musician is the author of the dissonances per accidens, or that he wills them per accidens, i.e., he permits them rather than wills them. For he does not will the dissonances per se; rather he would avoid them readily if the
1383 perfection of the melody allowed. However, he permits the dissonance, not reluctantly but willingly, yet nevertheless per accidens, i.e., not on account of its own nature but because by its occurrence a greater perfection exists in the whole. Thus God tolerates and permits sins, not reluctantly; nevertheless, he wills them per accidens because he knows that the series will be more perfect with these included and compensated for in a marvelous way. Hence, the ultimate ground of sin is not the will itself of a loving God but the nature of the universal perfection of things, which requires that a picture should be set off by shadows and that a melody should be enlivened by dissonances that increase the pleasure by their very resolution.[33]

If the necessity of choosing the best were to destroy freedom, it would follow that God, the angels, the blessed, we ourselves would not act freely, since we are determined to act by the greater good, real or apparent.

Since God necessarily, ⟨and, nevertheless, freely,⟩ chooses the most perfect whenever one thing is more perfect than another, it follows that his freedom will be preserved, ⟨if the more perfect is always produced, i.e.,⟩ even if the case of choosing one of two equally perfect things without a reason never exists and could not exist.

If God wills something without reason, it follows that he acts and wills imperfectly because every intelligent substance, insofar as it does not act from intelligence, acts imperfectly.

To choose, in the strict sense, is to select or pick what seems best from several. The case is proposed in which there are two opposites, A and B, which cannot both hold at the same time. Furthermore, it is proposed that it is necessary that one or the other be chosen, and, third, that there is no

nullam esse rationem alterutrum eligendi: ajo hunc casum ex his tribus hypothesibus compositum implicare.

At inquies, ipsa ratio quae facit ut alterutrum eligendum sit, facit etiam ut alterutrum eligatur.

Respondeo communis illa ratio non est plena seu sufficiens, nam facit quidem ut eligatur vel *A* vel *B,* sed non facit eligi *A* non *B,* nec etiam facit eligi *B* non *A*.

Scientia media A. VI.iv

1373 *Scientia media*

Novembr. 1677

Principium illud summum: *nihil esse sine ratione,* plerasque Metaphysicae controversias finit. Illud enim videtur negari non posse a Scholasticis, nihil fieri, quin Deus si velit rationem reddere possit, cur factum sit potius quam non sit. Quin etiam de futuris conditionatis circa quae scientiam mediam introduxere Fonseca et Molina, idem dici potest. Scit Deus quid infans fuisset facturus si adolevisset, sed et scientiae hujus suae si vellet rationem reddere posset, et convincere dubitantem; cum id homo quoque aliquis imperfecte possit. Non ergo in quadam Visione consistit Dei scientia, quae imperfecta est et a posteriori; sed in cognitione causae, et a priori. Ponamus Petrum in certis quibusdam circumstantiis constitui, cum certo quodam gratiae auxilio; et Deum mihi permittere ut a se quaeram, quid facturus sit Petrus in hoc statu. Non dubito quin Deus respondere possit aliquid certum et infallibile, quanquam aliquos Scholasticos ea de re dubitare ausos mirer. Ponamus ergo Deum respondere, quod Petrus gratiam sit rejecturus. Quaero porro an Deus hujus sui pronuntiati rationem reddere possit, ita ut me quoque possit reddere scientem hujus eventus. Si
1374 dicimus id Deum non posse imperfecta erit ejus scientia, si dicimus Deum id posse, manifesto eversa erit scientia media. Secundum veros Philosophos et S. Augustinum, ratio cur Deus sciat rerum actiones necessarias vel liberas, absolutas, vel conditionatas, est perfecta naturae [ipsarum] cognitio, quemadmodum Geometra novit quid per circulum et

reason for choosing one over the other. I say that this case, composed of these three hypotheses, implies a contradiction.

But you insist that the very reason that brings it about that the agent must choose one or the other also brings it about that one or the other would be chosen.

I reply that this general reason is not full or sufficient. For it certainly brings it about that either A or B would be chosen, but it does not bring it about that A is chosen and not B, nor does it bring it about that B is chosen and not A.

6. Middle Knowledge[1] A VI.iv

1373 *Middle Knowledge*

November 1677

The highest principle—*nothing exists without a reason*—puts an end to many controversies in metaphysics. For it seems it cannot be denied by scholastics that nothing occurs without God being able to give a reason, if he wishes, why it happened rather than didn't. And, indeed, the same can be said also about future conditionals with respect to which Molina and Fonseca introduced middle knowledge.[2] God knows what the infant would have done had he grown up, and he can give a basis for his own knowledge if he wishes, and he can overcome anyone who has doubts, because men can also do this imperfectly. Therefore the knowledge of God does not consist in some vision which is imperfect and a posteriori but in cognition of the cause a priori.[3] Let us suppose that Peter is situated in certain particular circumstances with a certain particular aid of grace and that God has permitted me to ask him what Peter would do in this state. I do not doubt that God can respond with something certain and infallible, although I am amazed that some scholastics have dared to doubt this. Hence, let us suppose that God responds that Peter will reject grace. I ask next whether God can give the reason for his own pronouncement so that he can cause me also to have knowledge of this event. If we say God cannot
1374 do it, his knowledge will be imperfect; if we say he can do it, manifestly middle knowledge will be subverted.[4] According to true philosophers and St. Augustine, the reason God knows the actions of things, necessary or free, absolute or conditional, is his perfect cognition of the nature of these things, just as a geometer knows what can be established in any proposed case by means of a compass and straight-edge ruler, or what will be the

regulam in aliquo casu proposito possit praestari; vel quis futurus sit datae alicujus machinae effectus, si datis rebus ac viribus applicetur. Ponamus Paulum cum iisdem circumstantiis et auxiliis poni, cum quibus positus est Petrus, et Deum mihi dicere, quod Petrus tunc rejecturus esset gratiam, Paulus vero accepturus; necesse est utique aliquam dari rationem differentiae hujus; ea vero non aliunde peti poterit, quam ex Petrinitate et Paulinitate; seu ex natura voluntatis Pauli, et natura voluntatis Petri, quae differentia harum duarum libertatum facit, ut alter hoc alter illud eligat. Differentiam autem istam etiam in ordine ad hanc electionem, Deo cognitam esse necesse est, eamque si mihi explicare dignaretur intelligerem, atque ita plenam de eventu futuro conditionato scientiam a priori nanciscerer. Secundum autores scientiae mediae non posset Deus rationem reddere sui pronuntiati, nec mihi explicare. Hoc unum dicere poterit quaerenti cur ita futurum esse pronuntiet; quod ita videat actum hunc repraesentari in magno illo speculo intra se posito, in quo omnia praesentia, futura, absoluta vel conditionata exhibentur. Quae scientia pure empirica est, nec Deo ipsi satisfaceret, quia rationem cur hoc potius quam illud in speculo repraesentetur, non intelligeret. Quemadmodum is qui in Tabulis Calculatos invenit numeros, non vero ipse eos calculare potest. Deus scit futura absoluta quia scit quid decreverit, et futura conditionata, quia scit quid esset decreturus. Scit autem quid esset decreturus, quia scit quid in eo casu futurum sit optimum, optimum enim est decreturus, sin minus sequetur Deum non posse certo scire, quid ipsemet in eo casu facturus esset. Praeclara Scoti sententia, quod intellectus divinus nihil cognoscat (ex rebus facti), quod non determinavit, alioqui vilesceret. Vasquez egregia sententia quod voluntas ex duobus objectis non potest eligere nisi alterius bonitas fortius repraesentetur. 1. p. c. 2. d. 43. *in 1. 2.* init. Ut ostendit Macedo in *diff. Thom. et Scot.* coll. XI, diff. 1, *circa scientiam mediam.*

Du franc arbitre A VI.iv

1406 *Du franc arbitre*

La Question si nous avons un franc arbitre, et quelle est son étendue est une des plus anciennes et des plus agitées dans le monde. Des nations en-

outcome of a given machine if it is applied to given things and forces.

Let us suppose that Paul is situated with the same circumstances and aids that Peter is situated with and that God says to me that in that event Peter would reject grace, whereas Paul would accept it. Certainly, it is necessary that some reason for this difference be given. It cannot be sought from a source other than Peterness and Paulness; i.e., from the nature of the will of Paul and from the nature of the will of Peter.[5] This difference between these two cases of freedom means that the latter chooses one thing, the former another. However, it is necessary for even this difference in detail with respect to the choice to be known by God, and I would understand it if he thought it worthy to explain it to me. And thus I would obtain a full knowledge a priori of a future conditional event. According to the authors of middle knowledge God cannot give a reason for his pronouncement, nor explain it to me. According to them, this alone may be said to someone seeking why God declares that it will be thus; namely, that he sees this act to be displayed in this way in that great representation posited within him, in which all things present, future, absolute, or conditional are shown. Yet this knowledge is purely empirical. It would not give satisfaction to God himself because he would not understand the reason why this rather than that is displayed in the representation, like someone who finds numbers calculated in tables though he is not able to calculate them himself. God knows future absolute things because he knows what he has decreed, and future conditionals because he knows what he would have decreed. Moreover, he knows what he would have decreed, because he knows what in this case would be best, for he would decree the best.[6] Were it otherwise it would follow that God could not know for certain what he himself would do in this case. The well-known opinion of Scotus that the divine intellect knows nothing (of matters of fact) which it has not determined would become worthless. The illustrious opinion of Vasquez—that the will cannot choose between two objects unless the goodness of one of them is greater—is anticipated.[7]

7. On Free Choice[1] A VI.iv

[Between Summer 1678 and Winter 1680–81?]

1406 *On Free Choice*

The question of whether we have free choice, and what its scope is, is one of the most ancient and most vexed in the world. Entire nations and

tieres, et des sectes aussi bien des anciens philosophes, que des chrestiens modernes ont pris parti là dessus. Elle est de grande importance pour la conduite de la vie; on se condamne pour ce sujet; et après cela, il paroistroit temeraire de dire qu'elle est aisée à resoudre. J'avoue qu'on ne la vuidera jamais, tandis que les hommes se plaisent dans les doutes et cherchent à les entretenir plus tost par des discours en l'air mais agréables, qu'à les finir par des raisonnemens plus solides, mais plus severes.

La cause de la pluspart des disputes sans fin, vient en partie, de ce qu'on veut avoir la liberté de jouer des notions, et qu'on croit que ce seroit une espece d'esclavage de s'obliger à des pensées fermes, et à des idées fixes et bien arrestées. Quoyqu'il en soit tachons de découvrir, la vraye notion du franc arbitre, et puis nous verrons si c'est quelque chose dont les hommes sont capables.

Je suppose *premierement* que les hommes prennent le franc arbitre pour une perfection, car ils l'attribuent à Dieu, et aux anges, et le refusent aux bestes.

Secondement je suppose que le franc arbitre est contraire à la contrainte, c'est pourquoy si quelcun est tiré par force dans une maison, on ne dira pas qu'il y est allé librement. Mais quand ceux qui se trouvent sur mer dans une tempeste, jettent leur marchandises pour rendre le vaisseau plus leger, et pour se sauver; on peut douter s'ils agissent librement. Et je réponds qu'ouy, car on ne les force pas de se sauver s'ils ne le veuillent.

Je suppose en *troisieme lieu* que le franc arbitre est contraire non seulement à la contrainte mais encor à l'ignorance ou erreur par exemple lors
1407 que les Curateurs ne veuillent pas donner à un jeune homme la connoissance de ses affaires, il peut dire qu'on luy refuse l'administration libre de ses biens quoyqu'on les luy ait mis entre les mains.

De là je tire ces conclusions: *plus un homme est puissant, pour n'estre pas entraisné aisement par quelque force exterieure d'autant plus est il libre.* Si quelque homme pouvoit estre assez puissant pour s'arrester dans l'air au milieu de la cheute sans aucun soûtien, *non obstant* la pesanteur qui porte les corps vers la terre, il seroit sans doute plus libre, que les hommes ordinaires. C'est pourquoy quant à ce point les oiseaux sont plus libres que les hommes, ou au moins les hommes seroient plus libres, qu'il[s] ne sont s'ils avoient encor les avantages des oiseaux.

Plus un homme a de connoissance d'autant plus est il libre, car l'erreur et la contrainte sont egalement contraires à la liberté de l'action; par les suppositions susdites.

La *Volonté* est un effort qu'on fait pour agir, parce qu'on l'a trouvé bon. D'où il s'en suit, *qu'on ne manque jamais d'agir, lorsqu'on veut et lors*

sects of ancient philosophers, as well as sects of modern Christians, have taken sides on it. It is of great importance for the conduct of life; a person condemns himself on the basis of this subject. Having said that, it would seem rash to say that it is easy to resolve. I recognize that the issue will never be settled as long as men take pleasure in doubts and seek to keep those doubts alive by discourses with an agreeable air rather than to settle them with reasonings that are more solid but more difficult.

The cause of most disputes that lack resolution comes, in part, from the fact that one wants to have the freedom to play with the notions, and one believes that it would be a kind of slavery to be restricted to unswerving thoughts and to fixed and steady ideas. However that may be, let us try to discover the true notion of free choice, and then we shall see if it is something men are capable of.

I suppose, *in the first place,* that men hold free choice to be a perfection, for they attribute it to God and to angels, and they deny it of beasts.

Second, I suppose that free choice is contrary to constraint. This is why, if someone is pulled by force into a house, we shall not say he went there freely. But when those who are at sea in a storm throw their cargo overboard in order to make the ship lighter and save themselves, one can doubt if they acted freely. And I respond yes, for they were not compelled to save themselves if they did not want to.

I suppose *in the third place* that free choice is contrary not only to con-
1407 straint but also to ignorance or error. For example, when guardians do not wish to give a young man knowledge of his affairs, he can say that he is denied free administration of his goods, although they have been placed in his hands.

From that I draw these conclusions: *the more powerful a man is, so as not to be swayed easily by some exterior force, the more he is free.* If a man were powerful enough to stop himself in the air in the middle of a fall without any support, notwithstanding the weight that moves the body toward the ground, doubtless he would be more free than ordinary men. This is why, with respect to this point, birds are more free than men. At any rate, men would be more free than they are, if they also had the advantages of birds.

The more knowledge a man has, the more he is free, for error and constraint are equally contrary to freedom of action, on the basis of suppositions noted above.

The will is an effort one makes in order to act because one has found it good. From which it follows *that one never fails to act when one wills and*

qu'on peut à la fois. Car quand on fait effort l'action s'en suit necessairement quand il n'y a point d'empechement c'est à dire quand on peut. C'est donc un axiome des plus constans et des plus asseurés, que de la volonté et de la faculté l'action ne manque pas de suivre.

D'où il s'en suit *que nous sommes les maistres de nos actions,* c'est à dire que nous faisons tout ce que nous voulons, pourveu que cela ne surpasse point nos forces. Et par consequent nous avons une liberté tout entiere en ces matieres, d'agir comme bon nous semble.

C'est pourquoy *il n'y auroit pas lieu de douter de nostre liberté à pro-*
1408 *portion de nos forces et de nos connoissances; si nous nous contentions de ce qui est raisonnable,* en considerant que Dieu nous a donné la raison pour examiner le bien et le mal, et pour en faire le choix, et ensuite le pouvoir d'agir suivant ce choix.

Mais nous demandons quelque chose au delà; nous ne nous contentons pas de la liberté d'agir, mais nous pretendons encor une liberté de vouloir ce que nous voudrions vouloir; qui est une chose contradictoire et qui seroit nuisible, si elle estoit possible. Il sera aisé demonstrer l'un et l'autre.

Je dis donc que *la liberté de vouloir tout ce qu'on voudroit est une chose impossible.* Car si elle estoit possible cela iroit à l'infini; par exemple si on me disoit pourquoy je veux, et si je repondois parceque je veux vouloir; on auroit le même droit de me demander la raison de cette seconde volonté; et si je recourois tousjours à une nouvelle volonté de vouloir; la chose n'auroit point de fin, et il faudroit des volontés de vouloir infinies en nombre precedentes à la volonté d'agir ou bien il faudroit venir enfin à une raison de vouloir, qui ne soit pas prise de la volonté mais de l'entendement; car nous ne voulons pas parce que nous voulons vouloir, mais parceque nostre naturel est de vouloir ce que nous croyons le meilleur. Et cette croyance ne vient pas de nostre volonté, mais de la nature des choses ou de l'assiette de nostre esprit. Tout ce que nous pouvons faire là dessus, c'est de nous servir de tous les moyens convenables pour bien penser, afin que les choses nous paroissent suivant leur nature plustost que suivant nos prejugés.

Il n'y a donc point de liberté d'indifference, comme on l'appelle dans les écoles. Car la liberté de vouloir, que plusieurs pretendent, et qu'il[s] disent consister dans l'indifference; en sorte qu'on puisse suspendre l'action et la volonté sans aucune raison qui nous y meuve, est une chose non seulement impossible, car tout estre creé a quelque cause, mais encor inutile et qui seroit même nuisible; de sorte que nous n'aurions pas sujet de remercier la nature si elle nous avoit donné une faculté si déraisonnable.

1409 Elle est encor contraire aux suppositions faites au commencement, et conformes au bon sens, car la liberté doit estre une perfection, cependant

has the ability at the same time. For when effort is made action necessarily follows if there is no impediment, i.e., when one has the ability. Hence, it is one of the best-established and most certain axioms that from the will and the ability action cannot fail to follow.[2]

From which it follows *that we are the masters of our actions,* i.e., that we do whatever we will, provided that it does not surpass our power. And consequently we have a complete freedom in these matters to act as seems good to us.

That is why *there would be no room to doubt our freedom in proportion*
1408 *to our power and knowledge if we were content with what is reasonable,* considering that God gave us reason so that we could examine good and evil and make the choice between them, and then the power to act according to this choice.

But we ask for something beyond that; we are not satisfied with the freedom to act, but rather we claim in addition a freedom to will that which we would will to will, which is a contradictory thing and would be harmful, if it were possible. It will be easy to demonstrate the one and the other.[3]

Hence I say that the *freedom to will whatever we would will to will is impossible.* For if it were possible it would go on to infinity; for example, if I were asked why I will and if I were to respond because I will to will, a person would have the same right to ask me the reason for this second will. And if I always had recourse to a new will to will, the matter would have no end, and infinitely many wills to will preceding the will to act would be required. Or it would be necessary to come finally to a reason for willing that was not taken from the will but from the understanding. For we do not will because we will to will but because our nature is to will what we believe best. And this belief does not come from our will but from the nature of things or the state of our mind. All that we can do with respect to that is to make use of all the means appropriate for thinking well, so that things appear to us according to their nature rather than according to our prejudices.[4]

Hence, there is no freedom of indifference, as it is called in the schools. For the freedom to will, which several claim and which they say consists in indifference, so that one can suspend action and will without any reason that moves us to it, is something that is not only impossible—for every created being has some cause—but furthermore useless and would even be harmful. So we would have no reason to thank nature for giving us such an irrational faculty.[5]

1409 Furthermore it is contrary to the suppositions made in the beginning, which conform to good sense, for freedom must be a perfection, whereas

cette indifference, ou cette faculté de rejetter le meilleur sans aucune raison vraye ou apparente, est plustost marque d'une grande imperfection; et ne se trouve ny dans Dieu ny dans les anges confirmés dans le bien, *donc vraye liberté de l'esprit consiste à reconnoistre et à choisir le meilleur*; et comme nous avons établi cy dessus, qu'on est plus libre, à mesure qu'on a plus de connoissance, c'est tout le contraire à l'egard de l'indifference, qui est plus tost une suite de l'ignorance, car plus on est instruit, moins sera-t-on indifferent ou embarrassé[L1] sur le choix qu'on doit faire; et plus, on est accoutumé à suivre la raison, plus sera-t-on determiné à d'executer ce qu'on jugera le plus raisonnable.

Ainsi je conclus, que la vraye liberté consiste dans le pouvoir que nous avons de raisonner meurement sur les choses et d'agir suivant ce que nous aurons jugé le meilleur. *Et autant que nous nous servons de la raison dans les choses qui ne sont pas au dessus de nos forces, autant avons nous de franc arbitre,* mais comme nos raisonnemens ont de la connexion avec les mouvemens du corps, qui se changent suivant les impressions exterieures; il arrive souvent que des rencontres subites, des grandes passions, des prejugés et coutumes inveterées et tracées dans le cerveau, et enfin les maladies, nous font vouloir et agir, avant que nous ayons raisonné. Et par consequent nostre libre arbitre est méslé de quelque servitude. Mais plus un homme se sera accoustumé à ne se pas precipiter dans les occasions ce qui est appellé la fermeté de l'esprit d'autant plus sera-t-il libre.

De necessitate eligendi optimum A. VI.iv

1351 Ponamus tria puncta dari ut ex illis formetur triangulum: ajo sapientem (si nulla sit ratio specialis aliter agendi) formaturum inde Triangulum aequilaterum, ita enim omnia puncta eodem modo tractantur. Et Triangulorum
1352 aequilaterum *Species est infima,* seu omnia triangula aequilatera sunt inter se similia. Si necessitas quae in sapiente est, eligendi optimum, tolleret libertatem, sequeretur, nec Deum libere agere, cum ex pluribus optimum eligit. Essentiae rerum sunt ut numeri. Duo numeri non sunt aequales inter se, ita duae essentiae non sunt aeque perfectae.

L1. Above "embarrassé": incertain.

this indifference or faculty of rejecting the best without any reason, real or apparent, is rather the mark of a great imperfection, and is not to be found either in God or in the angels confirmed in the good.[6] *Therefore true freedom of the mind consists in recognizing and choosing the best.* And since we have established above that a person is more free to the extent that he has more knowledge, it is entirely the opposite with respect to indifference, which is rather a consequence of ignorance, for the more informed one is, the less indifferent or confused[L1] one will be about what choice to make. The more one is accustomed to follow reason, the more one will be determined to carry out what one judges the most reasonable.

Thus I conclude that true freedom consists in the power we have to reason with due consideration on matters and to act in accordance with what we have judged best. *And insofar as we use reason with respect to those matters that are not beyond our power, to that extent we have free choice.* But since our reasonings have some connection with the movements of the body which are altered in accordance with external impressions, it often happens that sudden encounters, grand passions, prejudices and inveterate customs engraved on the brain, and, finally, illnesses, make us will and act before we have reasoned. And consequently our free choice is mixed with some servitude. But the more a man accustoms himself to not rushing into situations—which is called firmness of mind—the more free he will be.

8. On the Necessity of Choosing the Best[1] A VI.iv

[1677?]

1351 Suppose that three points are given in order to form a triangle from them. I claim that a wise person (provided there is no special reason for acting otherwise) will form an equilateral triangle for in this manner all the points are treated in the same way. And the *species* of equilateral triangles *is the* **1352** *lowest,* that is, all equilateral triangles are similar to each other. If the necessity of the wise person to choose the best destroyed freedom, it would follow that God does not act freely when he chooses the best from many alternatives.[2] The essences of things are like numbers. Two numbers are not equal; similarly, two essences are not equally perfect.

L1. Above "confused": uncertain.

Demonstratio quod Deus omnia possibilia intelligit

A VI.iv

1353 Deum intelligere non solum omnia quae sunt eruntque, sed et omnia possibilia sic egregie ostendi potest.

Sit liquor aliquis pressus et qui exire conatur. Manifestum est tentari semper ab eo vias possibiles omnes, successum autem haberi tantum secundum viam omnium possibilium facillimam. Tentari autem omnes ex eo patet, quia ut quaeque oblata est commodior eam statim arripit: nec vero eligere posset commodissimam nisi eodem momento omnes tentarentur, neque enim determinatur commodissima nisi comparatione omnium. Constat autem naturam esse opus Dei, et quod natura tentat aliquid, id non nisi a voluntate Dei oriri, nam ipsa per se corpora actionum suarum causa non sunt, cum ne sint quidem eadem ultra momentum.

9. A Demonstration That God Understands All Possibles[1]

A VI.iv

[1677?]

1353 It can be shown in the following rather remarkable manner that God understands not only everything that is and everything that will be but even all possibles. Suppose there is a liquid that is restrained and that tries to flow out. It is manifest that on every occasion the liquid will probe all possible routes; however, it will succeed only by finding the easiest of all possible routes. That all routes are probed is evident from this: when any route is presented as more suitable the liquid seizes that route immediately; however, it could not choose the most suitable route unless all routes were probed at the same moment because the most suitable route is not determined except by comparison with all routes. Yet it is evident that nature is the work of God, and even if nature attempts something, it does not happen except through the will of God. For bodies themselves are not by themselves the cause of their own actions through their own efforts because they are not even the same for more than a moment.

Notes

Introduction

1. Norman Powell Williams, *Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin* (London: Longmans, Green, 1927), 3.

2. For a helpful discussion of Leibniz's reunion efforts see Paul Eisenkopf, *Leibniz und die Einigung der Christenheit* (Munich: Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh, 1975), and the classic study by Jean Baruzi, *Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la Terre* (Paris: Alcan, 1907; reprint ed. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1975).

3. See Gustav Scherz, "Neils Stensen und Leibniz," *Theologie und Glaube* 41 (1951): 309–27, for a study of the Steno-Leibniz interaction.

4. See A VI.iii:xxii–xxiii for the comments of the editors of the Akademie edition, and A II.i:83 for Leibniz's letter to Johann Friedrich.

5. See A II.i:477–78 for the 22 June 1679 letter to Malebranche and Gvi:353 for the 27 December 1694 letter.

6. This imprecise account of per se possibility replaces a more precise account that I offered in *Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), chap. 4, sec. 7. Unfortunately, the more precise account was thoroughly botched, as Adam Elga pointed out to me. For an insightful account of the per se modalities and their role in Leibniz's thought, see Robert Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 1.

7. See, for example, *De veritate* Q23, a.3 ad 4.

8. See, for example, S.T. I. Q22, a.2 ad 2; Ia IIae Q79, Resp.; and *De malo* Q3, a.1, ad 1.

9. See S.T. Ia IIae Q79, a.1 and a.2; the same contrast occurs in *De malo* in articles one and two of question three.

10. *De potentia* Q3, a.6, ad 20.

11. See, for example, T 25, *Causa Dei* 38, Giii:32–33, and the standard biblical passage cited in this context, *Romans* 3:8.

12. I offered an interpretation in an earlier piece, "Leibniz's First Theodicy," in James E. Tomberlin, ed., *Metaphysics, 1996,* Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996): 481–99. I now see that paper as too much under the influence of Steno.

13. It is important to grasp the notion of causality or, at any rate, dependence involved here in order to understand seventeenth-century debates about the relation of necessary truths to God's will and to God's understanding. Leibniz held that necessary truths do not depend on God's will but that they do depend on God's understanding. Thus in Monadology 43 and 44 Leibniz wrote, "God's understanding is the realm of eternal truths. . . . Without Him there would be nothing real in possibilities, and not only nothing existent but even nothing possible. . . . If there is a reality in . . . eternal truths, this reality must be founded . . . in the existence of the Necessary Being." The notion of dependence involved is a one-way street; accord-

ing to Leibniz, necessary truths depend on God in a way in which he does not depend on them. An acceptable account of this notion of dependence is much to be desired.

14. For help in understanding Leibniz's position in the *Confessio,* I am indebted to Michael Murray, Alan Nelson, and Eric Wielenberg.

1. Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf

1. L B 493. The editors of the Akademie edition suggest the letter was written in May 1671. An English translation appears in L 146–47.

2. At the time Leibniz wrote this letter Wedderkopf was a professor of jurisprudence at Keil. In a piece on freedom probably composed in 1689 Leibniz wrote that he had once been "not far from the view . . . that all things are absolutely necessary" (A VI.iv:1653 [AG 94]). He then noted that he had been "dragged back from this precipice by a consideration of those possibles that neither now exist, nor will exist, nor have existed." Of the letter to Wedderkopf, Robert Adams remarked that Leibniz "has already slipped over the edge of the precipice." (Robert M. Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1994], 11.) I agree and so, as Adams noted, did Leibniz, as his appended remark indicates—see L1.

3. Leibniz is a bit tentative in formulating his position here, but I think we are safe to suppose that he meant to go for broke. Leibniz was obviously committed to the thesis that God is both omnipotent and omniscient. Hence, we may extract these strong claims from his remarks: God decrees concerning everything that occurs, and what God decrees occurs. Therefore, God is the author of everything that occurs; there is no purely permissive divine will.

4. Compare this quick account of Pilate's damnation with the more detailed account of Judas's damnation in the *Confessio,* A VI.iii:118–20. See also *Confessio,* A VI.iii:135, on the importance of attention, of paying heed to one's goal.

5. Leibniz argued in favor of the principle of sufficient reason along these lines—that it is required in order to prove the existence of God—in a number of texts included in this volume. See *Confessio,* A VI.iii:118, and "Conversation with Steno," A VI.iv:1375.

6. Cf. *Confessio,* A VI.iii:121. Note that a lot hangs on what *basis* (*ratio*) means here.

7. The line of thought expressed here seems to be that God wills necessarily what he understands to be the best; what he understands to be the best is so of necessity. Necessarily, if God wills that something obtains, then it obtains. Hence, whatever obtains does so of necessity. Still, its obtaining of necessity is compatible with God's choosing it freely. In the *Confessio,* Leibniz set out to mitigate the harshness of this account.

8. This doctrine is expressed in a number of passages in pieces included in this

volume. See *Confessio,* A VI.iii:134; "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man," section 19; and "On Free Choice," A VI.iv:1408.

9. See "Conversation with Steno," n. 32, for comments on Leibniz's claim that nothing is absolutely evil.

2. On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man

1. L H I 4, 2 Bl 1–8. A VI.i:537–46 and A VI.ii:579–80. The text is printed in A VI.i.; the editors' introductory remarks in A VI.ii. The text lacks a title and is incomplete, as its last words indicate. The Akademie edition presents the text in Fraktur, printing only the Latin text in roman. In this edition the text is presented in roman; boldface text indicates words printed in roman in the Akademie text. I thank Beth Moore, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, for preparing the roman text.

2. In the essays included in this volume Leibniz wrestled with a variety of questions about God's fairness with respect to his creatures, given various alleged facts about creation that seem to some to be inconsistent with fair treatment of creatures by the Creator. Here Leibniz reminded us that Christians ought not to have their faith shaken by what may appear to be unfair distributions of reward and punishment in this life, since *this life* is barely the tip of the iceberg relative to the whole of one's existence. Christians need to take into account the next life, which is to come. The more serious problem concerns how *any* unequal distribution of reward and punishment, however extended the duration, can be fair, given that God is providential, which some take to imply that the ultimate grounds for creaturely behavior that allegedly merits reward or punishment are beyond the control of the person so rewarded or punished and, in fact, reside in the one who rewards or punishes. For a powerful version of this problem see the *Confessio* (A VI.iii:136).

3. The idea that Christian doctrine raises problems about the fairness of the Creator's actions with respect to creatures in an especially acute form was noted by Leibniz in various texts; see, for example, the preface to the *Theodicy* (G vi:33–34 [Huggard 57–58]).

4. The Manichaeans were followers of Manes (c. 216–276), who held that there are two independent first principles, one good, one evil. Bayle wrote an entry in his *Historical and Critical Dictionary* on the position of the Manichaeans. Some took Bayle to hold that reason, unaided by Christian revelation, supports the Manichaean position. Part of the point of Leibniz's *Theodicy* is to combat this view.

Leibniz next provides a list of those holding views on predestination, grace, and free choice, judged to be heretical by the Church. Origen (185–254) was one of the first Christian theologians. In paragraph 17 of the *Theodicy,* Leibniz noted that Origen held that all rational creatures, even the fallen angels, would become holy and

be blessed in the fullness of time. The Pelagians were followers of Pelagius (d. 418), whose views on grace and free choice were condemned by the Council of Carthage in 418. Canon 5 of that council, aimed at a view associated with Pelagius, stated, "Whoever says that the grace of justification was given to us in order that grace could make it easier for us to do what we are ordered to do in virtue of our free choice, as if, were grace not given, it would be possible but not easy for us to obey God's commandments without that grace, let him be anathema." For our purposes in this note we may treat the semi-Pelagians and Massilians together. The semi-Pelagian position had its origin among monks at Marseilles (Massilia), particularly, John Cassian (c. 360–435). The position was condemned at the second Council of Orange in 529. In Canon 4 the council held that it is unacceptable to hold that "God awaits our will before cleansing us from sin," and that one must hold that "even the will to be cleansed is accomplished through the infusion and the interior working of the Holy Spirit."

Leibniz listed (in Latin) terminology employed in theological debates concerning divine providence and foreknowledge. His point here is that failure on the part of philosophers and theologians to clarify adequately the meaning of these technical terms employed by his contemporaries and predecessors in the discussion of theological doctrines had generated much of the difficulty associated with the various doctrines.

5. Leibniz praised German as a philosophical language in his preface to a 1670 edition of Marius Nizolius's *De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra Pseudophilosophos, libri IV.* Nonetheless, almost all of Leibniz's philosophical work was composed in either Latin or French. This piece is one of the few exceptions.

6. The distinction Leibniz makes here and in the discussion that follows between *Versehung* and *Vorsehung* is odd. In contemporary German, the word *Versehung* is no longer used (though its cognate *versehen* is). According to Grimm's *Deutsches Wörterbuch, Versehung* simply became absorbed by *Vorsehung* in High German (col. 1265), and *Vorsehung* is probably best understood as our "providence." Yet there was a distinction at the time Leibniz composed this piece, and finding the proper English words for the translation is not so easy. According to Zedler's *Universal Lexicon* of 1746, divine *Versehung* is one of three aspects of divine *Vorsehung:* "Versehung Gottes, ist die dritte Handlung bey der göttlichen Vorsehung. Denn es ist bekannt, daß dieselbe aus diesen drey Actibus bestehe: 1) προγνώσει, der Vorsicht, 2) προθέσει, dem Vorsatz, 3) προορισμῶ, der Versehung" (vol. 48, p. 1786). Working back from the Greek, we have *Vorsehung* divided into (1) foreknowledge, (2) purpose, and (3) predestination. While one could, therefore, translate *Vorsehung* as "providence" and *Versehung* as "predestination," I think that Leibniz means something else. I believe that when Leibniz speaks of *Vorsehung,* he means what Zedler means by *Vorsicht* or προγνώσει, namely, "foreknowledge," and when Leibniz speaks of *Versehung,* he means "predestination." This reading is supported by Grimm: "als schulbegriff (praedestinatio) ist versehung durch die streitereien der protestantischen theologen aufgekom-

men [. . .]; [. . .] dagegen übersetzt [Schottel] praedestinatio mit *versehung,* praescientia vel praevisio mit vorersehung—nachdem der prädestinationsstreit die gemüter nicht mehr bewegte, ist das wort versehung außer gebrauch gekommen" (col. 1266). The following passages from the New Testament will lend further support, though not conclusive, for my general practice in this piece. (I) Acts 2:23: (a) τοῦτον τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει τοῦ θεοῦ ἔκδοτον διὰ χειρὸς ἀνόμων προσπήξαντες ἀνείλατε (Greek); (b) "hunc definito consilio et praescientia Dei traditum per manus iniquorum adfigentes interemistis" (Vulgate); (c) "ihn, der durch Ratschluß und Vorsehung Gottes dahingegeben war, habt ihr durch die Hand der Heiden ans Kreuz geschlagen und getötet" (Luther); (d) "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" (KJV). (II) Romans 8:29: (a) ὅτι οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς (Greek); (b) "nam quos praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii eius ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus" (Vulgate); (c) "Denn welche er zuvor ersehen hat, die hat er auch verordnet, daß sie gleich sein sollten dem Ebenbilde seines Sohnes, auf daß derselbe der Erstgeborne sei unter vielen Brüdern" (Luther); (d) "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren" (KJV). That is, in passage (I), both Luther and the authors of the King James Version translate the word προγνώσει as *Vorsehung* and *foreknowledge,* respectively; in passage (II), Luther and the King James Version again have *Vorsehung* and *foreknowledge* for the same Greek and Latin words. [Note prepared by Brandon Look.]

7. Leibniz means here that a question concerning whether some state of affairs is possible or impossible is not settled by empirical investigation, except of course when the state of affairs is known through experience to be actual. Even then, we need the modal axiom that what is actual is possible. In addition, Leibniz was on his way to a formal account of possibility, i.e., the thesis that a state of affairs is possible only in cases where a proposition to the effect that it obtains does not imply a formal contradiction.

8. See the *Confessio,* note 57, for comments on Leibniz's understanding of reduplicative propositions.

9. In the Lower Saxony of Leibniz's time, it was common for houses to have a horse head on the gable. A rustic translation would have the astrologer struck dead by the horseshoe that had hung above the front door. [Note prepared by Brandon Look.]

10. See the *Confessio,* note 60, for comments on the fallacy of the lazy reason. Leibniz was partial to the line of reasoning deployed here—see, for example, *DM* 30 and the *Confessio,* note 63. The basic idea is that sin requires a sinful intention on the part of the sinner. Hence, you sin only if you will to sin. If you don't will to sin, you won't sin. So it is up to you whether you sin or not, since it is up to you whether you will to sin. Ah, but is it? There's the rub, as Leibniz well knew.

11. The thesis that an ill will deserves punishment whatever the source of the ill

will was a favorite of Leibniz's—see the *Confessio,* note 92, as well as the "Conversation with Steno," A VI.iv:1378.

12. Leibniz's point here is that even if each sin that obtains is such that the creature who willed it deserves punishment for it, still a problem remains with the justification of God's conduct with respect to sin. See *Theodicy* 265.

13. The question here is whether we may find fault with God's failure to provide us with an ancestry free from the hereditary taint that accrues to us by virtue of the conduct of Adam and Eve. Leibniz did not provide a decisive answer here, but he did in the *Confessio*; see note 118.

14. This is a straightforward statement of the considerations favoring the conclusion that God is the author of sin. One of the main purposes of the *Confessio* is to provide definitive grounds for rejecting this argument and others of its ilk.

15. Note that Leibniz here subscribes to the thesis that an omniscient being desires what is best in virtue of its wisdom. See also the Letter to Wedderkopf.

16. Leibniz reached a similar conclusion in the *Confessio,* where he provided much more detail. See, for example, his analysis of the causal sequence leading to Judas's hatred of God in the *Confessio* (A VI.iii:118–20).

17. A central point of the *Confessio* is to establish that although God is the ultimate cause of everything that obtains in creation, still he is not the author of sin.

18. Leibniz next considers two efforts, which he attributes to the scholastics, to avoid the conclusion that God is the author of sin. The first, in schematic form, is that sin, like all evil, is a lack of some feature that is proper to the bearer of the lack. God, as ultimate cause of whatever obtains in creation, is causally responsible for whatever is positive in whatever obtains in creation, but not for what is lacking. Hence, God is not causally responsible for sin. Leibniz criticized that view here, in "The Author of Sin," and in the *Confessio.* However, in the *Confessio* Leibniz made an effort to locate what is sustainable in this line of reasoning.

19. The objection Leibniz offers here is exceedingly close to an objection formulated by Hobbes. See "The Author of Sin," note 4.

20. See Leibniz's commentary on Descartes (Giv:363 [L 389]).

21. Here Leibniz begins his criticism of the second effort of the scholastics to avoid the conclusion that God is the author of sin. The main idea of this second effort, as Leibniz understood it, is to maintain a libertarian conception of human free choice that has the consequence that God is not the ultimate cause of everything positive that obtains in his creation.

22. Leibniz's main objection to Molinism is its alleged incompatibility with the principle of sufficient reason. See "Middle Knowledge" and "On Free Choice."

23. The biblical texts take a beating here—the case in question (see I Samuel 22:20–23:15) concerns the residents of Keilah, not Ziclag. No harm; the philosophical points are independent of geography.

24. For more on Leibniz's attitude toward scientia media, see "Middle Knowledge."

25. Note where we are left at this point. The problem of the author of sin has

been formulated, two scholastic solutions have been rejected, but Leibniz has offered no solution. That is the work of the *Confessio.*

3. The Confession of a Philosopher

1. L H I 3, 5 Bl 7–22. Leibniz's handwritten original has not been found. There are two versions of the last quarter of the work. The complete version is referred to as L^A, the version with just the last quarter as L^B.

2. The reference is probably to the "Confession of Nature Against Atheists" (1668–69, A VI.i:489–93 [L 109–13]), the first part of which contains an argument for the existence of God and the second part an argument for the immortality of the human mind. It is also worth noting the program Leibniz outlined in 1668–69 in a piece entitled "Demonstrationum Catholicarum Conspectus" (hereafter "Catholic Demonstrations," see A VI.i:494–500), where Part I was to be devoted to proving the existence of God, and Part II to proving the immortality of the soul. Part III was to contain demonstrations of the possibility of the Christian mysteries, and various chapters would take up items discussed in papers translated in this volume, e.g., middle knowledge, freedom, God's relation to evil, the causation of sin, and differences between mortal and venial sins.

3. Leibniz double underlined the expression *Justitia Dei* in the manuscript.

4. Large segments of the *Theodicy* are devoted to arguing that Bayle was mistaken in the inferences he drew from the apparent disorder of things. In a paper entitled "On the General Connection of All Things" (A VI.iv:1614–15) Leibniz wrote, "The wisdom of God does not allow for there ever to be a true chaos; that would be a defect in his art."

5. Leibniz's views on the relation of natural theology to revealed (Christian) theology are orthodox, as is his thesis that reason and faith (Christian) cannot conflict. Leibniz composed three dialogues concerning faith and natural theology, each with a probable date of 1679 (or, in the case of the last, 1679–81): "Dialogus inter Theologum et Misosophum" (Dialogue Between Theologus and Misosophus, A VI.iv:2212–19); "Dialogue entre Poliandre et Theophile" (Dialogue Between Poliander and Theophile, A VI.iv:2219–27 [L 213–16, partial]); "Conversation du marquis de Pianèse et du Père Emery, etc." (Conversations of the Marquis de Pianèse and Father Emery, etc., A VI.iv:2240–83). A classic formulation of Leibniz's mature position on the relation of reason to revelation may be found in the preliminary dissertation on faith and reason in the *Theodicy.*

6. Implicit in this response is the suggestion that each divine perfection is a consequence of omniscience and omnipotence. I know of no text in which Leibniz explicitly and in detail argued for that thesis. We might wonder about God's moral perfection, for example. Here section 1 of the *Discourse on Metaphysics* is instructive. After characterizing God as an absolutely perfect being and explaining what perfection is, Leibniz concluded that omniscience and omnipotence are perfections

and, hence, attributes of God. Leibniz then wrote, "From this it follows that since God possesses supreme and infinite wisdom he acts in the most perfect manner, not only in the metaphysical sense but also morally."

7. This characterization of justice, along with the definitions that follow, are similar to those found in "Elementa Juris Naturalis" (Elements of Natural Law, 1670–71, A VI.i:431–85 [L 131–38, partial]) and in letters to Lambert van Velthuysen (A II.i:97–98, May 1671) and Antoine Arnauld (A II.i:169–81 [L 148–50, partial] November 1671; see especially 173–74 [L 150]). The characterizations in the letter to Arnauld should be compared with the more mature account found, for example, in Leibniz's letter of March 1690 to Arnauld, where he wrote, "Justice is nothing but the charity of the wise person. . . . Charity is a universal benevolence, which the wise person dispenses, in keeping with the measures of reason, in order to obtain the greatest good. . . . And wisdom is the knowledge of happiness, i.e., of the means of attaining lasting contentment, which consists in a continual advancement toward a greater perfection, or at least in a variation of the same degree of perfection" (LA 136). Leibniz offered a short summary of these matters in a letter to Louis Ferrand dated 31 January 1672: "I define the just or good man as one who loves everyone. To love is to be delighted by the happiness of another. Happiness is a state of pure delight. Delight is a sense of harmony. From these definitions I derive all that is in question" (A I.i:180–81). For a helpful account of Leibniz's treatment of justice, see Patrick Riley, *Leibniz's Universal Jurisprudence—Justice as the Charity of the Wise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

8. This account of love is to be found in Leibniz's "Specimen demonstrationum politicarum" (A IV.i:34, 1669), in the texts cited in note 7, and in two important pieces from this time period, "Elementa verae pietatis, sive De amore Dei super omnia" (Elements of True Piety, or Concerning the Love of God Above All," A VI.iv:1357–66, 1677–78) and "Aphorismi de felicitate, sapientia, carietate, justitia" (Aphorisms Concerning Happiness, Wisdom, Charity, and Justice," A VI.iv:2792–808). For Leibniz's conception of love, see Emilienne Naert, *Leibniz et la querelle du pur amour* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1959), especially chap. 3, "La Solution: Une définition de l'amour."

9. In "Elements of True Piety," Leibniz characterized delight as the experiencing of perfection, and in "Aphorisms," he identified the perfection of the universe with the harmony of things in the universe.

10. The same account of harmony occurs in the letter to van Velthuysen (A II.i:98) and in the letter to Arnauld of 1671 (A II.i:174).

11. Leibniz returned to the topic at A VI.iii:117. What he says there suggests that he has in mind here the people who assert that God loves only the elect. It is natural to connect this problem with a concern about the interpretation of I Timothy 2:3–4: "God, who wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of truth" (KJV). The difficulty lies in the fact that according to most Christian theologians, though God is omnipotent, all men are *not* saved. One line of defense, extant

among some seventeenth-century theologians, consists in interpreting "all men" to mean men of all kinds. Malebranche's *Treatise on Nature and Grace* was motivated in some significant measure by his desire for a better solution. The interpretation Leibniz offered at page A VI.iii:117 was not intended as a solution to the problem generated by the passage from Timothy. Its intention is to establish that contrary to appearances, those who assert that God loves only the elect do not intend to deny that God loves everyone but only to affirm that God loves the elect more than others.

12. This view may be derived from what Leibniz wrote in *Elements of Natural Law* (A VI.i:484, 1670–71).

13. Virgil, *Georgics* II, 458: "Very fortunate are those who know their own good."

14. Note that this thesis is a bonus; it is not a premise Leibniz employed to prove that all happiness is harmonious nor to prove that God loves everyone and, hence, is just.

15. See note 11.

16. Here Leibniz took for granted a thesis that is crucial to his treatment of the problem of evil, namely that the most harmonious series of things involves some dissonance, i.e., that the best possible world includes some evil.

17. Here Leibniz made a distinction crucial to his treatment of the problem of evil between God's productive and God's permissive will (see, e.g., Causa Dei 28). Leibniz was well aware that this distinction needed an explanation, and the *Confessio* contains a novel effort to provide one. Some of Leibniz's most forthright remarks on this topic are contained in Commentary on Burnet: see 6c, 39b, 39f, 39h, and 56d.

18. Leibniz's remark here might lead us to assume that he addressed the details concerning election elsewhere. But Leibniz's considered view is expressed in paragraph 31 of the *Discourse on Metaphysics,* where he claimed that general reasons are the most we can hope for: the details escape us.

19. In the Introduction I credited Leibniz with putting strong objections in the hands of the interlocutor (the Theologian). To this point the reader may be unimpressed with the Theologian's performance. Now he gets down to work; here is where the action begins.

20. Romans 9:21: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?"

21. As noted in the Introduction, one of the fundamental questions Leibniz aimed to answer in the *Confessio philosophi* is, How is it possible for God to be the ultimate ground of things, sins included, without being the author of sin?

22. The Theologian now begins a line of reasoning that reaches its conclusion at A VI.iii:120. The idea is to show that principles accepted by the Philosopher yield the conclusion that God is the ultimate cause of the existence of everything other than God himself. Hence, God is the ultimate cause of the existence of sin.

23. Leibniz had a high regard for this alleged proof of the principle of sufficient

reason. See, for example, "Demonstratio propositionum primarum" (Demonstration of Primary Propositions," A VI.ii:483, 1671–72), which contains a formal version of the proof; and "On Existence" (A VI.iii:587, 1676 [DSR 113]).

24. The idea expressed here that there are two distinct principles—one, the principle of some of the sciences; the other, the principle of the remaining sciences—occurs frequently in Leibniz's writings. Perhaps the best-known "two principles" passage in Leibniz's writings is from sections 31 and 32 of the Monadology:

"¶31. Our reasonings are based on two great principles; the principle of contradiction, by virtue of which we judge to be false that which involves a contradiction and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false;

"¶32. and the principle of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason, why it should be thus and not otherwise."

Subsequent sections of the Monadology suggest that Leibniz took the principle of contradiction to be the principle of necessary truths and the principle of sufficient reason to be the principle of contingent truths.

There are numerous interpretive problems in this area. (See my "Leibniz on the Two Great Principles of All Our Reasonings," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 8 [1983], edited by Peter French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein: 193–216, for a discussion of some of them.)

In the *Confessio* the principle of sufficient reason is said to be the foundation of morality. But it is crucial to one of Leibniz's arguments there that propositions of morality are not contingent. Moreover, in the *Confessio* the role usually assigned to the principle of contradiction is filled by the principle that the whole is greater than the part. The claim that the principle that the whole is greater than the part is the principle of the science of quantity, e.g., arithmetic and geometry, is not unique to the *Confessio.* It is contained in Leibniz's early, careful study "Demonstration of Primary Propositions" (A VI.ii:480). Later, Leibniz came to believe that this principle can be derived from more basic principles—see, for example, GM VII:20.

25. Leibniz frequently claimed that the principle of sufficient reason is required to prove the existence of God; see, for example, the "Conversation with Steno," the letter to Wedderkopf, and *Theodicy* 44. In "De principii" (Concerning Principles, A VI.iv:806 [L 227]), Leibniz wrote that without the principle of sufficient reason, "the existence of God can not be demonstrated *from creatures*" (italics mine). That seems like an accurate statement of Leibniz's thesis.

26. That the soul does not change in ways relevant to its damnation after death is familiar doctrine—see, for example, chapters 91 through 95 of book four of Aquinas's *Summa contra gentiles;* and, in particular, chapter 93, "That after death the souls of the wicked have a will unchangeable in evil." We can assume, then, that Steno's objections here are focused on Leibniz's account of why the soul is fixed in the relevant way after death.

27. In "Dialogue Between Poliander and Theophile," Leibniz ridiculed the idea that fear of God might suffice for salvation (A VI.iv:2222 [L 214]).

28. Leibniz defined penitence as sadness over the commission of error or sin (C 493).

29. The difficulty formulated by the Theologian is essentially the same as that formulated in sections 14 through 17 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man" and in the letter to Wedderkopf.

30. Steno's remark here is not entirely transparent. It is natural to assume that he was presupposing a libertarian account of free choice that has the consequence that God's total causal contribution to creation does not necessitate (metaphysically or causally) Judas's free choice to betray Christ. Leibniz intended to deny a libertarian account of free choice.

31. Here we have a major thesis of the *Confessio.* Leibniz first formulated it as the idea that God is the ultimate ground of sin. Subsequently, he revised the wording so that the thesis is that God is the ultimate ground of *the act* of sin. Does the addition of *the act of* make a difference? Leibniz knew that those under the influence of Aquinas, for example, would find the revised thesis congenial, the original anathema. At S.T. IaIIaeQ79, a.1, Aquinas asked whether God is the cause of sin; he answered that God in no way is the cause of sin. In the next article Aquinas asked whether God is the cause of the act of sin; he answered affirmatively. For more detail concerning Aquinas's position, see *De Malo* Q3, a.1 and a.2. In a.2 Aquinas argued that since all movements of secondary causes must be reduced to the first cause and since the act of sin is a particular movement of a free will, God is the ultimate cause of any act that is sinful. But the deformity of the act, i.e., its deviation from the order prescribed by God, is reduced not to God as its cause but rather to the creature. It is just this sort of effort to explain how God is untarnished by our sins that Leibniz ridiculed in "The Author of Sin" and "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," section 18. Here Leibniz aimed to provide a novel theory that yields the benefits sought by Aquinas without involving the alleged absurdity.

32. Leibniz's response utilizes the per se modalities; see the discussion in Section 3 of the Introduction.

33. As noted, one of the main points of the *Confessio* is to affirm that God is the ultimate ground of sin without being its author.

34. Leibniz used the notion of a moral cause in a variety of ways throughout his career. I think that here Leibniz is using it in the same manner as in T 4 and T 131. Roughly, the idea is that an agent is a moral cause of some action in cases where the agent is morally responsible with respect to the action because of the exercise or nonexercise of some causal power of the agent.

There are a variety of ways in which an agent becomes morally responsible with respect to an action—performing it, causing its performance, or permitting it, i.e., not preventing its performance although the agent knew about it and could have prevented it.

35. This way of putting the matter—that God is the ultimate cause of the substance of the act of sin but not of its evil aspect, i.e., its deformity from divine law—occurs in Aquinas; see, for example, *De potentia* Q 3, a. 6, ad 21. This language ap-

pears in the "Conversation with Steno" (A VI.iv:1382). In "Concerning Freedom, Fate, and the Grace of God" (A VI.iv:1595–1612, 1686–87), Leibniz wrote: "God is not the cause of evil or of sin. This must be understood so that evil can in no way be imputed to the divine will, even if the physical reality in evil must depend on God, like all other entities" (1597). See also Commentary on Burnet 14e and 45b. Here the notion of "physical reality" does duty for the substance of the act.

36. In the present context, the expressions "the nature of things" and "eternal ideas" may be taken to have the same reference, i.e., those ideas (essences, possibles) in the divine understanding on which necessary truths are based, according to Leibniz. See, for example, Monadology 43 and 44, and *Theodicy* 20 and 189.

37. Here Leibniz is referring to the fundamental thesis of the Manichaeans.

38. The thesis that necessary truths depend on the divine understanding for their truth but not on the divine will is a fixture in Leibniz's philosophy. See, for example, Leibniz's letter to Molanus, April 1677 (A II.i:306).

39. In "Introductio ad Encyclopediam Arcanam" (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia, A VI.iv:528 [PW 6], 1683–85), Leibniz wrote, "The object of this science is what is universally thinkable. . . . We therefore exclude a name without a notion, i.e., that which is nameable but not thinkable, such as 'Blitiri,' which the scholastics use as an example."

40. See note 38.

41. In a letter of 1696 to Sophie and Elizabeth Charlotte, Leibniz noted that order and harmony are mathematical, consisting in certain proportions (A I.xiii:11). At A VI.iii:130 Leibniz pointed out that harmony is a feature of an entire system, e.g., a world, taken as a whole. In "De arcanis sublimium vel de summa rerum," Leibniz presupposed that the existence of maximum harmony implies the existence of the greatest amount of essence (A VI.iii:472 [DSR 21]). Leibniz then characterized the most harmonious as what is most pleasing to God (476 [29]).

42. In these objections Steno set out to show that Leibniz's account has consequences that Leibniz himself could not accept. These objections and Leibniz's responses are grist for the mill concerning the topics discussed in section 4 of the Introduction.

43. Again, the reader may be unimpressed with the way the interlocutor throws in the towel at this point, but the interlocutor is about to formulate two powerful objections to Leibniz's position.

44. There are two objections, one in the original and one in Liebniz's added material, each claiming that Leibniz's position has unacceptable consequences. First, whatever obtains—whether good, bad, or indifferent—obtains because of God's existence, not because of his will; second, whatever obtains does so of necessity. The original text contained only the second objection.

45. The argument of the Philosopher here (and elsewhere in the *Confessio*) is aimed at showing that God is not the author of sin because God does not take delight in the obtaining of sins. Here Leibniz asserted what he needed, i.e., that God neither wills *nor produces* sins. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that Leibniz has estab-

lished that God is the ultimate ground of sins, although he does not produce them.

At A VI.iii:125 the Theologian appears to have thrown in the towel. But he returns to the fray at A VI.iii:130.

46. Here Leibniz asserted his familiar doctrine that God chose the most harmonious world, i.e., the best possible world.

47. The argument formulated by the Theologian is straightforward; the same cannot be said for Leibniz's response, which starts with the Philosopher's next set of remarks and concludes with a long statement ending at A VI.iii:127. It is a mark of the character of this dialogue that after the Philosopher's long statement, the Theologian repeats the objection nearly verbatim, and the Philosopher does not claim to have answered it already. On the second try, Leibniz formulated an interesting response.

48. See Luke 17:1 and Matthew 18:7. In "Conversation with Steno," A VI.iv: 1380, Leibniz used the same example; he claimed that scandals are necessary *ex hypothesi.*

49. The Theologian's question indicates that Leibniz was well aware that he had not answered the objection to this point in the dialogue.

50. Valerius Cordus (1515–54) was a doctor and botanist. Johannes Zwelfer (1618–68) wrote on pharmacology. Urbanus Regius (1489–1541) was a Catholic priest who left the church in 1525 and became a Lutheran minister in 1530.

Between "Regius" and "de" there is a tear in the manuscript approximately 2 inches long. Fortunately, no significant philosophical points seem to be omitted.

51. In classical mythology Acheron is a river in Hades.

52. The idea that the problems under discussion are exacerbated by the use of "twisted words" is front and center in paragraph 9 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God."

53. As noted in the Introduction, I interpret Leibniz as employing the per se variety of metaphysical modality here; I am aware that the evidence for my interpretation is not overwhelming.

54. There is a problem with the translation of *velle* and *nolle* when one is being contrasted with the other. "Will in favor of" and "will against" are awkward, but this way of putting the matter makes it clear that *nolle* sometimes means more than "does not will in favor." See note 64 for more on this matter.

55. This is an important definition in this dialogue. Translators have differed significantly on how to handle *alienae.* The problem is what noun *alienae* should be taken to modify implicitly. In JUL (361), Grua supposed that it is *voluntas,* so that the definition reads: "To be the author . . . is to be the ground of another's will because of one's own will." Otto Saame and Ezequiel de Olaso take the noun to be *ratio* (see Otto Saame, *G. W. Leibniz: "Confessio philosophi"* [Frankfurt am Main, 1967], p. 65); Belaval takes it to be *res,* and I am with him.

56. See the discussion of the per se modalities in the Introduction. See also Leibniz's remarks on these topics in "Conversation with Steno."

The two syllogisms mentioned here go as follows:

Darapti: All *A*s are *B*s.
All *A*s are *C*s.
Some *C*s are *B*s.

Felapton: No *A*s are *B*s.
All *A*s are *C*s.
Some *C*s are not *B*s.

Note that in each case, if we regard the "some" in the conclusion as an existential quantifier and add the premise that there are some *A*s, then the conclusion will follow from the premises thus augmented.

57. The point Leibniz was making here seems to be this. Consider:

(1) Whatever exists, it is necessary that it exists.

And

(2) Whatever exists, it is necessary that if it exists, then it exists.

Proposition (2) is the reduplicative version of (1). Proposition (2) is true, if trivial. Proposition (1) is not trivial; it is a component of the dreaded doctrine of necessitarianism. Leibniz's idea is that it is common practice with respect to modal notions to use a sentence such as (1) where what we have in mind is more accurately formulated by something like (2). In ordinary discourse, when we use an ellipsis, i.e., something like (1), in place of the reduplicative version, i.e., something like (2), no harm is done and some words are saved. But Leibniz's point is that in philosophical discourse such laxity may lead to necessitarianism, which would constitute harm. The same point is made with some fervor in "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," section 12.

58. The novel *Argenis* was written by John Barclay (1582–1621) and published at Paris in 1621. According to G. E. Guhrauer, Leibniz reread the novel on his deathbed. (*Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz,* 2 vols. [Breslau, 1846; rpt. Olms, 1966], vol. 2, p. 330).

59. Leibniz found the view here criticized in Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy,* Part 3, article 47.

60. Leibniz devoted considerable attention to what is here termed "that famous fallacy of lazy reason." See, for example, DM 4, the *Theodicy,* Preface 30–33 (Huggard 54–57), and Commentary on Burnet 11h. See also "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," section 11. Leibniz had two central points to make. Consider the following:

(1) Necessarily God foreknows that *p* is true if and only if *p* is true.
(2) For any proposition *p,* if *p* is true then *p* is necessarily true.
(3) *p* is true.
(4) No matter what you do, *p* is true.

The first point is that (1) does not entail (2). The second point is that (3) does not entail (4).

61. Similar remarks concerning how to lead one's life can be found at DM 30.

62. A question that needs pondering is this: Was Leibniz committed in the *Confessio* to the conclusion that every state of affairs that obtains comes about from the harmony of things? If so, then either nothing will be held against you or, more likely, you will not take charge of your affairs, because you lack the power to do so.

63. The last clause here is, of course, significant. Without it the sentence would seem to imply that whether we are predestined or not is under our voluntary control. But if the divine grace required to merit salvation is not under our control, then matters look very different. Much the same dialectic occurs in paragraphs 30 and 31 of *The Discourse on Metaphysics.* In 30, while discussing how we may avoid sin, Leibniz wrote, "It is only a matter of not willing [the sinful action], and God could not propose an easier and more just condition." This makes it sound as if we are in control. But in 31 Leibniz noted that performing good actions and avoiding sinful actions is the effect of grace. He concluded, "Is it not true that in the end everything is reduced entirely to his [God's] mercy?" This sounds as though someone else is in control.

64. See note 54 for the translation of *velle* and *nolle.* Consider the following:

(1) Nolo mortem peccatoris.
(2) I will against the death of the sinner.
(3) I do not will in favor of the death of the sinner.

Suppose we are considering a sinner's death and God asserts (1). Presumably Leibniz's point is that (2) cannot be the right translation of God's remark, since what God wills against does not happen, and yet the sinner died. Even if we use Leibniz's own definitions and thereby remove the causal implications from willing, (2) still cannot be the right translation. According to Leibniz's account, if an agent wills against some state of affairs and that state of affairs nonetheless obtains, then that agent (given the relevant knowledge) thereby suffers. Since the sinner did die, reading (1) as (2) would have the consequence that God would suffer. But God cannot suffer. So (3) is the right reading in this case.

65. Note that in Latin this sentence is given as follows in the Akademie edition: "Deus ipsa per se peccata si non existere intelligantur, nolle . . . dicendus est," though the original manuscript has *existere non.*

66. See the discussion in the Introduction of the anti-closure argument employed by Leibniz. Clearly willing in the sense of taking delight in the obtaining of some state of affairs is not closed under entailment. But it is not so obvious that willing in the sense of authorship is not closed under entailment, at least, under known and cogitated-upon entailments, especially in the divine case.

67. It was standard for Leibniz's contemporaries to ridicule efforts to show that although God is the ultimate ground of every contingent state of affairs that obtains, God nonetheless *permits* sins but does not will them. Leibniz claimed here to offer an original explanation of divine permission.

68. This is the dénouement of Leibniz's efforts on the author-of-sin problem in

the *Confessio.* His conclusion is that we and the devil are the authors of sin, not God.

69. In the outline for the "Catholic Demonstrations," Leibniz wrote that mortal sins are performed with malice, venial sins with imprudence. See A VI.i:498.

70. This is the beginning of the discussion of human freedom. Note that the Theologian's speech that begins "You have surely satisfied me" sets up the problem by noting the notion of causal determination integral to Leibniz's views of God's relation to sin. The Theologian's lead idea is that perhaps this determinism is inconsistent with human freedom.

71. In a paper entitled "De obligatione credendi" (The Obligation to Believe, A VI.iv:2149–55, 1677), Leibniz set out to prove that whether we believe something or not is not under the control of our will. He then argued for the thesis that we are not obliged to do what is not under the control of our will. He concluded that beliefs are not obligatory but cautioned that engaging in inquiry (which might lead to a change in beliefs) often is. It is important to note that in this paper Leibniz was working with a rather "intellectual" notion of belief, which he characterized as follows: "To believe is to be conscious of reasons that are persuasive to us."

72. The phrase *liberum arbitrium* is a difficult one to translate. *Liberum* (free) is easy enough; the problem is *arbitrium,* which usually refers to an act of deciding or judging or even commanding. *Liberum arbitrium* began its association with free choice as part of a theory of free choice (that is the association in Aquinas, for example), but by the seventeenth century it simply stood for free choice, independent of a particular theory of free choice.

73. Leibniz criticized the Molinist conception of freedom at every turn. A question arises as to whether Leibniz was setting up a straw man, since it is not part of Molina's conception of freedom that "everything both outside the agent and inside the agent [be] equal." Note that this same "equality" condition occurs in Leibniz's characterization of Molina's conception of freedom in the "Conversation with Steno" (A VI.iv:1380). This way of characterizing Molina's conception of freedom had become standard in Leibniz's time. It is inaccurate, however, and its inaccuracy may have misled some. I believe the criticisms of Molina on which Leibniz rested his case do not depend on the "equality" clause.

74. See note 23.

75. Aristotle, *Nic. Ethics* book III, 3. See Leibniz's discussion in the *Theodicy* in sections 288, 290, and 301.

76. In *Theodicy* 34 Leibniz wrote, "Aristotle has already noted that there are two things in freedom, namely spontaneity and choice." And in *Theodicy* 302 he wrote, "Up to this point, we have explicated the two conditions on freedom of which Aristotle spoke, i.e., spontaneity and intelligence, which are united in us in deliberation. But the scholastics have required a third condition, which they call indifference. And indeed it must be admitted, if indifference means the same as contingency."

Leibniz's classic mature analysis of freedom is in *Theodicy* 288. Note that the third condition, contingency, is not a required condition for freedom in these pas-

sages of the *Confessio.* Indeed, in the *Confessio* not even per se contingency is stated as a requirement for freedom in created beings. Is per se contingency required for freedom in any of the works translated in this volume? I think so; the natural interpretation of Leibniz's remarks in the "Conversation with Steno" concerning Judas's betrayal of Christ would involve at least the claim that in a free choice per se possibility of some alternative not chosen obtains. (See "Conversation with Steno," A VI.iv:1380.)

77. As noted in the Introduction, this principle holds for consequent willing, not antecedent willing.

78. Consider a mind that has the power to do the opposite of what anyone predicts. Leibniz argues that such a mind "neither has existed, exists, or will exist," his standard way of noting that such an entity is impossible *ex alterius hypothesi,* that is, that such an entity is inconsistent with some necessary feature of some necessary being, although it remains possible per se.

79. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII, 20–21.

80. On this topic, see Leibniz's remarks in *Theodicy* 297, NE 185, and *Theodicy* 154, where Leibniz wrote: "These words, which Ovid ascribes to Medea—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor, . . .—mean that the moral good is overcome by the agreeably good, which makes a greater impression on souls, when they are agitated by passions."

81. The notion of freedom, here identified with the use of reason, is front and center in "On Free Choice." Cf. Commentary on Burnet 42h.

82. The Theologian here begins constructing a line of attack on Leibniz's position that will generate a major objection at A VI.iii:137.

83. The concept of attention plays a crucial role in Leibniz's account of morality. Note that in the letter to Wedderkopf, Leibniz regarded lack of attention as central to a proper causal explanation of Pilate's damnation (A II.i:117). See also "Elementa verae pietatis" (Elements of True Piety, A VI.iv:1357–66), where serious attention is presented as a divine gift.

84. See John 12:40. It was customary to offer a "soft" reading of God's hardening of hearts along these lines, i.e., as God permitting the creature to refuse divine grace.

85. These aphorisms—*dic cur hic, respice finem, vide quid agas*—are from a medieval tradition. Leibniz discussed German and French variants in his commentary on Descartes's *Principles* (see Gvi:362 [L388]).

86. Note that here Leibniz traced the series of causes of creaturely willing back to "the universal harmony," i.e., to necessary truths in the divine intellect. Compare this with the following passage from "Conversation with Steno," A VI.iv:1378, where, considering the causal ancestry of sin, Leibniz wrote, "Its first cause is the same as that of the series, namely an order of ideas established in the divine intellect and of possible things representing nature in such a fashion that it was best in the end that this series was chosen rather than another." Here Leibniz made some effort to involve the divine will, as well as the divine intellect, in the causal ancestry of the obtaining of some created state of affairs. But of course if the causal an-

cestry of all cases of divine willing reduces to the divine intellect, then the two accounts are equivalent.

87. Apparently German superstition held that births on the fourth day after the new moon were unpropitious.

88. The doctrine expressed here occurs in "Conversation with Steno" in almost the same formulation—see A VI.iv:1379.

89. It is worth noting how rhetorically powerful Leibniz's prose became when he was formulating considerations favoring the conclusion that the problem of evil cannot be solved in a manner acceptable to Christians. Compare the remarks that follow with the first five sections of the *Theodicy.*

90. The damned are those whose fate is finally sealed, the damnable those currently worthy of being damned: this current course, if continued, will merit final damnation. The argument here is also elaborated at DM 30.

91. Once again, we should be pleased with the Theologian's reluctance to concede.

92. Leibniz was partial to the thesis that an evil will and evil action justify punishment, whatever the source of the evil will. See, for example, "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God," section 13.1; "Conversation with Steno," A VI.iv:1378; DM 30; *Theodicy* 67 and 264. Indeed, at *Theodicy* 67 Leibniz wrote, "Whatever dependence is conceived in the case of voluntary actions, even if there were an absolute and mathematical necessity (which there is not), it would not follow that there would not be as much freedom as would be required to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable." This passage might suggest that Leibniz did not consider contingency a necessary condition of freedom, contrary to what he seemed to imply at *Theodicy* 288 and 302. Another possibility is that Leibniz held that punishment or reward is just and reasonable provided the action punished or rewarded is voluntary, but genuine freedom requires something more.

93. Note that the passage Leibniz purports to quote is somewhat different from what is presented here. See A VI.iii:118–19.

94. See *Theodicy* 266–68, where Leibniz discusses a traditional problem: how a finite amount of sinning (which seems all one can pack into a finite lifetime, however corrupt the sinner) can justify an infinite punishment (i.e., eternal damnation). Leibniz opted for one of the traditional responses: the sinning turns out to be infinite because it continues in the next (the eternal) life. See also *The Catholic Demonstrations* (A VI.i:497–98).

95. Leibniz discussed the traditional problem of how the joy of the beatific vision could increase over time in a number of places: see, for example, *The Catholic Demonstrations* (A VI.i:499), PNG 18, and "An Mundus Perfectione Crescat" (Whether the World Increases in Perfection [Grua 95]).

96. Once again the Theologian's stubbornness deserves our appreciation. He remains bothered by a question about whether God has treated fairly those creatures "driven to a hatred that is fatal to them."

97. Leibniz employed the interplay between the Philosopher and the Theologian

here in order to signal that he was about to enter territory some would regard as reserved to theology, and, hence, off the philosopher's preserve, formulating an interesting principle justifying the trip. Roughly, natural reason can pursue a topic legitimately provided that it has the resources to discover its own errors on that topic. Leibniz's fears that others would suppose that he had ventured where even angels fear to tread are on display at the end of the dialogue.

98. As noted in the Introduction, from this sentence on a second copy of the dialogue exists. Where variations from the complete copy seem philosophically significant they are recorded.

99. For Leibniz's negative attitude toward Quietism see, for example, NE 454 and DM 4.

100. For further expressions of this seemingly optimistic thesis see A VI.iii:476 (DSR 29) and especially DM 30, where Leibniz wrote: "It is only a matter of not willing [to sin], and God could not propose an easier and more just condition." See note 63 for comments relevant to this point.

101. I retain the Latin *conatus* in the translation and use a cognate for the Latin *affectus. Conatus* was a standard term in the physics of Leibniz's time. In a classic table of definitions Leibniz offered this account: "*Conatus* is an action from which motion follows if nothing impedes it" (C 481). In a letter to Arnauld, written before his trip to Paris, Leibniz referred to "*conatus* of the mind, i.e., will" (A II.i:173).

In an important paper written in 1677–78 Leibniz characterized will (*voluntas*) as a sentiment (*sententia*) concerning good and evil; he then characterized a sentiment as a practical thought (*cogitatio*), i.e., a thought with a tendency (*conatus*) toward action. He noted that these two characterizations have the consequence that willing is a thought about good or evil joined with a tendency toward action. See "Elements of True Piety" (A VI.iv:1360–61). And in "De affectibus," written in April 1679, Leibniz characterized an affect (*affectus*) as a preoccupation of the soul that has arisen from a sentiment concerning good and evil (A VI.iv:1412).

102. Leibniz argues that although it is now determined whether you will succeed in the future or not, nonetheless, effort on your part is justified in part because of your current ignorance of the future. See, for example, DM 30, where Leibniz wrote, "But perhaps it has been assured from all eternity that I will sin. Answer yourself: perhaps not. And without thinking about what you cannot know and what cannot enlighten you, act according to your duty, which you can know." And see also Leibniz's remarks in a letter to Arnauld of 23 March 1690 (LA 136).

103. In the preface to the *Theodicy,* Leibniz wrote: "One cannot love God without knowing his perfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety" (Gvi:28 [Huggard 52]). See also PNG 17.

104. This poem resembles passages from Virgil's *Aeneid* on Aeneas's descent into the lower world; see, in particular, VI, 118, 126, and 495.

105. Avernus is a lake between Cumae and Puteoli. Nearby is the cave through which Aeneas was said to have descended into the lower world. Taenarum is a

promontory in Laconia; adjacent caves were regarded in antiquity as entrances to the lower world. See Seneca's *Phaedra,* ll. 1201–3.

106. In S.T. Ia IIae Q114, a.1, ad.3, Aquinas claimed that God could not have obligations to creatures, only to himself, referring to Romans 11: 35: "Who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?" In *Causa Dei* 66 Leibniz wrote, "That something is obligatory in the case of God, we understand not in a human way but as is proper to God, namely that otherwise he would derogate his own perfections."

107. This is an exceedingly necessitarian passage. In the second version of this part of the manuscript Leibniz added the following: "Etsi enim libere tamen infallibiliter haec quia optima, electa est. Ut supra evici" (For although the [series] was chosen freely, nevertheless it was chosen infallibly, because it is best, as I have shown above).

108. This same doctrine may be found in the letter to Wedderkopf (A II.i:117), where Leibniz wrote, "God wills those things he knows to be the best, moreover, the most harmonious." See, also, "On the Necessity of Choosing the Best," A VI.iv:1352, a piece written in 1677 and presented to Steno. In "On Existence" (1676) Leibniz wrote, "For things to exist is the same as for them to be understood by God to be the best, i.e., the most harmonious" (A VI.iii:588 [DSR 113]).

109. In DM 31 Leibniz made the same point: "As to this single great question, why it has pleased God to choose one from so many other possible persons, one would have to be very unreasonable not to be content with the general reasons that we have given, the detail of which is beyond our reach. . . . The best would be to say with St. Paul that there are certain great reasons of wisdom or congruity, which God has observed for this and which are unknown to mortals, and which are founded in the general order whose aim is the greatest perfection of the universe."

110. The need to combat atheism was much on Leibniz's mind during this period. See Leibniz's letter to Johann Friedrich of March 1673 (A II.i:231), his letter to Spitzel of 1670 (A I.i:85), and his "Confession of Nature Against Atheists" (A VI.i:489–93, A VI.ii:569–70), 1668.

111. The material on individuation presented in the next three pages of the dialogue is exceedingly difficult to interpret. The Theologian's position seems to be this. First, he supposes that initially souls are intrinsically similar and, hence, differ solely in number. Second, he infers from this that if *A* and *E* are distinct souls then they must differ because of their different impressions of the external world, which can only result from their being located differently with respect to place or time. He then asks why *A* and *E* are located as they are with respect to place and time. Surely his suggestion is that there cannot be a reason, and hence, we have a violation of the principle of sufficient reason. The Philosopher appears to respond by accepting the Theologian's thesis that souls are individuated by reference to place or time and that therefore there is nothing more to say about why *A* occupies one series of places and times, *E* another. His point seems to be that *A* is neither more nor less than whatever soul has the former spatio-temporal history and *E* whatever soul has

the latter spatio-temporal history. The Philosopher appears to conclude from this that there is nothing in this situation requiring a reason that cannot be given, and, hence, there is no violation of the principle of sufficient reason.

This exchange may seem to commit Leibniz to various theses that he elsewhere rejected. Compare the following from a letter to Thomas Burnett, dated March 1696: "There must necessarily be a reason why soul *A* is in body *B* and soul *E* is in body *F,* through the general rule that nothing occurs without some reason. But if there were no difference between *A* and *E,* these souls would be indifferent with respect to bodies *B* and *F,* and consequently, they would have been situated without a reason" (A I.xii:478).

112. Note that Leibniz seems to presuppose here that a principle of individuation pertains primarily where things differ *solo numero* (solely in number). But where things differ solely in number there is no principle of individuation. A passage from "Meditatio de principio individui" (Meditation on the Principle of an Individual), written in April 1676 is helpful: "Unless we admit that it is impossible that two things are perfectly similar, it will follow that the principle of individuation is outside a thing, in its cause" (A VI.iii:491).

I take it that Leibniz was asserting that if it is possible that *x* and *y* are perfectly similar, i.e., alike in their intrinsic properties, then what individuates them will be their extrinsic properties. That sounds safe enough. I believe that in this dialogue, when Leibniz asserted that *x* and *y* differ solo numero, what he meant was that *x* and *y* are intrinsically perfectly similar. This seems to fit what he wrote about the case of the eggs. So on this interpretation, two eggs might differ solo numero, i.e., be perfectly similar with respect to their intrinsic properties, and yet differ with respect to their extrinsic properties, e.g., where they are located in an egg crate at a given time.

113. Leibniz's treatment of eggs in this passage should be compared with the following remark he made concerning leaves in the *New Essays:* "I remember that a great princess of lofty intelligence said one day while walking in her garden that she did not believe there were two leaves perfectly alike. A clever gentleman who was walking with her believed that it would be easy to find some, but search as he might he became convinced by his own eyes that a difference could always be found" (NE 231).

It is clear that by "perfectly alike" here Leibniz meant alike with respect to intrinsic properties. When the great princess and the clever gentleman examined a pair of leaves for perfect similarity the leaves occupied different places and hence differed with respect to some extrinsic properties. It is also clear that Leibniz was not intent on noting a peculiarity of the leaves in the gardens of Herrenhausen, where the hunt took place. (The great princess of lofty intelligence was Electress Sophie, the wife of Leibniz's employer, Ernst August, Elector of Hannover; the clever gentleman was Carl August von Alvensleben, an official of the court.)

114. The introduction of the Latin term *haecceitas* to refer to what distinguishes one individual thing from all other possible things is usually attributed to Duns

Scotus; see his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, In 1 Sent. 2, distinction 3, question 6, article 9.

115. "There you have it, what may amaze you, the principle of individuation outside the thing itself." Let's begin by tempering our amazement. If, as seems plausible, in this dialogue Leibniz applied the notion of a principle of individuation only to cases where the relevant individuals differ solo numero, and if, in this dialogue, Leibniz regarded individuals as varying solo numero only when they were different but exactly alike with respect to intrinsic properties, then there is no place left to find what distinguishes them except "outside the thing itself." What seems to clash with doctrines Leibniz held at a later stage would be formulated in the language of this dialogue as the claim that there are distinct individuals who vary solo numero, i.e., who are alike with respect to intrinsic properties but differ with respect to some extrinsic properties. Consider the following typical passage from the *New Essays*: "If two individuals were perfectly similar and equal and (in a word) indistinguishable in themselves, there would be no principle of individuation. I would even venture to say that on that condition there would be no individual distinction, no separate individuals. This is why the concept of atoms is chimerical and arises only from men's incomplete conceptions. For if there were atoms, i.e., perfectly hard and perfectly unalterable bodies, i.e., incapable of internal change, being able to differ from one another only in size and in shape, it is obvious that since they could have the same size and shape in that case they would be indistinguishable in themselves and discernible only by means of external denominations without an internal foundation—which is contrary to the greatest principles of reason" (NE 230–31).

116. For a discussion of Leibniz's point here, see section 5 of the Introduction and notes 111–18 of the *Confessio.*

117. Leibniz here employed a standard example of ill-conceived wishing: a peasant who would be a king. See, for example, Aquinas's remarks in *De Malo* Q5, a.3, Response, where he claimed that only a peasant with a disordered will would grieve that he had not inherited a kingdom.

118. Consider the following passage from DM 30: "Whence comes it that this man will assuredly commit this sin? The answer is easy: it is that otherwise it would not be this man." This passage, and others like it, suggests that Leibniz held that each property of each individual is such that had that individual lacked that property, that individual would not have existed in the first place. Here and elsewhere Leibniz appears to have employed this doctrine for a theodician purpose. Thus, at A VI.iv:1639, the critic asks why God did not give him more strength to resist temptation. Leibniz responded that had God done that then he would not have created the critic, but rather someone else. So the critic has no grounds for complaint.

In the present context, Leibniz argued for a somewhat more limited conclusion—that you and I have no grounds for complaining about God's permitting the sinners Adam and Eve to exist, since otherwise we would not exist. Here Leibniz reached his conclusion from a supposition less sweeping and, hence, more plausible than the one employed in DM 30 and A VI.iv:1639. On this score, see Robert

Adams's insightful article "Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil," in his *The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

4. The Author of Sin

1. L H I 3, 5 Bl 25. The editors of the Akademie edition indicate that this piece may have been part of a larger work, which has not been found.

2. In *De potentia* Q3, a.6, ad 20, Aquinas considered the objection that if God operates as a first cause with respect to a creature's will, then the defects (sins included) of our voluntary actions must be ascribed to God. His answer: "In a sinful action, whatever there is of entity . . . is reduced to God as its first cause, but what there is of deformity is reduced to [creaturely] free choice as its cause." In S.T. Ia IIae Q79, a.2, ad 2 he elaborated on this account, claiming that in the case of a sinful act the creature whose act it is causally contributes to the obtaining of both the act that is sinful and its sinfulness, but not so God. Aquinas concluded, "Man is the cause of sin. But God is a cause of the act in such a manner that he is in no way the cause of the defect accompanying the act; and hence, he is not the cause of sin." This is the sort of account that is Leibniz's target in this essay.

3. What is here termed the physical aspect of sin appears to consist in all the natural properties of the sinful act.

4. Note the strong language Leibniz employed in ridiculing the "anomie" account here and in section 18 of "On the Omniscience and Omnipotence of God and the Freedom of Man." The language and the criticism are exceedingly close to those offered by Hobbes in section 22 of chapter 46 of the Latin version of *Leviathan.* Sin, in itself, is anomie, i.e., the failure of some act to be in accord with some relevant law; this failure is a negation and "not a deed or any sort of action." Hobbes formulated the way this thought is supposed to work and his criticism of it, as follows: "Recognizing . . . that God is the cause of every act and every law, they deny that He is the cause of the inconsistency, as if someone were to say when he drew two lines, one straight and the other curved, that he made both of them but that someone else made their lack of congruity" (*Leviathan,* ed. Edwin Curley [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994], pp. 475–76).

5. The claim that if the anomie account frees God of culpability it ought to do the same for us is also formulated in section 18 of "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man."

6. Ridicule is not Leibniz's last word on the framework on which the anomie theory rests. In the *Confessio,* Leibniz aimed for a revision that achieved the desired result, namely, that in sins, God is not culpable, we are. In an important essay entitled "Concerning Freedom, Fate, and the Grace of God" (1686–87) Leibniz wrote: "It seems illusory to say that God concurs in the matter of sin but not in the formal aspect, which is a privation or anomie. But it must be known that this response is more solid than it seems at first glance, for every privation consists in im-

perfection and imperfection in limitation" (A VI.iv:1605). This passage applies the conceptual tools of Leibniz's ultimate solution to the problem of the author of sin. See *Theodicy* and Commentary on Burnet 14e, 56b, and 56d.

5. Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom

1. LH IV 4, 3 Bl 12–14. The Akademie edition precedes its presentation of this piece with the following note: "We place in italics [here underlined] the contributions to the conversation that may be attributed to Steno." I follow the lead of the Akademie edition by underlining the relevant passages of the translation. But the editors are aware that there are problems involved in making such attributions in some cases. I believe their intent was to start a scholarly dialogue on the matter; my aim in some of the annotations that follow is to make a contribution to that dialogue.

Leibniz wrote this piece as a record of an exchange between himself and Steno. There is no notation in the handwritten original to indicate when Leibniz is speaking in his own voice and when he is recording material to be attributed to Steno. Still, there are places where it is obvious, e.g., A VI.iv:1376: "You reply, It is impossible. I ask, Why? You say, Because it is contrary to justice." Unfortunately, there are also places where it is not at all obvious (to me, anyway), where the matter becomes quite subtle—it may well distort Leibniz's intentions to suppose that full attribution to Steno or full attribution to Leibniz is appropriate. In my view, the material at A VI.iv:1377, as well as other passages in this piece, resist straightforward attribution to either Steno or Leibniz. See note 8 for comments on the lines just mentioned—a particularly difficult case.

2. See *Confessio,* note 25.

3. That the sufficient reason for the series of things constituting the world must be outside the world is where Leibniz began his well-known paper "On the Ultimate Origin of Things" (Gvii:302–3 [AG 149–50]).

4. I am not fully persuaded that we need to attribute this paragraph to Steno. It puts forward a familiar point directed against a Molinist conception of freedom, according to which determination of the will by reason is inconsistent with freedom. The point is that God's will is always determined by the divine reason and yet God manifests freedom in its most perfect form. See, for example, "On Free Choice."

5. Leibniz utilized consideration of the state of affairs consisting in all the impious being saved and all the pious being damned for various purposes. In notes appended to a letter from Arnold Eckhard of May 1677 (A II.i:352, n.78), Leibniz wrote that if justice and goodness were to depend on the will of God then the state of affairs mentioned would be possible. In the present passage Leibniz was making the point that this state of affairs is per se possible, although it is not consistent with a necessary feature of God. See the discussion of the per se modalities in the Introduction. For other passages where the example is employed for this or related purposes, see A VI.iv:1378 and also A VI.iii:581 (DSR 105), Grua 336, 342, 351, and 360; A VI.iv:1453; T 282; and A VI.iii:463–64 (DSR 7).

6. One can easily imagine that Leibniz was reacting to a criticism of Steno's that something Leibniz said was incompatible with something Augustine wrote. In matters of providence, grace, and freedom practically all seventeenth-century Christian writers claimed that their views were those of Augustine. Leibniz may have been recommending that he and Steno concentrate on determining the truth in these matters rather than attempt to figure out Augustine's views since the former is more easily discovered than the latter.

7. Leibniz made essentially the same comment to Clarke; see Leibniz's fifth reply to Clarke, paragraphs 55 through 58 (LC, Gvii. 404–5).

8. This paragraph raises a delicate problem of interpretation. In whose voice was Leibniz speaking here? Absent the last sentence in the paragraph, it might well be taken for a statement of heretical theses alleged by Steno to be consequences of Leibniz's position. I tentatively recommend the following reading. Here Leibniz wrote down a string of sentences, whose acceptance Steno probably took to verge on heresy. Then, beginning with the last sentence of this paragraph and continuing through A VI.iv:1378, Leibniz set out to demonstrate that we can interpret all those sentences so that they turn out to be not only not heretical but, in fact, true.

9. Perhaps Leibniz intended to characterize the meaning of *absolute impossibility* here, in which case the editor's *aliter* (to be otherwise) need not be added.

10. The meaning of this sentence is not transparent, but the point Leibniz had in mind is made clear in the rest of the paragraph.

11. This paragraph is difficult to translate and difficult to interpret. The Latin *speculum* usually means "mirror," but it can be extended to mean "copy," "imitation," or "representation." The difficulty of interpretation arises on the issue of whether what Leibniz wrote here about the character of divine foreknowledge is consistent with what he wrote about the same topic at approximately the same time in "Middle Knowledge." There Leibniz seemed to hold that foreknowledge based on knowledge of a representation would be purely empirical and, hence, unsuited to God. Leibniz went on in "Middle Knowledge" to argue that God's foreknowledge must be based on self-knowledge of what he decreed, or, in the case of contrary-to-fact conditionals, knowledge of what he would have decreed. In the following paragraph of "Conversation with Steno," Leibniz seems to indicate that in this piece too he takes knowledge of divine decrees as involved in God's knowledge of future contingent matters. Perhaps here Leibniz was summarizing Steno's point of view, as the editors of the Akademie edition believe.

12. This is a marvelously opaque passage. What is the primary cause—ideas in the divine intellect? The state of affairs in which a certain collection of ideas is the best possible? Or God's decision that that particular collection of ideas is to be instantiated? See *Confessio,* note 82.

13. Leibniz was partial to the idea that God's will is related to the sin in his creation just as a skillful composer is related to the dissonances in a work being composed. See below; "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man," sections 3 and 18; and *Confessio,* A VI.iv:1382–83; A VI.iii:131.

14. See *Confessio,* note 92, for other pieces in which Leibniz expressed views close to those expressed here.

15. See *Confessio,* A VI.iii:142–43. I see no reason to attribute this material to Steno.

16. See *Confessio,* A VI.iii:136.

17. This is from Virgil's *Aeneid,* VI, 376.

18. This is a careful formulation of the principle of sufficient reason.

19. See *Confessio,* note 73.

20. The phrase "by later scholastics" (*a scholasticis posterioribus*) replaced the expression "by the Molinists" (*a Molinistis*). But it is Molina's conception of freedom that is the target here.

21. Notice that here Leibniz was prepared to admit that freedom involves the ability to act, or not act, all the *external* requisites for acting having been posited. This doctrine is put forward at *Confessio,* A VI.iii:133. It is natural to raise the following objection. Given the rigorous causal determinism apparently put forth by Leibniz in these essays, it would seem that the *internal* requisites for an action are causally determined by the external requisites. Hence, if a person has the ability to act or not act in a given case, all the external requisites having been posited, the same must hold true of *all* the requisites—the internal as well as the external—since the internal are determined by the external. Hence, according to this objection, the characterization of freedom Leibniz was prepared to accept here reduces to Molina's conception.

In responding on Leibniz's behalf to this objection it is natural to appeal to his commitment to the principle of spontaneity; namely, that each nonmiraculous state of a created substance (with the exception of its original state) has as its real cause some predecessor state of that very substance. For a careful statement of the principle of spontaneity, see LA 91–92; for statements of Leibniz's claim that his principle of spontaneity provides a foundation for freedom see a letter to Masham (Giii:364) and also a letter to Jaquelot (Giii:471), where Leibniz wrote of his own system: "I believe that there is no system in which true freedom, i.e., spontaneity with choice and independence of the soul from everything else except God, appears to greater advantage."

So according to this response, when Leibniz drew a distinction between external and internal requisites of some action of some substance, he was speaking loosely; according to his theory of spontaneity, all the nonmiraculous actions of a substance—except for its first action—are the result of internal requisites.

To this reply we can imagine the following retort. Granted that Leibniz's principle of spontaneity precludes intersubstantial causal relations among created substances, nonetheless, his thesis of the preestablished harmony ensures a relation of dependence of a created agent on its external environment adequate to support a revised version of the original objection, according to which once the external requisites are set, so are the internal requisites. In fact, in an important paper written in 1689–90 Leibniz considered this retort, i.e., the claim that the internal dispositions of the mind arise from impressions on the body and other external factors. He wrote there, "I concede this concerning some present dispositions of the mind, but not all.

For there are certain primitive dispositions in the mind that do not arise from anything external. Therefore we must say that minds in and of themselves differ one from another in consequence of their primitive natures. . . . The root of freedom is in these primitive dispositions" (A VI.iv:1639).

Leibniz made the same point in a letter to Thomas Burnett in 1695 in which he wrote, "Our primitive determinations do not come from outside . . . ; there is a difference among human souls taken in themselves, whereas most people suppose that their differences arise only from the body" (A I.xii:178).

It is worth considering whether this thesis is consistent with the theses concerning the individuation of souls expressed in the *Confessio.* See *Confessio,* notes 111–18.

22. J. C. Scaliger, *De causis linguae latinae* book 12 (Lyons, 1540).

23. J. C. Scaliger, *Exotericarum exercitationum* book 15: *De subtilitate, ad Hieronymum Cardanum* (Paris, 1557).

24. The doctrine that the future is necessitated in whatever way the past is was a staple of Leibniz's philosophy.

25. Note that here Leibniz apparently presupposed that per se contingency is required for freedom. See *Confessio,* note 76.

26. The text of the first sentence of this paragraph begins *Ex complexis*; the text of the next paragraph begins *Ex terminis incomplexis.* I have translated *complexis* as "propositions" and *terminis incomplexis* as "nonpropositional entities." It would be natural to translate *terminis incomplexis* as "concepts," except that God is not a concept, according to Leibniz.

27. The material beginning with this paragraph and running through the paragraph that begins "The same conclusion follows if" presents difficulties of interpretation. At a first reading it seems unlike what we might expect from Leibniz. For example, the expression *praedeterminatio physica* (translated as "physical predetermination") was a term of art used by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers to refer to an aspect of the neo-Thomist account of God's influence on the creaturely will in free choice. Indeed, *praedeterminatio physica* was used to refer to exactly what Leibniz claimed we could do without in the following passage from the *Theodicy.* "Thus we have no need to resort, in the company of some new Thomists, to a new immediate predetermination by God (une predetermination nouvelle immediate)" [T 47]. It is likely that Leibniz had his own reading of the notion of physical predetermination; such a reading is offered in Commentary on Burnet 56C.

28. Leibniz frequently criticized the idea that God foresees what a creature would freely do without divine concurrence and decides whether to concur or not. See, for example, A VI.iv:1458 and A VI.iv:1790. But if we distinguish between God's general concurrence, without which no creaturely action ensues, and God's special concurrence, grace, without which no action would have supernatural merit, then it appears to make sense to suppose that God foresees what a creature would freely do, given general concurrence but lacking special concurrence, and uses that information to decide whether to dispense grace. Leibniz was well aware of this point: see DM 31.

29. This paragraph is crucial for anyone interested in understanding Leibniz's

account of concurrence. Concurrence matters in Leibniz's philosophy; there is little chance of understanding his theory of action without comprehending his account of concurrence. The argument of this paragraph is remarkably similar to an argument employed, e.g., by Durandus (William Durandus, *In sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi,* dist. 1, 9.5) *against* the doctrine of concurrence—the doctrine that numerically one and the same action is an action of God and creature—the product of effort by each. The idea of the argument *against* concurrence is this: the thesis concerning God's causal contribution to each creaturely action implied by concurrence, joined with basic truths about God and creature, has as a consequence that in the end only God really makes a genuine causal contribution to creaturely actions and thus, we are led to occasionalism. Clearly, Leibniz rejected occasionalism and accepted concurrence. I leave to others the project of providing an adequate account of what is going on here. For probing remarks on the problems involved, see Robert Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 94–99.

30. The clause "as far as the substance of the act is concerned⟨—in other words, with respect to what is positive in the thing⟩" seems to invoke the very doctrine Leibniz treated with derision in "The Author of Sin." See *Confessio,* note 31. The last sentence of this paragraph refers to St. Paul's doctrine, expressed in Philippians 2:13: "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to do, of His good pleasure."

31. "Conservation is the same as continued creation" is one of numerous slogans affirmed by most seventeenth-century Christian philosophers whose propositional content varied significantly from one philosopher to the next. Like others, Leibniz accepted the phrase and then set out in various texts to clarify what he meant by it. A satisfactory scholarly account of Leibniz's theory of divine conservation is much to be desired.

32. This same affirmation occurs in the letter to Wedderkopf, A II.i:118. The question is how Leibniz understood the claim that some state of affairs is absolutely evil. I suspect that what he meant has this consequence: a state of affairs *p* is absolutely evil only if *p*'s obtaining entails that the possible world that is actual is not the best possible. Given this reading, it is an easy consequence of Leibniz's thesis that the world that is actual is the best possible, that no state of affairs that obtains is absolutely evil.

33. This is a rather full statement of the analogy discussed in note 13. It spotlights a problem concerning God's concurrence in sin that I claim in the Introduction is not resolved to Leibniz's lasting satisfaction in the essays included in this volume. Consider what Leibniz wrote here concerning the composer who includes dissonances in his musical score—dissonances marvelously resolved in order to create a satisfying whole. According to Leibniz, we may say that the composer is the author of the dissonances per accidens, that he permits them rather than wills them. Yet the composer cannot claim—except, perhaps, metaphorically—that the dissonant notes "wrote themselves." He wrote them, even if with a worthy goal in mind. Still, he is causally responsible for those notes being in that score. In his ma-

turity Leibniz attempted to craft a theory of concurrence one consequence of which is that God is not causally related to sin in the way the composer is related to the dissonant notes.

6. Middle Knowledge

1. L H IV 4, 3 Bl 15.

2. Leibniz identified Pedro da Fonseca (1528–99, "the Portuguese Aristotle") and his student Luis de Molina (1535–1600) as the originators of the idea of middle knowledge. The two wrote and debated during the Hispanic revival of scholasticism, one of the most active and creative periods in the history of philosophical theology. Others active in the period include Domincus Bañez (1528–1604), Francicus Toletus (1532–96), Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621), Francisco Suarez (1548–1617), Gabriel Vaszquez (1549–1604, "the Spanish Augustine"), and Diego Alvarez (1550–1635), all of whom are cited by Leibniz in various works.

Fonseca and Molina thought that in a proper account of creaturely free choice one needed to recognize a category of divine knowledge called middle knowledge that differed from God's knowledge of necessary truths and his knowledge of the logical and causal consequences of his own volitions. Roughly their idea is this: if a creaturely choice occurs as a logical or causal consequence of a divine volition, with respect to either the natural order or the supernatural order, then that choice is not free. Hence, God's knowledge of necessary truths plus his knowledge of his own volitions and their logical and causal consequences is not adequate as a basis for his knowledge of creaturely free choices. But, of course, God is omniscient; hence, God knows what creatures would freely choose to do in various circumstances because of a so-called supercomprehension of the created will: middle knowledge.

It was commonplace in Leibniz's time for opponents of Molinism to attack this position on three grounds, claiming first that the notion of freedom attributed to creatures is inconsistent with a proper account of divine providence; second, that the notion of freedom attributed to creatures is mistaken; and third, that if the notion of freedom attributed to creatures were correct, then God would not be omniscient, i.e., "middle knowledge" is the name of a problem that has no solution. On occasion Leibniz seemed to accept the third criticism—see, for example, "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man," section 19, *Theodicy* 41, and Gvi:434 (Huggard 439–40). I am inclined to think that Leibniz's settled view was that this criticism is a failure—see T 42 and 364. For a discussion of the matter, see my "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge," *Faith and Philosophy* 11, no. 4 (1994): 547–71.

Leibniz sometimes employed the first objection to Molinism (see "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God"), but his main objection is the second, i.e., the notion of freedom it attributes to creatures is mistaken because it is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient reason.

3. This thesis occurs with some frequency in Leibniz's discussion of divine knowledge. The idea is that God's knowledge is perfect both with respect to its extent, i.e., God is omniscient, and with respect to its nature, i.e., God's knowledge is certain, infallible, and a priori. (See, for example, Causa Dei 13, A VI.iv:2309 and 2317–19, and A VI.iv:1516 [PW 97].) There is a particularly full treatment at A VI.iv:1658 (AG 97), where Leibniz wrote, "Contingent truths . . . are subject to the knowledge of God; they are known by Him . . . by some infallible vision. But this vision that God has must not be thought of as a kind of experiential knowledge, as though he sees something in things distinct from himself, but rather as a priori knowledge, based on the reasons for truths, inasmuch as he sees things within himself, possibles through a consideration of his own nature, and existing things through the additional consideration of his free will and his decrees."

4. This is Leibniz's standard line: since the principle of sufficient reason holds, the Molinist conception of creaturely freedom is mistaken. Hence, there is no need to postulate middle knowledge.

5. This sentence is difficult to translate and interpret; it is no surprise, of course, that these two difficulties often go together. The Latin *Petrinitate* and *Paulinitate* are obviously coined terms, so I coined terms to translate them. Perhaps "the nature (or essence, or haecceity) of Peter" (similarly for Paul) would do as well.

6. To the best of my knowledge, Leibniz's most forthright piece on God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom is his reading notes of William de Twisse's *Scientia media* (1639): "Very often, future conditionals are senseless things. Thus, if I ask what would have happened if Peter had not denied Christ, I am asking what would happen if Peter were not Peter, for denying is contained in the complete concept of Peter. Nevertheless it is excusable that, on this occasion, by the name Peter is understood what is involved in those things [attributes of Peter] from which the denial does not follow, and at the same time there is subtracted from the entire universe all those things *from which it does follow.* And then sometimes it can happen that a decision follows per se from the remaining things posited in the universe. But sometimes it does not follow unless a new divine decree occurs based on the rule of the best. If there is no natural chain or succession from the remaining things posited, then it is not possible to know what will happen except on the basis of a decree of God in accord with what is best. Therefore, the matter depends either on the series of causes or on a decree of the divine will. They do not seem to gain anything at all by means of middle knowledge" (Grua 358). There is also useful material in Commentary on Burnet: see especially 47b and 49a. The words in italics, "from which it does follow," are offered in place of the original *ex quibus non sequitur.* You don't need to know much Latin to have reservations about my translation. I am supposing that Leibniz miswrote and that his intention is captured by my translation.

7. Leibniz closed the text by noting some of his sources: Duns Scotus, *Quaesitiones in lib.1. sententiarum,* dist. 39, q.5, n.23; G. Vaszquez, *Commentoriorum ac*

disputationum in primam secundae S. Thomae; and F. Macedo, *Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae, et. Scoti, cum differentiis inter utrumque.*

7. On Free Choice

1. L H I 3, 5 Bl 23–24.

2. See the discussion of antecedent and consequent will in section 4 of the Introduction.

3. Consider the following from page 175 of *New Essays:* "The freedom to will is . . . understood in two different senses: one of them stands in contrast with the imperfection or bondage of the mind, which is an imposition or constraint, although an inner one like that which the passions impose; and the other sense is employed when freedom is contrasted with necessity." Leibniz went on in this passage to identify *le franc arbitre* (free choice) with the second of the senses. But we should note that in this essay, and in some other essays in this volume, Leibniz did not claim that a lack of necessity is required for freedom. See *Confessio,* note 76, and, by way of contrast, "Conversation with Steno," note 25.

4. For other passages in this volume to the same effect, see *Confessio,* A VI.iii:135, the letter to Wedderkopf, A II.i:117, and "On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man," section 19. For a careful statement of Leibniz's mature view on this subject, see NE 182, where Leibniz took note of the fact that "by our voluntary actions we often indirectly prepare the way for other voluntary actions."

5. In his mature works Leibniz often contrasted a sense of "indifference" in which indifference is required for freedom with what he termed "indifference of equipoise," or "indifference of equilibrium," which is not required for freedom and which does not obtain. See, for example, Commentary on Burnet 34c and 42a. Consider the following typical passage from *Theodicy* 302: "The scholastics demand yet a third [condition for freedom, in addition to spontaneity and intelligence], which they call indifference. And, indeed, indifference must be admitted, if indifference means the same as contingency; for I have already stated here that freedom must exclude a necessity that is absolute and metaphysical or logical. But as I have already explained more than once, this indifference, this contingency, this nonnecessity, . . . which is a characteristic attribute of freedom, does not prevent one from having stronger inclinations toward the course chosen, and it does not require in any way that one be absolutely and equally indifferent toward the two opposing courses." In the next paragraph Leibniz termed this last variety of indifference "indifference of equilibrium." This notion may strike the reader as significantly different from a notion of indifference that amounts to a lack of causal necessitation with respect to the relevant choice. On this matter, see *Confessio,* note 73.

6. A standard objection to Molina's account of freedom is that the indifference it requires for free choice is not found in God or the elect, confirmed in the good.

Yet surely, so the objection goes, freedom is found in its most perfect form in God. See, for example, Dominicus Bañez's early criticism of Molina's account of freedom in "Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter moventis humanam voluntatem," in *Commentarios inedites a la prima secundae de Santo Tomas,* ed. V. B. de Heredia (Madrid, 1948), pp. 351–420; see especially 364–66. Francisco Suarez defended the Molinist account of created free choice, arguing that since there can be no reduction from potency to act in the case of divine actions, there can be no efficient causality with respect to the divine will. Hence, the notions of indifference that characterize, respectively, divine and human free acts, are of necessity so diverse that different notions of freedom are to be expected. See *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965, a reprint of volumes 25 and 26 of Carolo Berton's edition of Suarez's *Opera Omnia* [Paris, 1866]), disputation 19, section 4, number 7.

8. On the Necessity of Choosing the Best

1. L H IV 4, 3 Bl 16.

2. The topic of God's freedom in choosing the best concerned Leibniz throughout his career.

9. A Demonstration That God Understands All Possibles

1. L H IV 4, 3 Bl 17.

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